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VIRTUAL MOTHERS AND THE MEANING OF PARENTHOOD
Annette Ruth Appell*
Professor Appell supports the use of the traditional parental rights doctrine, which
accords biological parents, particularly mothers, parental status alienable only
voluntarily or upon proof of unfitness. She defends the doctrine against the criti-
cisms that it is regressive and does not protect the interests of children or de facto
parents. She contends that the attacks on traditional parental rights doctrine are
misguided because they work to the disadvantage offamilies who do not easily fit the
dominant norm-minority, single-mother, lower income, or politically and legally
under-represented families. After examining the constitutional underpinnings and
application of the parental rights doctrine as well as proposals to change it, she con-
cludes that the doctrine provides more concrete standards than any alternative and
serves to protect those families most vulnerable to intervention or dissolution.
"What she called the nastiness of life was the shock she re-
ceived upon learning that nobody stopped playing checkers
just because the pieces included her children."'
INTRODUCTION
This Article is a cautionary tale. It presents a progressive
response to a series of progressive and not so progressive critiques
of the constitutional doctrine that supports parental rights. The
critiques range across a broad and complex spectrum. They
include critical theories that identify as socially constructed what
once seemed natural, recognition that family structures are
variable and changeable, increasingly sophisticated reproductive
technologies, unsatisfied demand for adoption, greater rights for
women, and reaction to the constitutionalization of parental rights
doctrine. The critiques denigrate the three core, interrelated
aspects of parental rights-that biological relationships are
* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. BA. 1982 Cornell University; J.D. 1986, Northwestern University School of Law. I
have represented hundreds of children and a few dozen parents and relatives in child wel-
fare and related proceedings in Chicago, Illinois, Columbia, South Carolina, and Clark
County, Nevada. These clients and their families inspire and inform my work. I am grateful
to Mary Becker, Jean Bohner, Susan Brooks, Naomi Cahn, Marty Guggenheim, Lynne Hen-
derson, Joan Howarth, Pam Mohr, Cheryl Tadin, Carl Tobias and Matthew Wright for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts, Jennifer Durcan and Kelly Horne for their research
assistance, and the James E. Rogers Faculty Enrichment Fund for research support.
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privileged, that parents determine their children's interests, and
that families are private. Many child advocates, feminists and
alternative family proponents, however, criticize those protections
as harmful to adults and children, regressively patriarchal,
heterosexist, and unduly dismissive of alternative methods of
forming families.
These diverse and critical views about the current legal con-
struction of families are not surprising, given the wide array of
family forms. Dominant societal norms perceive and value a nu-
clear family model in which an adult married heterosexual couple
bears, raises and supports their children without governmental cash
assistance. Yet these families constitute a minority of households.3
Adults and children live together through diverse arrangements,
such as adoption, kinship care, foster care, reproductive technology,
parental separation, and formation of new intimate relationships.
These families may have multiple kinds of parents. One kind is
birth parents, those who conceived and gave birth to the child.
The other is virtual parents, persons who are not necessarily bio-
logically related to the child, but whom the child and the "parent"
may view as a parent. This group of "parents" includes step-
parents, co-parents, second parents, foster parents, grandparents,
and prospective adoptive parents. Many virtual parents and their
proponents view traditional parental rights law as a barrier to the
protection of affectional relationships and have advocated new
definitions of the families and corresponding state protections for
them.
In addition, continued struggles to afford financial and legal
protections for women who rear children and who battle domestic
violence and subordination seem to demand public attention and
accountability, not deference to families. Commentators, activists,
and policy-makers challenge the value of family privacy that helps
immunize families from public scrutiny and intervention, shields
private acts of violence, and fails to mediate power imbalances
among family members. These critics contend that family privacy
reinforces oppressive gender norms that place women in the home
and in the role of mother. Family privacy also limits a woman's
2. See infra notes 287 and 416.
3. Eric Schmitt, For First Time, Nuclear Families Drop Below 25% of Households, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2001, at Al.
4. Now that a majority of all married women are in the workforce, the demographic
dominance of nuclear families with stay-at-home mothers has declined. Michael Grossberg,
Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L.
REv. 273, 296-97 (1995). Moreover, a child born in 1990 reportedly has a fifty percent
chance at having a court determine where and with whom she or he will live. Id. at 297.
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attempts to define her own life and obtain adequate support for
her child rearing and other roles. This privacy allegedly harms
everyone because it confines familial values of connection and
care-giving to women and the home, rather than expanding the
operation of these values to the public sphere where they are most
needed to temper individualism. Commentators argue that
families and feminine values should be more public and the public
should be more responsible for supporting families.
These perspectives raise important concerns, but in their haste
to dismantle parental rights doctrine, critics ignore the virtues.
The doctrine provides fairly determinate rules for establishing and
maintaining families. It presents a model for parenthood that
privileges and protects biological mother-work and those
associated with this work. The current model holds that mothers
earn parental status by gestating and birthing while fathers earn
parental status by caring for the born child or marrying the
mother. Persons who earn this status retain it, until they voluntarily
relinquish the status or prove to be unfit. Parental status entitles its
holders, rather than any other adult or entity, to make decisions
for and about their children. Parental rights doctrine prohibits
other persons and the state from usurping the parental
decisionmaking role because they are, or claim to be, superior
parents.
Regardless of how cogent the family critiques may be, many
ultimately devolve into adult disputes about what is best for
children and how families should function. The critiques proffer
more subjective, less determinate rules for intervening in, or
defining, the family. These rules would disadvantage poor and
minority families who receive greater public surveillance and less
respect as competent, functioning families. Critics ignore the self-
referential nature of assigning value to families who resemble
one's own family, but not families who are different. Moreover,
persons who possess the power to assign family value typically have
financial, political, or legal power.5 These same people generally
have, or come from, families who satisfy dominant norms (White,
marital and economically privileged) , so their families both
5. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C.S. § 7, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738C (Lexis Supp.
2001) (refusing to recognize non-heterosexual marriage); Annette R. Appell, Protecting
Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay],
48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 585 (1997) (explaining how social workers, lawyers and judges assess
families). The author includes herself, as well as many of the commentators she cites
herein, within this class of persons with some measure of financial, political and legal power.
6. See infta Section IIB.
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produce value and are valued. From this position of dominance,
commentators and decisionmakers can easily take privacy for
granted and advocate interference into "other" families. These
tendencies to devalue what is different make the critiques
particularly troubling because the legally-protected biological
nexus may be the only shield available to families who do not meet
dominant norms.
The biologically-based legal construction of parenthood is actu-
ally a progressive tool for protecting the integrity of those families
who do not easily fit dominant norms of family. This doctrine can
facilitate the interests of children and the adults who care for
them. Current constitutional protections of biologically-based
families are important safeguards for women and children who are
at risk of losing their status as family.7 Parental rights doctrine
privileges and privatizes the parent-child relationship, thus offer-
ing relatively determinate and objective standards for creation and
dissolution of families. The doctrine protects families who are
most vulnerable to intervention or dissolution.
This deference is integral to the private production of values
that constitutes a philosophical lynchpin of our constitutional
scheme. The system, however, also values private property and
promotes individualized self-interest in a way that often correlates
the degree of privacy one enjoys directly with the amount of prop-
erty one has and how well one conforms to dominant parental
norms. Thus, dismantling family privacy while leaving in place the
larger political scheme that permits autonomy-limiting income and
power disparities will effectively target poor and non-dominant
families who already must struggle to maintain their integrity.
For all of these reasons, parental rights doctrine and its critiques
warrant analysis. This Article undertakes that effort. Part I first ana-
lyzes the constitutional doctrine that defines and protects families,
locating its theoretical base and assessing theories about the effi-
cacy of parental rights doctrine. That doctrine, premised on basic
7. This Article does not rely on sociobiological theories that hold biological parents,
particularly mothers, are genetically programmed to provide the best care for their off-
spring. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 37-38 (1991); JOHN H.
BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW 81-102, 130-34 (1985). Nor does the Article rely
on other theories and studies concluding that biological parents serve children best. Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2433-36 (1995)
(describing studies). Biological relationships are extremely important to children and
adults, but the author does not base her argument on that opinion and does not believe
that protecting these biological connections necessarily dictates the particular contours of
parental rights doctrine. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implica-
tions for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 1013-20 (1995) (arguing
that the importance of biological relationships to adults and children supports open adop-
tion).
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principles of our constitutional system of government, defines par-
ent with reference to biological maternity. It grants parental status
to persons who have earned that status through child-bearing or a
nurturing relationship to the child-bearer or one's biological child.
The doctrine concomitantly protects that status by deferring to
parental governance of children.
Part II assesses major proposals to revise, directly and indirectly,
the current biologically-based definition and protection of fami-
lies. These family revision perspectives find that parental rights
doctrine confines and harms women and children while presum-
ing that parental rights doctrine is overrated and anachronistic.
The revisionist accounts would wholly or partly replace the doc-
trine with a construction of parenthood based on affectional or
state-sponsored, rather than biological, norms. The accounts
would also reduce the privacy afforded family life, so that outsiders
could more easily enter to reform or support families and so ma-
ternal values could transfer to larger society.
Part III examines the assumptions and repercussions of those
critiques. It finds that the proposed alternative family standards
frequently devolve into differences of opinion about what is best
for particular children. These disputes do not provide principled
reasons to depart from current law privileging parental assessment
of what is best for children, absent parental unfitness or consent.
This section shows that the critics may not fully appreciate how lit-
tle privacy many families now enjoy and that the proposed
alternative standards would further reduce, or disproportionately
affect, the privacy of these more public families. Although parental
rights doctrine is not perfect, it does protect people who otherwise
enjoy little privacy. Many of the critiques do not afford such pro-
tection.
I. LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILIES
Defining and regulating families is principally, though not
exclusively, a state, rather than federal, prerogative." State laws
8. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
404 (1975); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (noting, with disapproval,
that an expansive view of the Commerce Clause would permit Congress to regulate family
law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (same). Federal law, nevertheless,
governs and defines families in at least three prevalent ways: (1) constitutional protection;
(2) individual benefits (e.g., tax deduction for dependents, 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 151, 152(a)-(b)
(Lexis 2000), immigration, 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1153, 1157 (Lexis 1997 & Supp. 2001), Social
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govern family issues, but the U.S. Constitution provides parameters
that limit the states' ability to define and regulate family rights and
obligations. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly refer to
families. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
interpreted the document to protect the integrity of certain
families-mostly those related through biology or marriage. 9 The
Court has protected families on a number of doctrinal grounds,
including substantive and procedural due process, equal
protection, and freedom of religion.'0 Regardless of the precise
constitutional source, the Court's decisions hold that the family
relationship is so fundamental that government intervention must
be circumscribed." This limited intervention into family
relationships (generally parent-child relationships) can be
characterized as "family privacy."12 "Parental rights doctrine" refers
Security Survivors Benefits, 42 U.S.C.S. § 402 (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2001)); and (3) benefits
to states that treat families according to federal dictates (e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 620-29 & 670-79 (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2001); Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 601. (Lexis 2001); Child Support
Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 228 (Lexis 1993 & Supp. 2001)); see also Jill Elaine Hasday,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297 (1998) (offering critical
analyses of the view that domestic relations are purely local, and exposing the race-based
origins and themes of local control over domestic relations); Judith Resnik, "Naturally"
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721-29
(1991) (listing federal laws that define, govern and affect families).
9. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); M.L.B. v. S.L.J, 519 U.S. 102
(1996); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Quality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also
PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997);
Hasday, supra note 8, at 1324-57 (illustrating the connection between the 13th and 14th
Amendments and the right to family integrity).
10. E.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 394 (equal protection); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (religious
freedom); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (procedural due process); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (sub-
stantive due process).
11. See Troxe4 530 U.S. at 57; see also David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53
VAND. L. REv. 527 (2000) (describing the Court's varied levels of review for infringements of
these fundamental rights). Although the importance of families circumscribes governmen-
tal intervention, families are apparently not important enough to oblige the government to
support them or choices about them. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (declining to
hold that the government must provide abortion funding for women who cannot afford
medical care); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state cap on depend-
ent child welfare benefits). Professor Robin West discusses more progressive notions of
liberty than freedom from intervention, including governmental obligation to promote the
material conditions for exercise of liberty. Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373 (1991).
12. The following subsections demonstrate that adult-adult relationships differ from
parent-child relationships, so family privacy in the context of parental rights doctrine pro-
tects parental decision-making regarding the child (including the decision to have relatives
assist in or provide total care for the child). Family privacy also protects decisions about
[VOL. 34:4
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to the fuller doctrine that defines parents and limits intervention
into the family.
The historical context, is  doctrinal development or even
doctrinal coherence of this constitutional protection are not of
concern here. 14 Instead, the analytic coherence of privileging
family relationships within both the context of liberal philosophy'5
and the repercussions for mothers and children of abandoning
this privilege is assessed. Moreover, the present examination of the
marriage and procreation, however, states should not decline to intervene on behalf of
adults just because they are married.
13. See Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 349 (1989) (discussing the irrelevance and impossibil-
ity of determining original intent); Sylvia Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REv.
583 (1987) (arguing that original intent is both indeterminate and anachronistic in the
context of women and family).
14. I am aware of the anti-communist hysteria that drove the Meyer and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) decisions. E.g.,Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy Roberts, A Feminist
Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal
Theory, 84 Ky. L.J. 1197, 1200-1207 (1995-96); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good
Society, 69 FORD. L. REv. 1901, 1903 (2001); see, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995
(1992), (discussing the ethnocentrism of constitutional family doctrine based on Anglo-
American middle-class nuclear family structures, and the limitations of liberal legal phi-
losophy). I do not take on any of those issues here. I am concerned instead with the benefits
of this apparently archaic, biologically-based legal construction of parenthood to people
who need its protection most.
15. This Article presumes that liberal philosophy is the predominate theoretical basis
for the United States form of government, or at least that it provides the predominate
theme explaining personal liberties doctrine. See Anita Allen, Social Contract Theory in Ameri-
can Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REv. 1, 1-10 (1999) (rehearsing views of the role of liberal social
contract theory in early American political thought and subsequent legal doctrine); Robin
West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 61 (1990) (claiming that the Constitu-
tional drafters largely rejected republicanism); see also Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IowA L. REv. 1319, 1325 (1987) (claiming
"[a]ll right-thinking Americans of the founding era were professing republicans[,]" but
noting republicanism then was a broad term unified by a theme of public governance);
Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: the Career of a Concept, 79J. AM. HIST. 11, 38 (1992) (claim-
ing that in early national history, it appears that there was no clear understanding of the
meaning of republican, and quoting John Adams' declaration that the term is "unintelligi-
ble"). See generally THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 28-127
(1988) (showing that Lockean philosophy dominated early Constitutional theory). Cf JYLJ.
JOSEPHSON, GENDER, FAMILIES, AND STATE: CHILD SUPPORT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(1997) (noting that multiple political theories produced the United States political system,
though two themes predominate-protection of individual rights and democratic rule);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 6 (1996) (claiming that while republican-
ism dominated in early national history and while liberalism dominates now, both have
always been present);James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republican-
ism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1987) (noting that
Christianity, republicanism and Lockean liberalism informed revolutionary and early na-
tional ideology); David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 817-18, 842-47 (1986) (describing early constitutional theory as liberal
republican).
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privileged family concerns the parent-child relationship, rather
than intimate unions between adults. These adult unions are
addressed insofar as they relate to, or contrast with, parent-child
relationships.
To explore parenthood's meaning and privileges, this part of
the Article addresses four issues. First, it reviews what a parent is-
how the parent-child relationship is defined. Second, it considers
the privileges that flow from this definition and attach to that rela-
tionship, and who exercises those privileges. Third, it examines the
limits of these privileges and when the state can interfere with or
reform the parent-child relationship. Fourth, it explores why this
relationship receives special constitutional protection. These four
aspects of parenthood specifically reveal that parental rights doc-
trine presents a unique form of privacy, that motherhood is the
dominant theme of parenthood, and that the definition and pro-
tection of the parent-child relationship is deeply rooted in
constitutional theory.
A. Defining Parents
The notion of families during the formative periods of the
United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, contemplated a patriarchal house-
hold in which the father presided over and controlled his wife and
their children.16 The Supreme Court, in a series of cases defining
parental rights to custody and control of children, continues to
define families along these traditional lines, primarily recognizing
families created through birth and marriage. This doctrine's de-
velopment, however, in the context of parent-child relationships,
has defined the family in matrifocal terms. That is, parenthood, as
protected by the Constitution, is understood in relation to the
16. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 4-9 (1985); MARY ANN MASON,
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 1-83 (1994). See also Law, supra note 13,
at 589-93; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2122-24 (1996). The household may also have included child apprentices or
indentured servants. MASON, supra, at 30-39. In the antebellum South, the (white) patri-
arch's household power and control extended to slaves as well. Hasday, supra note 8, at nn.
119, 120 & 147. Nevertheless, the actual experiences of many women and families did not
entirely fit this patriarchal model. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA (2000)
(describing marital separations in the 19th and early 20th centuries); MASON, supra, at 50-
83 (describing rise in maternal rights in the 19th century); Law, supra note 13, at 594-605
(describing 18th and 19th century family life).
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mother and incorporates the two female maternal aspects of
childbearing: genetic contribution and nurturing.
The Court's jurisprudence presents childbearing as the parental
paradigm and the mother as the anchor. It does so in three ways.
First, the Supreme Court presumes that the woman who gave birth
("biological" mother) 1 7 is a parent, regardless of marriage or any
proof that she has cared for her child after birth or made legal
declarations of parenthood. A woman establishes parenthood byis
carrying the fetus to term. Although the Court has yet to review
competing claims of women to the same child, it has not placed
even long-term foster mothers on par with biological mothers.'9 Yet
the Court took the extraordinary step of extending procedural due
process protections to a mother whom a trial court judged to be
unfit. The Court held that the mother's legal relationship to her
children was so fundamental that the state must waive costs of her
appeal even when the action was brought by a private party, her ex-
husband.21
Second, constitutional family privacy doctrine defines the non-
maternal parent, the "father," in relation to the mother. A father is
someone who has either (a) acted like a mother by contributing a
gamete and nurturing the child ("biological" or "birth" father)2 2 or
17. When gestational and genetic relations are split, the biological mother is referred
to as the "gestational mother" and the "genetic mother." The Court has not yet faced the
question of a gestational mother who is not genetically related to the child. This Article
does not address issue here, although it will surely arise eventually. R. Alta Charo, And Baby
Makes Three-or Four or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family After the Rsprotech Revolution, 15 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 243 (2000); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-
Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 316-18.
18. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) ("The mother carries and bears
the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.") (quoting Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (both denying equal gender
protection challenges to citizenship rules that treat as United States citizens children born
to female United States citizens, but require non-marital biological fathers to take addi-
tional steps to establish paternity).
19. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Quality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
20. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (ruling that indigent mother was entitled to
free transcripts in a civil appeal from an adoption court order terminating her parental
rights).
21. Id. at 124. M.L.B. involved a private dispute between divorced parents regarding
stepmother adoption of the noncustodial mother's children. The state's role was purely
judicial. Id. Fifteen years earlier, though, the Court refused to recognize a per se right to
legal representation for indigent parents when the state itself petitions to terminate their
parental status. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
22. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 (ruling that the father was "fully comparable to ...
mother"); Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Quality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding the fact that foster parents nurtured the
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(b) been married to the mother at the time of conception ("legal"
father).2 For example, the Court held that the man in Stanley v.
Illinois who was not married to the children's mother but who had
cared for, and lived With, the children for most of eighteen years,
was a father and, therefore, entitled to a hearing before the state14
could remove the children from his care. Similarly, in Caban v.
Mohammed, the biological father lived with the mother during con-
ception, after conception and during the birth of his children and
then continued to visit them after their mother remarried. The
Court held that the biological father had a relationship with his
children "fully comparable to that of the mother" and could not
25be deprived of that relationship without a hearing or his consent.
In contrast, the Court refused to grant parental status to bio-
logical fathers who have merely contributed a gamete, but have
not provided significant care for the child or wed the mother. In
Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court held that an unwed biological father,
who never lived with the mother or the child, and provided only
sporadic support, and never legally claimed the child as his had no
parental rights. He was, therefore, powerless to stop his eleven-
year-old child's adoption by the mother's husband.2 6 Similarly, in
Lehr v. Robertson, the Court held that a biological father who lived
with the mother prior to the child's birth, visited her in the hospi-
tal when the child was born, but who did not live with or support
the mother or child after birth, had no parental right to bar the
mother's new husband from adopting the child.27 Instead, the bio-
logical relationship merely "offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring.... If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of
child is not sufficient to establish a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship,
although acknowledging that procedural due process might attach).
23. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality upholding rights of a
man who was married to the mother at the time of conception and birth to the exclusion of
the biological father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (requiring a non-marital
father to take certain steps to assert his paternity in order to assert parental rights); Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (permitting stepparent adoption over the objection of non-
marital birth father). This protection may, in fact, be related more to the ideological pri-
macy of the monogamous, heterosexual marital relationship, and the sexual control of
women and the preservation of patriarchal control over the family. As an analytic matter,
this protection also derives from the husband's legal relationship and commitment to the
mother, which signifies mutual support (although that support may not exist in fact).
24. 405 U.S. at 658-59.
25. 441 U.S. 389.
26. 434 U.S. at 247-50.
27. 463 U.S. at 251-52.
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where the child's best interests lie. Nevertheless, it is possible
that this unique, inchoate opportunity will not override the rights
of the man married to the mother.2 9 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a
plurality of the Court held that the man who was married to the
mother at the time of conception and birth has a superior paternal
claim to that of the biological father despite the fact that he had
maintained a relationship with the child, that included living with
her and her mother for short periods of time.30 A majority of the
Court, however, would have recognized at least a right of the bio-
logical father to visit the child.3 '
Third, parent-child-like relationships that are based only on nur-
ture, not biology and nurture (including a nurturing relationship
to the biological mother), are insufficient to establish legal par-
enthood over the claims of fit, legal parents who have not agreed,
i.e., legally consented, to the formation of the relationship. For
example, the Court has recognized that deep and enduring par-
ent-child-like relationships may arise with no biological
connections, but it has not given those relationships the same
status as birth relations.3 Indeed, the Court held in Santosky v.
Kramer, that the state has no interest in reforming families, until or
unless the biological parents have been proven unfit. The Court's
reluctance to grant certiorari to adoptive parents whose adoptions
28. Id. at 262.
29. See, e.g. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 132-136 (concurring opinion by Justice Stevens for reasons that the biologi-
cal father's right to visit his daughter was properly denied based on the best interests of the
child); id. at 142-145 (dissenting opinion by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
arguing that the biological father here established a parent-child relationship worthy of
protection); id. at 159-163 (dissenting opinion by Justice White, arguing that the biological
father should have the opportunity to prove paternity, despite the mother's marriage to
another man).
32. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994 (1994); DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301
(1993); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (child's relationship with foster
parents is subordinate to child's relationship with fit biological parents); Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Quality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents do not have lib-
erty interest equal to biological parents).
33. See Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 844-847 (recognizing importance of relation-
ships between foster parents and children, but declining to give them equal status to birth
relations). Although Org. of Foster Families distinguishes relationships that "have their origins
in an arrangement in which the State has been partner from the outset," the Court did
suggest that adoption might deserve equal legal status to biological parenthood. Id. at 844-
45.
34. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67. This prohibition applies to parents who wish to retain
their parental rights. Parents are free, however, to transfer their parental rights to others for
the purposes of adoption. This Article does not address the status of adoptive families ex-
cept to the extent of their legitimacy when formed as a result of such voluntary transfers or
after appropriate hearings that determine parents are unfit to have any parental status.
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judges have overturned or denied, while ordering the children re-
31turned to their biological parents, strongly suggests that the
Court does not recognize as parents persons who have no biologi-
cal relationship to the child, unless the would-be parent has a
relationship to the biological parent, like the non-biological father
in Michael H. 36
Thus, the constitutional definition of parent differentiates be-
tween women as mothers and men as fathers. So far, the Court
treats the mother's biological connection (gestational and genetic)
differently than the father's biological (genetic) connection; the
31latter is not sufficient or even necessary to create a legal parent.
Parenthood, as a constitutional matter, can be lost for failure to
earn it by caring for the child or legally claiming the childs° or it
can be usurped by a person who shows affection for the mother by
40
marrying her. Parenthood to date requires a biological connec-
tion between the mother and child; a nurturing connection
between the prospective other parent and the mother; or a nurtur-
ing and genetic connection to the child.4'
35. See Baby Richard, 513 U.S. at PC; DeBoer, 509 U.S. at 1301-02 (1993) (Justice Ste-
vens, as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, denying stay pending certiorari determination
because the Supreme Court was unlikely to grant certiorari or, if it did, to declare decision
unconstitutional: federal law does not authorize "unrelated persons to retain custody of a
child whose natural parents have not been found unfit simply because they may be better
able to provide for her future and her education"); see also O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S.
1303, 1304 (1995) (Justice Stevens, as CircuitJustice for the Seventh Circuit, denying stay of
state court order to return Baby Richard to his birth father because there was no federal
question). But see O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995) (Justices O'Conner and
Breyer dissenting from denial of stay because state court's order may have been based on an
interpretation of the Federal Constitution that conflicts with decisions of other courts).
36. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
37. Even the Court's cramped abortion jurisprudence reflects this distinction between
male and female biological connections by refusing to permit the pregnant woman's hus-
band (the potential legal father) to be notified of the woman's decision to abort. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835, 895-96 (1992).
38. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
39. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
40. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110. One could also read Michael H. and the step-parent
adoption cases, Quilloin and Lehr, as further reflecting a matrifocal definition of parent, for
in those cases, it was the mother's chosen (marital) partner that the Court considered as, or
paved the way to become, the father. That is, those cases in effect allowed the mothers to
choose the father. But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that the
mother was not permitted to choose her new husband to be the father).
41. An in-depth examination of fathers is beyond the scope of this Article, however,
under current definitions, the category of "father" is more variable than "mother." Because
it includes both genetic and non-genetic paternal relationships to the child, the category
could logically encompass a larger group of fathers than previously sanctioned. The fathers
who have shown a commitment to the mother, symbolized by marriage, are paradigms for
other domestic partners, whether marital or not, who have shown a commitment to the
mother. It is not evident why marriage in itself should be the only way of establishing non-
biological legal fatherhood, or why "fathers" must be men. Accord Ruthann Robson, Making
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The Supreme Court's line of cases that resolves whether the law
should treat non-marital parent-child relationships the same as
parent-child relationships arising out of marriage also reflects this
matrifocal definition of parent. The Court has implicitly defined
parent and child when determining whether these non-marital
42families can receive benefits available to marital families. Like the
paternal rights cases discussed above, the non-marital child cases
rarely raise questions about mother-child relationships. Indeed,
the only cases addressing the benefits which flow from the mother-
child relationship held that these benefits should not dependS 43
upon whether the mother was married. Her status as mother (i.e.,
genetic and gestational) is presumably sufficient to create a legally
recognizable parent-child relationship so that she could sue for the
wrongful death of her children and her children could sue for
hers. A father, however, must be more than the genetic parent,
unless he dies before the child is born.4 If he has not married the
mother, the state may deny, a father parental status if he does not
establish legal paternity or the children are not actually
Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & The Judicial Construction Of Lesbian Mothers, 22 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 15, 21 (2000) (arguing that treating husbands with no biological relationship to
their wives' children as legal parents and not treating lesbian co-parents as legal parents
violates the Equal Protection Clause). But cf Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (claiming that the possibility of marriage for heterosexuals, but not homosexuals,
is a constitutionally permissible reason to treat the two groups differently in the adoption
context).
42. The traditional alignment of marriage with parenthood held that non-marital fa-
thers were not fathers. GROSSBERG, supra note 16, at 196-233. The nonmarital family cases
address whether legal benefits could flow between non-marital parents and their biological
offspring.
43. SeeGlonav. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, (1968); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968). The only case in which the Supreme Court upheld a distinction regard-
ing benefits to non-married versus married mothers involved Social Security survivor
benefits that permitted both children and married mothers to receive benefits through the
father, but denied them to non-married mothers, although the non-marital children could
still receive children's benefits. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). The court based its
decision there on the presumptions that non-marital children would not be unduly disad-
vantaged because they still received benefits and unmarried women are less likely to be
economically dependent on the father of their children. Id.
44. See Glona, 391 U.S. at 73; Levy, 391 U.S. at 72; accord Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 at 64 (2001) ("Given the proof of motherhood that is inherent in birth itself, it is
unremarkable that Congress did not require" mothers to take further affirmative steps to
prove parenthood).
45. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169-70 (1972) (holding that worker's
compensation statutes cannot distinguish between marital and non-marital children who
are dependent on their father, including a child who never actually depended on the father
because he died pre-birth in a work-related accident).
46. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787(1977); Trimble v.
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S47dependent on him. Fathers in the non-marital children cases, as
in the parental rights cases, are men who either were married to
the mother or were genetic contributors and proved their parent-
hood by a court order or by supporting the mother or children. A
mother is a mother by virtue of giving birth.
The Court's view of parenthood shows that parenthood is bio-
logically-based, although it must be earned. Mothers earn it
through the nurturing biological acts of gestation and birth. "Fa-
thers" earn it in one of two ways. Men who are biologically
(genetically) related to the child earn the status by caring for the
child after birth. Both non-genetic and genetic fathers may earn
parental status by making a commitment to the child's mother,
generally by marrying her. Although a person may become a father
through marriage, marriage is not essential to maternity or to bio-
logical paternity. The acts of gestation and birth instead form the
anchor and paradigm for parenthood. Persons must relate to the
child like a mother, through biological connection and nurturing,
or must relate to the mother through commitment and caring.
B. Nature of Parental Rights
A significant, if obvious, aspect of the matrifocal definition of
parent relationships is that care-giving (rather than solely genetic
connection) is a necessary component to each of these relation-
ships: mother-child, father-child, or father-mother-child. The
relationship to a child is an integral aspect of the creation of the
status (parent) and the contour of the right (parental). Parental
rights involve decisionmaking by parents that necessarily include
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974); see also N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (forbidding the
state to deny welfare benefits to dependent children living with unmarried parents). A se-
ries of cases striking down statutes of limitations against non-marital children seeking to
establish their father's paternity to obtain child support illustrates the Court's unwillingness
to let children lose the opportunity to require their genetic fathers to act like fathers by
obtaining paternity and support orders. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Pickett v. Brown,
462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
48. The label "parental rights" is used rather than "family rights" because the former
is more accurate. These rights are exercised by parents, not children and not, necessarily, a
combination of the two. Certainly, parents may determine how much deference they would
give to their children's choices. Children, however, do not have rights equal or superior to
their parents. For example, children cannot veto parental relinquishment for adoption and
similarly cannot, absent parental unfitness, seek termination of parental rights. Indeed,
because of the legal disability and developmental limitations of children, parents frequently
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or affect children. 49 That is, categorizing someone as a parent pre-
sumptively ties his or her interests to the child's.50 This means that
parents' decisions about, or affecting, their child are both pre-
sumptively cognizant of the child's needs and in the child's "best"
interests. Once parenthood is established, it is by definition earned
and cannot be terminated without substantial process.51 This right
belongs to the parent and applies only to decisions regarding, af-
fecting, or relating to the child.
In this way, these parental rights are not individual rights, but
rights that arise out of these relationships and apply to decisions
for or about others. They are distinct from other decisional
make the family decisions. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (stating that "parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions"). See generally Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associa-
tion, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 642-43 (1980). Moreover, calling these "family" rights masks the legal
and factual difference between adult relationships and parent-child relationships. See infra
text accompanying notes 70-74.
49. Once these decisions become sufficiently non-relational, the parent ceases to have
parental right. Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the
Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context ofAdoption, 2 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 75 (1995);
see also Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the
Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045,
1076-78 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court protects parental rights only when parents
have undertaken the corollary parental responsibilities); Scott & Scott, supra note 7 at 2440
(linking parental performance to parental authority).
50. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-60 (1982) (children do not have an in-
terest in terminating their relationship with their parents); Parham, 442 U.S. at 600 (holding
that a child's interest in not being committed to a psychiatric institution "is inextricably
linked with the parents' interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the child");
see also Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2437-38 (explaining this presumption and the interre-
lationship of parent-child interests).
51. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that even after a mother has been
proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence she has a right, reserved theretofore only for
criminal defendants, to a free copy of the records for appeal); Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (even
parents who abused or neglected their children have a right to substantial process before
termination of parental rights); Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that putative
father has a right to hearing before a state can remove his children).
52. Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO, WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1241 (1999);
Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1207,
1213-14 (1999); see also, JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348 (SECOND TREA-
TISE § 58) (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) ("The Power, then, that Parents
have over their children, arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of
their Off-spring during the imperfect state of Childhood."); Kaas, supra note 49 at 1072
(stating that, the "analysis of parental rights is actually a consideration of the scope of the
protection afforded to the parent-child relationship"); David A. J. Richards, The Individual,
the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 28 (1980)
(stating that the scope of parental rights is defined by responsibilities to the child); Mary L.
Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation
of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 88 (1995) ("A 'parental right' should not be viewed as
pertaining to an individual per se, but only to an individual-in-relationship with a depend-
ent child."). Others promote a relational conception of the parent-child relationship but
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privacy rights that involve decisionmaking for oneself. 53 Neverthe-
less, commentators often view parental rights as individual rights,
thereby either equating parental rights with property rights54 or
associating parental rights with other personal rights arising out of
individual autonomy.55 In fact, early constitutional family jurispru-
dence applied decisional privacy to the married-parent child-
56rearing entity, and not to individuals outside the marital context.
Relying on this early jurisprudence, the Court has subsequently
extended the private realm to include heterosexual individuals'
decisions about birth control, 7 pregnancy58 and marriage, 9 regard-
less of whether they occur in the context of individual, coupled or
marital decision-making. Thus, although such privacy rights began
in traditional family contexts, the Court has extended them to pro-
tect individual decisions about certain intimate heterosexual60
matters. Their common origin, however, does not mean all deci-
sional privacy is the same.
view parental rights as individual entitlements. E.g., Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parent-
hood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294-98 (1988); Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational
Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA
4, 23 (1996); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2407-18.
53. Decisional privacy refers to the doctrine protecting intimate decision-making, in-
cluding marriage, birth control, and parental decision-making for their children, from
coercive intervention by the state.
54. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 1359 (1992) (comparing the status of
children to slaves); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents'Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1412-15 (1994) (comparing children's status
to slaves and more generally to property); Woodhouse, supra note 14, at 1042 (comparing
children's status to property); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Chil-
dren's Rights". The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321, 326 (1994)
(comparing parent-child relationships to slavery).
55. E.g., SANDEL, supra note 15, at 108-15;Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal
Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345 (1997); Dwyer, supra
note 54; Meyer, supra note 11, at 548-54. In another context, Professor Katharine Baker has
recognized this distinction between intimate adult relationships ("horizontal") and adult-
child relationships ("vertical") and advocated two different legal models for these relation-
ships. Katherine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy By Valuing
Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1523 (1998).
56. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). This privacy, associated with inti-
macy, is distinct from privacy associated with property or control.Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 782-87 (1989) (discussing differences regarding privacy
interests in Lochner and Meyer lines of cases). It also may have directly reflected the court's
moral judgment regarding the sanctity of marriage, rather than a respect for individual
autonomy. SANDEL, supra note 15, at 96-98; Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: from
Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1544 (1994).
57. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
58. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835 (1992).
59. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
60. Dolgin, supra note 56, at 1553-58.
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Instead, parental rights and other rights involving intimate adult
decisions, like procreation, or adult relationships, such as mar-
riage, address two different sides of privacy.6' Despite their
common origin, parental rights are by definition relational while
62
adult decisions and relationships are individual. This distinction
is important because of the developmental differences between
adults and children that distinguish parent-child relationships
from adult-adult relationships. The former involve dependent rela-
tionships63 while the latter may be interdependent, but generally
involve relationships between competent adults.6 Adults in these
latter relationships may make certain decisions that will financially
or legally bind their partners, but such power does not extend to
61. See Cahn, supra note 52, at 1230-40 (describing and distinguishing three types of
constitutional privacy: marital, parent-child, and sexual decision-making); Anne C. Dailey,
Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv. 955, 981 (1993) (characterizing
individual and family privacy as "subdoctrines" of constitutional privacy); Rubenfeld, supra
note 56, at 749 (distinguishing Fourth Amendment privacy from substantive limits on state
power to intrude on certain decisions).
62. See Dailey, supra note 61, at 981 ("Family privacy, far from being instrumental to or
even compatible with individual privacy, is deeply antithetical to it."). But see Karst, supra
note 48, at 642-43 (characterizing all of these intimate or family rights as associational but
recognizing a difference between parent-child and adult-adult association); Minow &
Shanley, supra note 52 (advocating that law regarding intimate associations be viewed as
relational); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1077, 1102-07 (1998) (distinguishing between relational rights (right to
connect with others, including adults) and individual rights ("right to be left alone")).
63. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counselfor Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1407 (1996) ("Children are by definition persons in need of
adult caretakers ... .") (quotingJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 122 (1979)). Of course, the category of "child" itself is problematic because of
the wide range of development and dependency persons experience between birth and the
age of eighteen. "Child" also masks the wide variety of material and social conditions
children experience relating to gender, class, race, culture and national origin. In addition,
"child" is a problematic category over time and place. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth,
Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile
Court, 69 N.C.L. REv. 1083, 1091-1104 (1991) (describing changing social constructions of
child in Western culture, and noting that "who is classified as a child, and what emotional,
intellectual, and moral properties children are assumed to possess-has changed over time
in response to changes in other facets of society."); Dolgin, supra note 55 (describing
changing legal constructions of childhood); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern
American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv.
1038, 1047-52 (1979) (describing the source and development of western construction of
childhood as a distinct and special stage); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 547 (2000) (describing the different treatment of
adolescents in various areas, such as medical care, voting, drinking, and criminal activities).
This Article does not undertake the daunting and much needed task of particularizing
children as a category. Instead, the Article treats children as a category defined by their
relationship to parent, occasionally making crude distinctions between children at various
ends of the developmental spectrum.
64. The balance of power between the two may be unequal, and one person may in
fact be dependant on the other. But that does not make the dependent person a child.
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intimate decisions like divorce or whether to bear a child." Simi-
larly, although certain decisions made about or within adult
relationships are protected from governmental intervention, these
relationships do not consider individual autonomy. Treating all
decisional rights as relational would encumber adult decision-
making, particularly in childbearing and marriage." Indeed, fail-
ure to distinguish between adults (i.e., women) and children
supported some of the most outrageous and negative aspects of
family privacy doctrine. The decisions held that wives' identity
merged into their husbands' identity and had no legal status of67
their own. The parallels between a husband's complete power
over both his wife and his children are striking." However, the dif-
ference between combining a husband and a wife's interests
(marital unity) and parents and children's interests (parental
rights) is that adult women can generally identify, articulate, and
frequently affect their own interests, whereas children cannot
69through much of their childhood.
65. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (holding that a woman's autonomy regarding her own
pregnancy precludes a husband from gaining an interest in the pregnancy).
66. Id. at 887-98; see also Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 327, 352-53 (1991) (discussing pregnancy as a matter of bodily integrity
over which others should not have decision-making authority); Rao, supra note 62, at 1105-
11 (distinguishing between relational rights and bodily integrity rights, such as abortion and
contraception, but including adult-adult relationships as relational rights).
67. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 16 (describing the historical doctrine of marital unity
that included the right of husbands to beat their wives, and explaining the persistence of
this power differential even as domestic violence prohibitions have outlawed such status-
based conduct); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1211-17 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home]
(describing husbands' control of family assets and wives' continuing economic dependence
due, in part, to devaluation of household work); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A His-
torical Perspective on Abortion and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 319-23
(1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning] (describing the role that the wifely duty to her hus-
band to bear and raise children played in limiting women's access to abortion); see also
discussion of feminist critique of privacy infra text accompanying notes 305-24.
68. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child Centered Perspective on Par-
ents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1828-29 (1993).
69. Helpful here is Professor Yochai Benkler's distinction between capacity for auton-
omy (competence and ability to "evaluate options and consequences of actions") and
conditions for autonomy (the factual circumstances that limit or enable self-direction).
Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 23, 33 n.32 (2001). Adults generally have the capacity and the conditions to be
autonomous, though each may vary from adult to adult. Young children lack the capacity
and conditions for self-direction, although they should develop both as they mature. Teen-
agers may fall someplace in between child and adult in the areas of capacity and conditions
for autonomy. See Scott, supra note 63, at 591-92 (describing limitations in a teenager's
ability to appreciate consequences). Professor Benkler, however, may not agree with my
simplistic formulation, for he seems to assume that teenagers are autonomous. See, e.g.,
Benkler, supra, at 46 (allowing parents to keep their children out of high school "violates
the autonomy of children").
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Conversely, treating parents and children as holders of individ-
ual rights within the family obscures the different capacities of
adults and children. That is, most adults have the cognitive and
experiential ability to make informed, forward-looking decisions.
Children, however, depending on their chronological age and de-
velopmental stage, have limited cognitive abilities. Most children
remain unable to appreciate the full and future meaning of their
choices and actions, even as their cognitive abilities approach
those of adults.7 Moreover, most adults can implement their own
decisions-to go somewhere or do something else-although
many are constrained by poverty, emotional ties, dependence, or
obligation." In contrast, young, but even unemancipated older,
children are often financially, physically, and legally dependent on
adults.72 Treating all children, rather than mature children, as in-
dependent rights holders vis At vis their parents, presumes a level of
autonomy, independence and competence that simply does not
apply to all children.73 Assigning such autonomy-based rights to
children who are unable to make their own decisions merely em-
powers an adult to make decisions for the child7 4 Parental rights
70. Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights And Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 132
(1996); Scott, supra note 63, at 555-56, 591-92. These well-accepted limitations have not,
however, persuaded lawmakers who have in many states established laws permitting or
mandating children ten years old and younger to be tried as adults. Id. at 557.
71. Critical domestic violence literature in particular recognizes the material and
emotional complexity of leaving. E.g., Donna Coker, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers:
LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope In
LatCrit theory and Praxis, 33 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1009 (2000); Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying
for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281 (1997).
72. See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 18 (1986) ("Conceptually and practically, children in our
society are not autonomous persons but instead dependants who are linked legally and daily
to adults entrusted with their care.").
73. Guggenheim, supra note 63, at 1405-08. This does not mean that children are not
rights holders in other contexts. E.g. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (assuming with-
out deciding that children may bring suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643-644 (1979) (holding that pregnant girls have a limited right to obtain an
abortion without parental consent); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (holding that children have a limited right to free speech in school setting); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that children have a right to certain procedural protec-
tions in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(holding that children have a right to equal protection); see also Minow, supra note 72, at
18-21 (advocating that children's rights be framed in the context of children's dependency,
relationships, and connections); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children's Rights and the Problem of Equal
Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799 (1999) (discussing difference between children's needs-
based and autonomy-based rights); Woodhouse, supra note 54, at 327-30 (advocating rec-
ognition of children's needs-based rights).
74. Appell & Boyer, supra note 49, at 75-76. Even children's rights rhetorician Barbara
Woodhouse recognizes that children's rights are not autonomy-based, but are defined by
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doctrine bestows the right to make these decisions on adults who
have shown a prescribed level of commitment to the child (or to
the child's mother). In this way parental rights are earned, unlike
other decisional privacy rights, that inure automatically to (adult)
persons.
Although parental rights are relational-in the sense that they
protect decisions made by parents for their children-they are not
mutual. Children do not share corresponding decisionmaking
75
rights. That is, children's decisions about their own parents or
family status do not clearly have constitutional protection, 7' but
children do have some individual constitutional rights that could
interfere with parental control over them. Children have certain
procedural protections against punitive state intervention. 7 For
example, in juvenile delinquency proceedings, children have a
right to their own attorney, who is ethically bound to represent the
child's interests, not those of the parents.78 Children also have lim-
• , ,79
ited rights to reproductive freedom. For example, when a teenage
girl becomes pregnant and seeks an abortion, her rights may over-
ride her parent's parental rights, should they disagree about the
80
outcome of the pregnancy. Yet, she may have no right to make
adult conceptions and interpretations of children's needs. Woodhouse, supra note 54, at
328-29; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 73 (distinguishing between adult autonomy-based
and children's needs-based rights).
75. Arguably the children benefit from parental decision-making and autonomy ab-
sent abuse or neglect, but the children are not positive rights-holders in this context.
76. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-60 (1982); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families
for Quality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
77. E.g., Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519 (1975); Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
78. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (holding that due process requires child and parents to
be notified of the child's right to counsel in certain juvenile delinquency proceedings);
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.8(0, 1.14 (2001) (establishing that an attorney
must follow to the extent possible a minor client's direction regardless of who pays the at-
torney's bill).
79. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835, 899-900 (1992); see also Carey v. Popu-
lation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). These limited rights are constitutional in nature and
follow adult constitutional rights. They are, however, distinct from statutory rights or limita-
tions on parental rights arising out of the state's parens patriae role. For an argument that the
teenage abortion decisions do not grant children rights, but instead merely replace paren-
tal control over children's medical treatment with state control, see Martin Guggenheim,
Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, HOFSTRA L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
80. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900 (upholding a minor's right to seek judicial bypass
of parental consent to abortion). Interestingly, girls who have not reached majority are
legally competent in most states to consent to the adoption of their children. Jennifer Dur-
can & Annette Appell, Minor Mothers and Consent to Adoption: An Anomaly in Youth Law. 5 (1)
ADOPTION Q. (forthcoming 2001). The philosophical and jurisprudential tensions that arise
when parental decisions conflict with children's procreational and procedural rights are
beyond the scope of this Article. For some discussions about these conflicts, see generally
Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 329; Dailey, supra note 61;
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other medical decisions"' or decide whether she would rather have
other parents. 2 It is sufficient for purposes of this Article that chil-
dren may attain rights independent from, and in conflict with,
their parents' parental rights at some point, as children become
83
more like adults (i.e., more mature). These rights may limit pa-
rental rights, though in a different way than third party or state
intervention limits parental rights.
C. Extent of Parental Rights
A parent84 has a constitutional right to direct his/her child's care
and upbringing, absent proof that the parent is abusing or neglect-
815 816ing the child or has failed to establish legal parenthood.
Parental rights doctrine protects parental decisions by presuming
that parental choices regarding or affecting children are sound.8 ,
The government may adopt general laws and policy relating to child-
rearing, such as education of children, child labor prohibitions, and
Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme
Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459 (1982); Richards, supra note 52.
81. Minow, supra note 72, at 8-14, 18-21 (describing history, current treatment, and
mixed rationales behind children's rights); Scott, supra note 63, at 566-68 (same).
82. See O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1303 (1995) (denying a young child a stay of
court orders returning him to his birth parents); DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993)
(denying a young child stay of court orders returning her to her birth parents). But see
George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K " A Child's Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM.
L. Q. 365 (1993) (describing a case involving his foster son's petition to terminate his own
mother's rights). On the other hand, adolescents usually must consent to their own adop-
tion. Joan Hollinger, 1 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE § 2.08, at 2-76.1 (2000).
83. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying An Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000) (arguing that adolescents are and should be treated legally as
autonomous); LOCKE, supra note 52, at 346 (SECOND TREATISE § 55 (noting that parental
control over children diminishes as children grow up)).
84. The references throughout this Article to "parent" and "biological parent" may re-
fer to persons who have attained parental status through legally valid and completed
adoptions. For purposes of this paper adoptive parents are presumed to would stand on the
same footing as other dejure (biological and marital) parents.
85. SeeSantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
86. E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978).
87. See Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
937, 954 (1996) ("Rather than prescribing the best diet or the best style of parenting, we
police the extremes."); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (noting that meeting the designation as parent determines the
deference to the relationship); Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Pa-
triae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 525-27 (1996)
(providing a succinct rehearsal of parental rights and parens patriae doctrines).
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establishment of minimum parenting standards."" The constitu-
tional liberty interest, however, in the parent-child relationship
cabins the state's ability to legislate regarding child welfare and
child rearing.89 Thus, the state9 can coercively intervene in, or in-
terfere with, family governance in order to protect the child, i.e., if
the parents have fallen below minimum parenting standards.9' The
state, however, cannot intervene merely because it has a difference
of opinion with the parent about what is best for the child.9' This
means that the state may not take children away from parents or
diminish parental autonomy without adequate cause and process
93
or, of course, parental consent. Moreover, the state cannot sanc-
tion another parent-child relationship through adoption, without
94proper proof and process. In these ways, families are private: par-
ents have primary control over child-rearing, and the state may not
usurp that control, unless there is sufficient cause and process or
the parents consent to ceding control.
The Court has been divided and cautious about extending its
95decisional privacy doctrine. It, however, has been relatively united
in upholding the sanctity of the parent-child relationship, as illus-
trated most recently in Troxel,96 a case that raised the question of
whether a court could substitute its judgment for the mother's re-
garding whether third party visitation was in the best interests of
the children and if so how much. Two things are particularly note-
worthy about the decision. First, at least eight justices affirmed that
88. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (holding that, "the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare").
89. E.g., Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Prince, 321 U.S. 158; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
. 90. "State" and "government" are used interchangeably to refer to federal and state
(geopolitical organizations) legislative,judicial or administration action.
91. See Meyer, supra note 11, at 545-48 (discussing balancing between parental rights
and governmental protection of child welfare).
92. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (O'ConnorJ., plurality) (discussing
that "there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of
the family to further question the ability of [a fit] parent to make the best decisions con-
cerning the rearing of that parent's children"); see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)
(noting that the best interests of the child is not grounds for intervening in the parent-child
relationship).
93. E.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
94. E.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
95. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that relational pri-
vacy doctrine does not extend to consensual sex between two men). Indeed, some observers
suggest that the Court has not broadly extended privacy even to parental rights. Meyer,
supra note 11, at 545-48; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev.
1135, 1157 (1985).
96. 530 U.S. 57.
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood
the Constitution protects the parent-child relationship from undue
governmental interference, although a majority of the justices
could not agree on a rationale for the decision. 7 Second, these
eight justices affirmed the line of privacy doctrine cases that origi-98
nated in the oft-denigrated Lochner era as establishing the
primacy of parent-child relationships, 9 even though the justices
and constitutional law scholars have long questioned the validity100 _
and modernity of these early cases. Thus, the Troxel Court did not
definitively identify what a family is or when the state can inter-
vene. It did affirm that state action relating to the parent-child
relationship has constitutional limitations, in an era of decisions
which have diminished the rights of the federal government to
curtail state authority.101
D. Philosophical Underpinning of Parental Rights Doctrine
The Court's family doctrine seems to have developed as an ex-
tension of political and personal autonomy principles on which
the United States government was founded' ° as well as from com-
mon law family doctrine that treated families as entities into which
the state could not intrude.0 3 The origin and basis for these deci-
sional privacy rights, derived from, but not enumerated in, the
97. All Supreme CourtJustices butJustice Scalia agreed that the Constitution protects
parental rights. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, plurality); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas,
J., concurring); id. at 86-88 (Stevens,J., dissenting); id. at 95 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
98. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
99. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-67 (O'ConnorJ., plurality); id. at 77 (SouterJ., concurring);
id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring, although holding open the possibility that the Court
might overrule that line of cases); id. at86-87 (Stevens,J., dissenting); id. at 95 (KennedyJ.,
dissenting).
100. See id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973).
101. See e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Ha. Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of
Ha. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
102. Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional Order, 77 TEx. L. REv.
1195, 1226-30 (1999); Richards, supra note 52, at 6-15.
103. Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Pri-
vacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 961-62 (1991); see also William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty,
Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869,
874 (1999) (discussing state and family in liberal democracy as defined by early 20th cen-
tury Supreme Court privacy cases).
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Constitution, have been the subject of much legal theorizing.10 4
The focus here is on decisional privacy doctrine's foundation in a
political and moral philosophy that values individual autonomy
and informs the theoretical basis for the United States' structure of105
government. The purpose of government is to maintain the po-
litical (if not material) conditions for people to determine the
course of their own lives, through elected representative rule
guided by reason and limited by respect for individual liberty to106
determine one's own morality or sources of meaning. The state,
104. Commentators have also searched for a unifying theme for privacy. E.g., Dolgin,
supra note 55; Meyer, supra note 11, at 535-36; Rubenfeld, supra note 56.
105. This refers primarily to the liberal influence on early American political theory
that valued personal freedom, tolerance, and justice, espoused most influentially perhaps by
Locke and his adherents. STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIB-
ERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65-96 (1990); Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227;
Kloppenberg, supra note 15. Cf Richards, supra note 15, at 842-43 (characterizing this phi-
losophy as a republican conception of self government). This value of individual autonomy
might be traced to the notion of inalienable-natural-rights that precede positive law.
Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227-30; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (noting that decisional privacy is a right "older than the Bill of Rights"); 5 FREDERICK
COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 128-30 (Image Books 1985) (1959) (stating that
Locke's theoretical construct of the state of nature established individual liberty as pre-
political); SANDEL, supra note 15, at 30-39 (describing the development of concepts of
natural law, encompassing notions of individual freedom justifying the colonial rebellion
and the framing of the constitution); accord Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2407 ("Parental
rights were understood to be grounded in natural law"). Others suggest autonomy-based
rights are political, not prepolitical. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIB-
ERAL STATE 5-6 (1980) (arguing that rights are political and liberalism is better understood
as a political account of power distribution, not as a social contract or a method of preserv-
ing natural rights); Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 804-05 (arguing that privacy is a political,
not natural, right necessary to democracy). Whatever autonomy's philosophical home, the
pursuit and protection of it are part of our constitutional theory. For more complex and
complete accounts of early American political theory, see DWORETZ, supra; SANDEL, supra
note 15; Brandon, supra note 102 (describing the role of family in early American political
theory); Finkelman, supra note 13; Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The
Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REv. 423 (1999); Kloppenberg, supa note
15; Richards, supra note 52, at 8, 14-19 (describing themes of autonomy undergirding the
Constitution).
106. Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227-31; David A. J. Richards, Liberal Political Culture
and the Marginalized Voice: Interpretive Responsibility and the American Law Schoo4 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1955, 1957-62 (1993); West, supra note 15, at 52-53. Historically, and even currently,
other governmental roles include protection of a way of life for some people. See SANDEL,
supra note 15, at 94-96 (tracing earlier notions of privacy that were based on the state's
interest in a certain morality); Finkelman, supra note 105 at 423 (noting that the Constitu-
tion was written in large part to protect a very valuable form of property in the late 18th
Century, slavery, which, of course, came at the expense of the freedom of enslaved persons).
Although notions of liberalism and individual autonomy seem to have driven much of the
decisional privacy doctrine in the latter part of the 20th Century, notions of the state or the
majority as arbiters of moral values (the good life) appear to be on the rise. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835, 882-87 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986); see also West, supra note 15, at 54-60 (describing the Supreme Court's move away
from liberal protection of individual non-majoritarian rights and toward a more republican
notion of positive, majoritarian rights).
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as a result, has a limited ability to interfere with individual auton-
omy.'°7 This autonomy is important in itself, but it is also significant
because it promotes a dynamic democracy that relies on autono-
mous citizens to govern.108
How families fit into this model of individual liberty' °9 is a matter
of interpretation based on different theories of the role of families
vis i vis individuals and the state. One set of theories derives family
autonomy from the family's public functions ("public family"),
while the other set derives from individual autonomy ("autono-
mous family"). These theories explain or justify the family's
protection from coercive state intervention based on competing
views of the good life. Both sets of theories also support parental
rights doctrine."
The public family theories hold that families are protected from
undue governmental intervention because the family fulfills two
important, related public functions: caring and nurturing the
young and preparing them for autonomous adulthood and citizen-
ship in a pluralistic democracy." Families are uniquely suited to
107. E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 784 (arguing that privacy is the "fundamental
freedom not to have one's life.., determined by a... normalizing state"); West, supra note
15, at 46 (stating that "individual freedom is the primary, if not the only, moral end of po-
litical organization"). Cf SANDEL, supra note 15, at 103 ("The image of the person as a freely
choosing, unencumbered self has only recently come to inform our constitutional prac-
tice.").
108. See Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227-28; Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 805; see also
Galston, supra note 103, at 901 (discussing liberalism's limitations on the state's power to
mold individuals).
109. This assertion presumes, of course, that there is an inherent constitutional liberty
interest in family integrity. See Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227-34 (arguing that although
the Constitution does not explicitly provide for family protection, it is an institution, like
other explicitly protected institutions (press, religion, private property) that enable political
autonomy or independence from the state); Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 804 (noting that
privacy, including family integrity, is a constitutional right because the Constitution creates
democracy). But see, Ely, supra note 100 (arguing that the Constitution does not support
general privacy rights).
110. Although both sets of theories offer a positive and empowering picture of families,
family privacy has also served historically to disempower women and children. See infra, Part
II.D. In addition, decisional privacy doctrine has not served women well in preserving their
families against custodial and economic challenges. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
180-81 (1995); see West, supra note 11, at 1385-86; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reec-
tions on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1310-11 (1991) (discussing privacy in
protecting women's freedom to choose).
111. Brandon, supra note 102, at 1226-27; Dailey, supra note 61, at 958-59; Bruce C.
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Indi-
vidual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 473-84 (1983). Public family theories
overlap with republican notions of the family as producer of good citizens. SeeJOSEPHSON,
supra note 15, at 17-18 (describing republican approaches to family). Depending on the
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perform these functions by caring for children in a communal
context of self-sacrifice and duty, and raising them in diverse set-
tings.12 Children then mature into adults who possess pluralistic
values and the ability to think critically because of their allegiance
to family and community."3 This rearing function enriches the
government by creating citizens separate enough from the state to
be capable of exercising the power to govern." 4 In contrast, institu-
tionalized or uniform child rearing values would presumably
create citizens who would not question the state and who would
not provide the diversity of opinions and values that can serve as a
check on government.
1 5
The autonomous family theories also relate family autonomy to
individual adult autonomy, but these theories are based on indi-
vidual autonomy as an end in itself, as opposed to a means to
democratic governance. These autonomy theories hold that deci-
sions regarding family relationships and issues are protected
because families are intimate associations created and controlled
by autonomous adults.' The family is fundamentally importantbecause it is "an aspect of human self-definition and moral
strand of republicanism, the family's public role may authorize state intervention to insure
inculcation of specific, publicly-defined values in children. Id. at 18-19.
112. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that parents'
"primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder"); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Lib-
eral Theory, 59 OmIo ST. L.J. 133, 170-74 (1998) (arguing that families teach children to
subordinate personal preferences for the greater good).
113. Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227; Dailey, supra note 61, at 1021-22; see also Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (noting that "[t]he fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 410-02 (1923) (criticiz-
ing state law for seeking to "foster a homogenous people with American ideals"). But see
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that public education is considered a pri-
mary means of inculcating fundamental democratic values and preparing citizens for
effective participation in government). Public versus private education raises complex issues
regarding preparing children for autonomous adulthood in a liberal state and the nature of
autonomy itself. See, e.g., Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious
Freedom: A Critique ofWisconsin v. Yoder, in DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 137 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1996);
Benkler, supra note 69 (each asserting that excessive parental value production-as in the
case of the Amish parents in Yoder who kept their teenagers out of school-inhibits chil-
dren's autonomy). This Article does not address with specificity the area of parental versus
public education production of values. Nor does it take on the deeper issues regarding the
nature of self that drive liberal conceptions of autonomy.
114. Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227; Dailey, supra note 61, at 1021-23.
115. Dailey, supra note 61, at 1022-23; see also Brandon, supra note 102, at 1227 ("This
capacity in turn presumes that people possess, at a minimum, intellectual and ethical re-
sources independent from the ruler or state."); William A. Galston, The Legal and Political
Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD. L. REv. 236, 236-40 (1998) (suggesting that family
autonomy protects value pluralism, a central idea in political liberalism).
116. See Richards, supra note 52, at 28.
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choice."". Families in turn support sell-definition and moral
autonomy by providing an environment free from state control of
socialization and value production. 8 Because these family associa-
tions are so intimate and fundamental to adult life, the state
should have exceedingly good reasons to interfere. Once it does,
the state must provide substantial process to protect choices about
families.! 9 Whether this intimacy is an end in itself'2 or a means
through which people produce or exercise moral value,"' the es-
sence of the family autonomy theory is that family relationships are
the ultimate exercise of positive freedom to form and protect in-
timate associations.
1 2
Each set of theories supports, at least in part, the parental rights
doctrine. Under the public family theory, it is the parent's role to
raise and nurture children to become mature adults who are able
to exercise political choice. The sine qua non of the public family
theory is that children are both dependent and malleable. There-
fore, they are in need of protection and formation. Parents, rather
than the state, have responsibility in the first instance to care for
and socialize children, with the goal of producing independent
adults who are able to care for themselves and be productive citi-
zens. Although the family fulfills a public function, this role
requires a measure of independence from the state. Thus, parental
rights doctrine curbs the homogenizing effect of the state by insur-
ing that the state does not unduly interfere with parental decisions
and does not entirely usurp the family's socializing role.
The public family theory does not, however, explain why families
123
should be defined in the first instance around biological relationships.
117. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 168; see also Baker, supra note 55, at 1541-42; Karst, supra
note 48, at 635-37; Richards, supra note 52, at 28.
118. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV.
L. RaV. 1348, 1349 (1994); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1977) ("It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cher-
ished values, moral and cultural."); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989) (arguing that relationships are
central to the formation of individual values).
119. DAvis, supra note 9, at 242-43; see also Davis, supra note 118, at 1369-72 (noting
that Supreme Court jurisprudence has failed to make explicit this connection, instead hing-
ing rulings protecting choice and family autonomy on the social and political roles of the
family).
120. Karst, supra note 48, at 632-33.
121. Davis, supra note 118, at 1371-73.
122. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 9; Karst, supra note 48, at 629-47.
123. Disagreeing with the idea that families are autonomous or pre-political, many
commentators argue that the state is deeply involved in the definition and control of the
family. E.g, Meyer, supra note 11, at 556-57; Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in
the Family, 18 U. MICH.J.L. REFORm 835, 837 (1985).
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Any nondiscretionary and nondiscriminatory 24 general rule that
assigns parenthood to private citizens and minimizes state discre-
tion in placing individual children would presumably promote the
goals behind public family theories. 25 For example, a rule defining
parents as those adults who were born on the same day as the child
and live in the nearest proximity would limit state discrimination
and discretion (although it may be difficult to administer). One
can imagine a slightly more discretionary and potentially discrimi-
natory rule that would require all persons interested in becoming
parents to take a course or pass a test regarding child rearing or
development. 126 These potential parents would then place their
names on a waiting list; children could be assigned based on a lot-
tery or bestowed upon the next person on list. An even more
discretionary and potentially discriminatory rule would be for the
state to determine who would be the best providers of care for the
child, perhaps through psychological and intelligence testing, fi-
nancial means guidelines, any history of caring for the particular
child, and then place children accordingly.
Defining parents based on their biological relationship to the
child seems the most definitive rule because it is perhaps the clear-
est, simplest standard that also minimizes the state's role in making
individualized decisions about who constitutes a family. It also
promotes diversity by minimizing discriminatory choice that could
result in homogenization.127 When the state establishes less deter-
minate rules, such as the best care-giver, it invites injection of
contingent standards that exclude or include persons in the cate-
124. Discrimination refers to the use decision-making based on values regarding race,
class, morality, religion, sexual orientation and the like. Discretion refers to decision-
making without determinate rules that grants greater latitude to the decision-maker to as-
sess different outcomes. If one of the main purposes of family privacy is to promote private
value production, then rules that permit the state to choose parents based on its own values
or to discriminate may well curb private values.
125. Contrast this to the rules for ruling class families in Plato's Republic which would
have the state determine where children are reared. I FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY 229-33 (Image Books 1985) (1946).
126. See Howard B. Eisenberg, A "Modest" Proposal: State Licensing of Parents, 26 CONN. L.
REv. 1415 (1994) (advocating for state examination and licensing of would-be parents).
127. Our current standards are not natural but are based on judgments that the birth
or biological connection makes parents particularly willing and suitable to raise children. It
seems a more benign judgment than other tools used to define families. The government's
coercive removal of Native American children from their families and tribes to foster homes
and government boarding schools reveals the personal and cultural destructiveness of dis-
cretionary decisionmaking regarding who should raise children. Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer
of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1,
2-3 (1997); see also Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost
of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91) (discussing the tendency of judges and social work-
ers to make presumptive and biased decisions regarding placement and adoption of
children).
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gory of "parent" based on value-laden judgments about what types
of child rearing and parent are most important for children. 2 The
interpersonal aspect of the current definition of father (nurturing
relationship to the child or mother) is more problematic than the
maternal definition because competing claims to fatherhood may
arise under the less determinate standard that will be more diffi-
cult to resolve. These claims require the state to exercise its own
homogenizing values when making specific decisions about
whether a parent is sufficiently nurturing or which person has a
stronger relationship to the child.9 The existing rule, however,
minimizes both state discrimination in defining parent and state
discretion in applying the definition, while limiting the state's role
in administering the rule for distributing children.
The family autonomy theory also supports parental rights doc-
trine. Because the theory is based on protection of decisions about
intimate matters, such as whether to bear children, the theory of-
fers tighter analytic support for the deference to biologically-based
definitions of parent. The principle that choosing to conceive and
raise a child is an expression of individual autonomy supports de-
fining and protecting parenthood by linking biological and chosen
interpersonal connections. Insofar as family autonomy promotes
individual autonomy by creating a private zone of value produc-
tion, those who are able to exercise autonomy within that
context-i.e., adults-should be free to do so, absent just cause for
state interference.! ° In this way, families are expressions of adult
self-definition and associational choice so state intervention should
be minimal.
The thornier problem for family autonomy theory is how to ac-
count for the parent as the rights-holder: adults are the decision-
makers and children are not. Legally-sanctioned control over an-
other individual seems at odds with notions of individual
autonomy theories that support family autonomy theories.13 True
128. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 49, at 78-82 (describing the lack of social consensus
regarding what is best for children); see also John E. Coons et al., Deciding What's Best for
Children, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 465 (1993) (describing the inherently
value-laden and subjective task of determining what is best for children).
129. See infra, part III.C.
130. Autonomy suggests the right to make decisions without interference from the
state. See Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, supra note 103,
at 966; Teitelbaum, supra note 73, at 802.
131. See Benkler, supra note 69, at 46-47 (arguing that if children are not autonomous,
then parental control must arise out of stewardship, not parental autonomy); Richards,
supra note 52, at 36 (criticizing family privacy as promoting "absolute right of parents to
control their children"); Teitelbaum, supra note 73, at 810 (noting that parental control
over children "cannot be reconciled with liberal rights theory"); West, supra note 11, at 1385
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autonomy would make each family member a parent-a decision-
maker.1 32 It may not make sense to think of children as having indi-
vidual autonomy, particularly in light of their developmental
limitations.1 33 Indeed, to the extent that the autonomous family
theorists view families as fora to inculcate values and create mean-
ing, part of that freedom relates to the act of rearing-molding
and socializing-children. Once children reach a level of matur-
ity that enables them to engage in adult-like behavior and share in
adult-like obligations and responsibilities, they may begin to share
in some of the autonomy adults enjoy. The more like adults chil-
dren become, they are less like children. As a result parents enjoy
less control.1
35
In any event, children who are incapable of acting autono-
mously require adult assistance in making or carrying out
decisions. This is generally the parents' role, though frequently
supplemented by actual and fictive kin networks. I1 6 If the parents
(discussing cramped or conservative notions of liberty that do not consider private oppres-
sion).
132. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 146-48 (suggesting desirability of greater
limitations on parental control over children); Dolgin, supra note 56, at 1557-58 (stating
that children as independent rights holders are at odds with parental authority); Wood-
house, supra note 14, at 1040-44 (analogizing parental rights to property rights). Contra
Gilles, supra note 87, at 959-60 (arguing that just as adults are autonomous because they
have incentives to act in their own best interests, parents should control children because
parents have incentives to act in their children's best interests).
133. Some commentators view autonomy not as something children have, but instead
as something they will have, and that potentiality should guide decision-makers to insure
children will have tools to live autonomous lives. See e.g., Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113,
at 158-63.
134. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 248; Gilles, supra note 87, at 962 ("the proposition that
general custody, control of, and responsibility for the child lies with the child's parents
stands as a fixed point in the thinking not only of the Supreme Court, but also of most lib-
eral political theorists.").
135. See Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 957, 970-71 (1999); Teitelbaum, supra note 73, at 821-23.
136. See, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN 10-15 (2001) (de-
scribing the prevalence of extended family households in the United States); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: the Power of Discourse, Discourses of Powe, and the Recon-
struction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 925-27 (1996) (describing extended kin
relations and network of Latin families); Carol B. Stack & Linda M. Burton, Kinscripts: Reflec-
tions on Family, Generation, and Culture, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY
33, 33-44 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994) (describing extended kin networks in
African American communities). This Article's reference to parents as decisionmakers
masks the cultural contingency of lines of nurture and authority in child rearing. SeeJane
Collier et al., Is There a Family? New Anthropological Views, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME
FEMINIST QUESTIONS 31 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1992) (describing cultural
and temporal diversity of family structures). Fictive and actual kin frequently rear children
through informal and perhaps tacit agreement by the parent. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES 2 (2001) (noting that relatives
provide care for 1.3 million children in the United States as a result of private, as opposed
to child protective agency, arrangements); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, at 3 (noting that in
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do not exercise the authority to make or assist the child in making
the child's decisions, the question becomes who. If a judge or an-
other adult substitutes for the parents, the child is not less
restricted, just subject to someone else's decision-making about
what is best for the child or what the child actually wants.17 There
is, however, no clear or universal standard for deciding what is bestS 138
for children. Moreover, the government has not proven adept at
filling the parental role. 39 Thus, autonomous family theories hold
that families, not the state, are the primary source of value produc-
tion. Therefore, parents or their designees should be the decision-
makers for non-mature children.
4 0
Both theories lead to the same result: that raising children is a
private matter. It is the parents' role to decide what the good life
is-how and with whom the child should live. Unless the parents
are unfit to make those decisions or have consented to have others
make or share in making them, the state may not second-guess
those decisions or sanction the decision-making power of others.
Constitutional design and theory do not support the state's exer-
cise of such power.
The preceding explanation of the doctrinal content and phi-
losophical grounding of the parental rights doctrine frames the
following rehearsal of parental rights critiques. This framework
1996, four percent of United States children lived with neither parent. In African-American
families, eight percent of children did not live with either parent. In Native American fami-
lies, the number was six percent). For purposes of this Article, these arrangements are
treated as manifestations of parental choice to delegate or forego day-to-day child rearing
decisions and value production to kin.
137. Bartlett, supra note 52, at 303. Professor David Meyer suggests that when the family
is unified, then intervention should be curtailed, but when there is a disunity of rights or
interests, then intervention should be easier. Meyer, supra note 11, at 555. However this
scheme begs a series of questions regarding who decides when there is disunity; i.e., when
children have a voice beyond their parent's; when or under what standards the arbiter
should determine there is disunity; and, similarly, once that arbiter has decided there is
disunity, what the standards are for deciding whose rights or interests prevail.
138. Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney-Client
Model For Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1955, 1957-58 (1996); Appell & Boyer,
supra note 49, at 78-82; Bartlett, supra note 52, at 303; Martin Guggenheim, Counsel for Chil-
dren, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1488, 1507-08 (1999) (book review). Values regarding what is best
for a child drives adult decision-making. Determining and weighing values, however, is a
private, not public matter, best left to parents rather than the state. Galston, supra note 115,
at 238-39; Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 792.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 404-14.
140. See Gilles, supra note 87, at 965-72 (arguing for parental, rather than government
or majoritarian, control of value production in children).
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should help assess whether the critiques fundamentally conflict
with parental rights doctrine and whether alternate visions of fam-
ily privacy honor the basic theory underlying our political
structure. This introduction accepts this framework at face value,
and does not explore the philosophical (moral, metaphysical and
epistemological) underpinnings of the political philosophy that
provides a foundation for our constitutional structure or provide
support for parental rights doctrine in empirical, sociological, psy-
chological, or biological research. The goal instead is to establish
the basic principles of parental rights doctrine.
First, the doctrine defines parent matrifocally-where the mother
is the paradigmatic parent. She embodies both biological and care-
giving aspects of parenthood through the work of bearing and birth-
ing. Second, neither genetic connection nor nurturing in
themselves are sufficient to establish parenthood, but must exist in
combination in relation to the child or to the "mother" (the parent
who contains both biological and nurturing relationship to the
child). Third, parents, not the state, make decisions about their
children's interests when the children themselves cannot physically,
developmentally or economically, make their own decisions. Fourth,
parents can lose their status if the parents choose or if they severely
abuse or neglect their children. Finally, the privacy of the parent-
child unit is valuable both because it serves the political function of
rearing children to meet their basic needs and to be citizens, mor-
ally independent from the state which they will eventually govern
and because child rearing is an exercise of individual autonomy.
II. RECONSTRUCTING FAMILIES AND REVISING BOUNDARIES
This model of family privacy that privileges biological relation-
ships and parental assessments about what is in their children's
interests receives much criticism from a variety of perspectives.
One or both of two phenomena seem to motivate those critiques
that specifically address parental rights doctrine: (1) the subordi-
nating rhetoric and practices attendant to notions of parents as
supreme rights holders over their children; and (2) the apparent
dissonance between the privilege afforded nuclear families and the
structure of so many other families that are headed by different
types of parents. These other families include single mothers, les-
bian or gay co-parents, grandparents, extended kin networks, and
substitute care-givers. To these critics, parental rights doctrine is
out of touch with and a barrier to the protection of the interests
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and affectional connections of the adults and children in these
non-nuclear families. Prominent examples of this seeming disso-
nance are when persons without legal parental status, such as
prospective adoptive parents, foster parents, or co-parents, develop
parent-like relationships with children that the legal parents sub-
sequently and lawfully terminate. Parental rights critics would
revise family law to protect such significant, affectional relation-
ships over the objection of the birth parents.
Other critics who do not specifically address parental rights doc-
trine focus more broadly on aspects of decisional privacy that
relegate families to a private world apart from civil and market so-
ciety. This division places women (whom dominant culture equates
with mothers) and children in the private world of family. Such an
assignment limits their options, shields abusive husbands and fa-
thers from public sanction, excuses the public from financial
accountability to children and other dependents and their care-
givers, and relegates valuable care-giving norms to women and
families. These critics would place families and motherhood in the
public where they would be supported, valued, emulated, and,
most importantly, de-gendered.
Three common themes characterize all of these critiques and
the models they propose. First, they minimize biology in defining
parent-child relationships and privilege actual or prospective affec-
tional or care-giving relationships. Second, they essentially
advocate reduced family privacy, by allowing third parties or the
state to play a parental or supervisory role in determining what is
in the child's interests. Third, like parental rights doctrine, the cri-
tiques implicitly or explicitly are adult-oriented, even those that
purport to be child-centered. Indeed, the models frequently hold
homogenized views of children and their needs, without regard to
age, race, culture or gender.
The critiques vary in the depth of challenge to parental rights
doctrine and in the alternatives they propose. These revisionist
critiques can be placed into four categories based on the values
they promote. First is the public children perspective that views
children as belonging to the public and parents as fiduciaries
whose role is to promote and protect the children's interests. Sec-
ond is the psychological parenting perspective that values and
protects psychological relationships between children and the
adults who are not their legal or biological parents. Third are the
adult choice critiques that seek to accommodate the changing
roles of sex and gender in defining and creating families. Fourth
are feminist perspectives that claim the connections between
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women and motherhood and between families and privacy are
harmful to women, men, mothers, fathers, children and society.
A. Public Children Perspective: The Fiduciary Model
To some legal commentators, parental rights doctrine is trou-
bling because it leaves the important and potentially exploitive task
of child-rearing to parents, who have wide discretion in raising
their children. This discretion allows parents to elevate their inter-
ests above their children, particularly in the contexts of religious
training and the dissolution of families. 14 1 These commentators
criticize the adult-orientation and individualism of parental rights
rhetoric. 142 They propose a fiduciary model for parent-child rela-
tionships that treats children's interests as the principal and casts
the parents as fiduciaries who serve those interests. 143 Under that
model, the state fills the role of identifier and promoter of chil-
dren's current and future interests, rather than the protector of
children.'4 The purpose of the fiduciary model is both rhetorical
and directive. It seeks to humanize children by making them dis-
tinct from their parents and part of the larger political
141. See Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 138 (religious indoctrination); Dwyer,
supra note 54, at 1435 (religious indoctrination); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2446 (stating
that divorce weakens the family structure and promotes individualized values); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in Irra-
tional Action, 81 VA. L. Rv. 2493 (1995) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Irrational Action] (failure
to consent to children's adoption); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1247, 1256 (1999) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Family Privacy]
(arguing that the state should establish "social and legal expectations" to educate parents in
their responsibilities).
142. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2412-13; Woodhouse, supra note 68, at 1809-12. At
least two proponents of the model were motivated by the Supreme Court's promotion of
the parents' religious values over the presumed secular interests of the children in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). SeeArneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 138-39; Dwyer, supra
note 54, at 1383-90.
143. See, e.g., Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113; Dwyer, supra note 54; Scott & Scott,
supra note 7; Woodhouse, Irrational Action & Family Privacy, supra note 141; Woodhouse,
supra note 68. These commentators vary in the content and specificity of proposals for
change and in their views of what children's interests are, but they are united in their oppo-
sition to status-based parental rights. Compare Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2418
(advocating laws that promote child-centered parental decisions) with Arneson & Shapiro,
supra note 113, at 156-57 (the state should limit parental decisions that threaten children's
future autonomy), Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1429 (permitting state intervention that would
be good for the child), and Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at 2505-06 (argu-
ing that the law should protect children's affectional relationships).
144. See generally, Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113; Dwyer, supra note 54; Scott &
Scott, supra note 7; Woodhouse, Irrational Action & Family Privacy, supra note 141; Wood-
house, supra note 68.
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145
community. The model also seeks to provide a decisional stan-
dard for parents, judges and legislators to insure that they each act
in ways that are cognizant and protective of children's interests.
1 46
Under the fiduciary model, parents would not have the right to
direct their children's upbringing, but would instead be stewards
for their children, acting in their present and future interests147 or
according to their presumed desires. 14 Although proponents of
the fiduciary model generally presume that children should re-
main with their families of origin (usually their birth parents),
parents, under this model, would lose their status or authority by
seff-dealing-placing their own interests above their children's.1
50
Rather than deferring to parental decisions about children, the
fiduciary model frees judges to assess whether parental decisions
reflect their children's interests, presumably by reference to public
standards defining and ranking children's interests.15 ' The model
would expand current legislative authority to protect children's
145. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 156-71; Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2474;
Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at 2507. Apparently, Professors Elizabeth and
Robert Scott would not significantly modify current doctrine, but instead recharacterize the
parent-state balance of power regarding children from state as protector of dependant chil-
dren to state as definer and arbiter of interests. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2438-39
(casting child labor prohibitions, education mandates, and minor drinking, driving and
marriage rules as analogous to conflict of interest rules applicable in fiduciary contexts).
Professors Scott and Scott would, moreover, sanction greater state monitoring of children
through physical and psychological evaluations. Id. at 2441. They do not, however, suggest
standards for interpreting the results of those tests.
146. See Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 156-57; Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1432-
35; Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2418; Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at
2504-05. Professors Scott and Scott claim their vision of parents as fiduciaries is largely
descriptive of current law. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2453.
147. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 149-57; Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1429-30;
Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2418-19; Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at
2500-01. The fiduciary model is particularly concerned with preserving children's future
interests in being autonomous, which may be synonymous with rejecting their parents'
values. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 156; Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1430.
148. Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1432-33; Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at
2504-05.
149. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 156-57; Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2431;
Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at 2504.
150. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2442; see Woodhouse, supra note 141, at 1256; see also
Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 154-56 (arguing that the Amish parents in Wisconsin
v. Yoder were serving their own and their community's religious needs at the expense of
their children's religious freedom).
151. E.g., Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 158-62 (maximizing a child's oppor-
tunities for an "open future," generally by promoting secular education); Dwyer, supra note
54, at 1429, 1433 (continuing care, protection, guidance by a single set of parents, educa-
tional opportunity, and medical care); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2437-39 (discussing
broad social consensus about the best interests of the child); Woodhouse, Irrational Action,
supra note 141, at 2501-08 (preserving affectional attachments).
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physical health and development to preclude parents from inter-
fering with children's present happiness and future interests.
152
Although the model's proponents are more or less deferential
to parental determinations of the child's interests, the model
diminishes parental authority and remains adult-oriented. It di-
minishes parental authority and family privacy, under the parental
rights doctrine, by presuming there is some universal correct an-
swer about children's interests and that the state does or should
have the wisdom and authority to make those determinations.
5 4
Parental rights doctrine holds that such wisdom and authority are
within the parent's province, in part because the state should be
relatively neutral about competing family values as long as they do
not promote abuse or neglect. The fiduciary model remains adult-
oriented, merely substituting the state as all-knowing super-parent
able to discern what children's interests are and to discern when
parents are acting contrary to their child's interests.5 5 This model
does not empower, particularize or free children to decide any
more than the parental rights doctrine.
152. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 158-71 (arguing that children must be free
to develop critical thinking skills, but parents should be free to make choices that might
limit children's future adult career options); Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1430 (noting that
parents mustjustify decisions based on the child's desires and future interests); Woodhouse,
supra note 14, at 1042 (criticizing parental right to refuse to send children to school or to
consent to adoption when children are in the care of others).
153. Compare Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2443-45 (state should be more deferential
in intact families, but less when interests are more likely to conflict), with Dwyer, supra note
54, at 1376, 1429 (arguing parents have no legal grounds to resist state intervention except
by asserting the child's interests to prohibit unhelpful state intervention).
154. For example, Arneson and Shapiro favor religious freedom. Arneson & Shapiro,
supra note 113, at 154 ("As a fiduciary, the parent is bound to preserve the child's own fu-
ture religious freedom."). Professors Dwyer and Woodhouse expect the state to define and
protect the child's presumed desires or best interests. Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1433-35;
Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at 2504-05.
155. As a case in point, Arneson and Shapiro define children's interests in reference to
the "state's interests in the production of a citizenry able to participate in its operations."
Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 157; see also Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1432-33 (noting
that parents would substitute theirjudgment for what the child would rationally want). Pro-
fessors Elizabeth and Robert Scott present a more nuanced approach that promotes laws
which strengthen the parent-child relationship and defer to parental assessments of the
child's interests. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2415-18, 2430-31.
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B. Psychological Parent Perspective
The psychological parent view favors relationships children156
form with their primary care-givers. This perspective holds that
day-to-day care-giving, not biological connections, should define
parenthood. Although in many, if not in most instances, the
biological parents will be the psychological parents. The theory
holds that (biological) parental rights should not prevail over
psychological parental rights, as it is in every child's best interests157
to remain with his or her psychological parent. Because
psychological attachments predominate in assessing children's
interests, biological connections may be subordinated to
psychological relationships."" Psychological parent advocates fear
that the parental rights doctrine does not protect children's desires
or interests in maintaining psychological relationships.
156. This theory is no doubt shaped by the influential series of books on the best inter-
ests of children, in which Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and AlbertJ. Solnit articulated and
popularized a psychological theory that children's relationships with their care-givers
should not be disturbed or disrupted. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS] and BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]. Accord-
ing to the theory, the "psychological parent" is the real parent-the most important
relationship the child has, and disturbing that relationship harms the child. A "psychologi-
cal parent" is "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a par-
ent, as well as the child's physical needs." BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra, at 98. For
critiques of the psychological parent theory, see Susan Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings, A Family Systems Approach, 5 PSYCH., PUBL. POL'Y, &
L. 951, 957-58 (1999); see also Symposium, Helping Families in Crisis: the Intersection of Law &
Psychology, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 295 (1996); Symposium, The Impact of Psychologi-
cal Parenting Theory on Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 485
(1983-1984).
157. E.g., Marcus T. Boccaccini & Eleanor Willemsen, Contested Adoption and the Liberty
Interest of the Child, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 211 (1998); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley,
Parental Rights and the Ugly Duckling, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 41, 56-67 (1999); Meyer, supra note
11, at 575-83; Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a Con-
tested Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41 (1995); Woodhouse, Irrational Action,
supra note 141. Yet the psychological parenting theory is less determinative when state au-
thorities decide to remove children from their parents. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good
Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347, 348
(1996); see also Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1716, 1732-33 (2000) (describing studies that find insuffi-
cient resources are devoted to keeping children with their families of origin).
158. See Davis, supra note 157, at 363-64 (arguing that psychological parenting theory
privileges relationships with the psychological parent and discounts the child's other at-
tachments); Marsha Garrison, Parents'Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child,
22 N.Y.U. R~v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 394-95 (1996) (noting psychological parent advo-
cates support non-biological connections, but not biological ones).
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The psychological parent perspective comprises two models.
The first, the de facto parent model, expands the idea of parent to
include adults who become members of the child's family and
whom the child may view as a parent, though the person lacks a
legal or biological relationship to the child. The second, the adop-
tion promotion model, seeks to maximize children's opportunities
to develop or preserve non-biological parent-child relationships.
Both models are concerned primarily with the promotion of psy-
chological relationships children can form or have formed with
care-giving adults. The models purport to be child-centered, how-
ever, they presume that these psychological attachments are
important to all children, regardless of age or circumstances.
These models would, for the most part, permit individualized in-
quiries into children's needs,"" but they presume that adults other
than the parents should determine, or have a role in determining,
the children's interests.
1. De Facto Parent Models-Persons who meet the definition of
parent generally have the right to play a role in the child's up-
bringing through custody, support and visitation. 16 Parents enjoy a
presumption that they will have custody of, or visitation with, the
child and that the best interests of the child guides these deci-161
sions. Yet persons who do not satisfy legal definitions of parent
often play significant roles in children's lives. Such relationships
commonly develop when children form attachments to steppar-
ents, foster parents, other care-givers selected by the parents, and
father figures when the mother and father were not married.
These non-legal, de facto parents can lose their relationship and
any contact with the child, should the legal parent so choose. 162 De
facto parent models give these persons legal status, so that they can
seek custody or visitation with the child over the parent's objec-
tion, but they cannot necessarily terminate parental rights. In this
way, the de facto parent models expand the definition of parent to
people who have in fact, not through the operation of law, stood in
the role of parent to a child. There are two types of de facto parent
model, one consensual and the other non-consensual. The con-
sensual model grants legal status only to those persons who have
become de facto parents through relationships to which fit parents
159. Exceptions include the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and Professor
Elizabeth Bartholet, both promoting termination of parental rights whether or not the
child has significant affective relationships with others. See infra, text accompanying notes
193-208.
160. Cahn, supra note 87, at 5.
161. Id.
162. Bartlett, sura note 52, at 244.
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have consented. The non-consensual model grants such status to
persons without regard to parental consent or fitness. 1"
a. Consensual Model-The consensual de facto parent model
finds support in the American Law Institute's Draft Principles of
164
the Law of Family Dissolution (A.L.I.). This model also finds16law166
support in a growing body of statutory165 and case law that permit
163. "Unfitness" is used throughout this Article to refer to parental failings regarding
their children that rise to the level of abuse or neglect that has harmed or might harm the
child. The Article contrasts parental fitness standards to the "best interests of the child" that
is not based on harm or parental fitness, but instead on what is best for the child.
164. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, PART I, §§ 2.03(1), 2.04, 2.09, 2.10, 2.13 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998).
165. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 125C.050(2)-(3) (Michie Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001)
(each granting persons who have established a de facto parent-child relationship standing
to seek visitation); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (Michie Supp. 2001) (defining de
facto custodian as person who has been primary care-giver and financial supporter of child
and excluding foster parents); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-13-2, 31-17-2-8 (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2001) (permitting consideration of awarding custody to de facto custodian in pater-
nity and custody proceedings); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(3) (1999) (granting persons who
have established a de facto parent-child relationship standing to seek visitation and cus-
tody). Many other states have statutes that permit third parties to seek custody (including
visitation) based on prior custody of the child, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-123(1) (2001);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002), exceptional circum-
stances that could include substantial relationship to the child, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-415(G)(1) (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West 2001), or harm to the
child if the relationship were discontinued, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 (West 1994). New
Jersey requires that de facto parents be given notice and an opportunity to object to an
adoption. N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-46(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001).
166. See generally, Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982) (funding for steppar-
ent); Bryan v Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (funding for stepparent); In re
Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (funding for lesbian co-parent); In re
Martha M., 251 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988) (funding for heterosexual co-parent);
Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (funding for
lesbian co-parent); Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (funding for step-
parent); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (funding for stepparent
after wife-mother's death); Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979) (funding for step-
parent); S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (denying visits on the basis of the
best interest of the child, but granting standing to lesbian co-parent); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (funding for lesbian co-parent);
In re LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (funding for lesbian co-parent);
Cavanaugh v. deBaudiniere, 493 N.W.2d 197 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (funding for stepparent);
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000) (funding for lesbian
co-parent); AC. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (funding for lesbian co-parent);
J.A.L. v. E.P.H, 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (funding for lesbian co-parent); Karner
v. McMahon, 640 A.2d 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (funding for stepparent); Spells v. Spells,
378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (funding for stepparent); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959 (R.I. 2000); Utah ex rel. J.W.E, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) (funding for stepparent); In re
H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub nora, Knott v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975
(1995) (funding for lesbian co-parent); see also In re Olivia J., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (2000)
(holding that lesbian co-parent can obtain visitation through guardianship statute). The
NewJersey Supreme Court construed "parent" in the state parental custody statute to apply
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a person, frequently the significant other or affectional partner of
the legal parent, who has lived with, cared for, and supported the
child to secure some measure of parental status, generally to assert
visitation or custody claims. That status would allow the de facto
parent, upon dissolution of the relationship, to have visitation or
custody, and make decisions on behalf of the child. 16' The pre-
sumption, however, is that the de facto parent will not have
primary custodial or decisionmaking responsibility unless several
conditions exist. Such conditions are that the legal parent agrees,
has not performed a reasonable share of parenting, or that it
would be harmful to the child not to be with the de facto parent.68
The consensual de facto parent model creates a new category of
parent. Nevertheless, it does not unduly diminish the legal parent's
role as parent, because it requires either parental consent to the169
relationship's formation or a failure to parent. This model
to de facto parents. VC., 748 A.2d at 547-48. Fewer states will award primary custody to the
co-parent over the legal parent. David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay
and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 539 (1999); see also Gestl v.
Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that lesbian de facto parent
has standing but must prove exceptional circumstances to obtain custody); LaChapelle, 607
N.W.2d at 151 (awarding sole physical custody to the birth mother and joint legal custody to
her and her ex-partner, the lesbian co-parent). But see Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246
(Colo. 1995) (upholding denial of return of child to mother who initially consented to
child's placement before birth and did not request return of the child for over six months).
167. A.L.I., supra note 164, at §§ 2.03(1) (defining "parent" as legal and de facto par-
ent), 2.04 (granting certain de facto parents party status), 2.09 (allocating custody to
"parents"), 2.10 (allocating decisionmaking responsibility among "parents"), 2.13 (listing
factors court should consider in allocating custody and decisionmaking among parents,
such as violence, drug use or child abuse), 2.14 (listing factors court should not consider,
such as race, gender, sexual orientation and earning capacity).
168. A.L.I., supra note 164, at § 2.21 (1). This is consistent with current doctrine. Cham-
bers & Polikoff, supra note 166, at 539; see also, Gest4 754 A.2d 1087 (holding lesbian de facto
parent has standing but must prove exceptional circumstances to obtain custody); La-
Chapelle, 607 N.W.2d 151 (awarding sole physical custody to the birth mother and joint legal
custody to her and her ex-partner, the lesbian co-parent). However, when de facto parents
have had sole physical custody, courts may be willing to award full custody to the de facto
parent rather than removing the child to the mother. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-13-2.5(d)
& 31-17-2-8.5(d) (Michie Supp. 2001) (stating that best interests of the child governs deci-
sion to grant de facto custodian custody); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(3) (a) (1999) (applying
best interests of the child test to custody, visitation and guardianship requests of persons
whom court determines has established emotional ties creating a parent-child relationship);
C.C.RS., 892 P.2d 246 (affirming award of custody to persons with whom the mother placed
the child immediately after birth and the following six months); In re A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding custody to grandparents who had cared for the child with
the mother's consent for four months and holding that the best interests of the child stan-
dard applies in custody disputes between legal parents and non-parents who can make the
statutory showing that the that they have had the physical care of a child for six months or
more).
169. The ALI defines a de facto parent as:
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sanctions state interference with parental authority to determine
the child's interests. It does so, however, only when the
psychological parent relationship developed from a relationship to
which the legal parent had previously consented,' ° or when the
parent has abdicated the parental role.'7' The model thus limits
parental authority (regarding with whom the child may have an
ongoing relationship) only when the parents themselves have
chosen to expand their own family unit or have abdicated their
parental role.7 2 Moreover, the consensual de facto parent doctrine
comports with the matrifocal definition of parent to the extent
that de facto parent status extends largely to persons who were in a
domestic partnership with the legal or biological parent and
provided care for the child."' That is, in the context of co-
parenting, the de facto parent is analogous to the non-biological
an adult, not the child's legal parent, who for a period that is significant in light of
the child's age, developmental level, and other circumstances, (i) has resided with
the child, and (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with
the consent of a legal parent to the formation of a defacto parent relationship or as a result of a
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, regularly has
performed (i) a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (ii) a share of
caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child pri-
marily has lived.
A.L.I., supra note 164, § 2.03(1) (b) (emphasis added).
170. Id. Case law frequently articulates the consent of the parent to the formation of
the relationship as a factor or standard when defining de facto parent. E.g., E.N.O., 711
N.E.2d at 891 (defining de facto parent as someone who shares parental responsibilities
"with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent"); VC., 748 A.2d at 552 (the in-
tent of the legal parent to have the third party serve a parental role is critical to the analysis
of whether some one is a de facto parent); JA.L., 682 A.2d at 1321 (holding that a person
has standing in loco parentis when he or she, inter alia, "developed a relationship with the
child as a result of the participation and acquiescence of the natural parent.... ."); Rubano,
759 A.2d at 975 (citing parental consent to and fostering of the relationship as an element
in determining whether the de facto parent may obtain visitation rights); H.S.H.K., 533
N.W.2d at 421 (listing as one element of de facto parent test "that the [legal] parent con-
sented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship with the child").
171. A.L.I., supra note 164, § 2.03(1)(b).
172. Even then, de facto parents frequently hold a secondary parental status that does
not necessarily place the de facto parent on the same footing as a legal father or mother
who would be entitled to custody or visitation based on a best interests of the child analysis.
Instead, de facto parents, having established de facto status, are more likely to have to prove
detriment to the child should contact discontinue, and de facto parents are rarely entitled
to or awarded custody over a legal parent. See generally, supra note 166.
173. 748 A.2d at 552 (stating that if the legal parent "wishes to maintain that zone of
privacy she cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede
over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound
bond with the child").
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"father" who marries the "mother" or cares for the child."4 In this
way, the model does not reduce the importance of biology or make
the family public: it simply adds parents based on past parental
conduct and consent.
b. Non-consensual Model-In contrast, the non-consensual de
facto parent model does not consult parental conduct, but looks
solely at non-parents' parent-like relationships with children,
granting de facto parent status to persons who did not form a rela-
tionship to the child with the parents' consent or because of
parental unfitness. 75 Primarily reflected in legal commentary, but
also in some doctrine, the non-consensual de facto parent model
finds its motivation in protecting de facto psychological relation-
ships children form with adults other than their parents.16
Commentary advocating this proposed model, purportedly driven
'by the child's needs or interests, apparently responds to failed
"',,77
adoption cases like "Baby Richard" and "Baby Jessica. In those
situations, parental rights doctrine forced would-be adoptive cou-
ples to return young children, whom the couples had raised since
birth. They returned the children because the prospective adop-
174. Notwithstanding a heterosexist fatherhood analogy, and perhaps underscoring the
persistence of the social construction of gender, at least one female co-parent has obtained
legal recognition of her parenthood through statutory provisions for determining "the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26
(Lexis 2000). The Rhode Island statute was construed by Rubano to grant jurisdiction and
standing to lesbian co-parent seeking visitation after breakup of the women's relationship.
759 A.2d at 966-970. The court thus characterized the second female parent as a mother
rather than as a father. The court may have been unwilling to make the cognitive leap of
identifying a woman "father." Instead, the court reinforced the social connection between
woman and mother and subverted the biological connection between mother and child.
This is particularly noteworthy since the Uniform Parentage Act, after which Rhode Island's
statute was modeled, recognizes only "natural" mothers who have given birth to the child.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 3(1), 9B U.L.A. 391 (2001). "Natural" fatherhood may be
established simply by receiving the child into one's home and openly holding the child out
as one's natural child. Id., § 4(a) (4), 9B U.LA 394.
175. One definition of unfitness is the "complete failure or inability of any legal parent
to perform caretaking functions." A.L.I., supra note 164, § 2.03 (1) (b).
176. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050(2)-(3) (Michie Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.119 (1999) (noting that both statutes grant certain rights to de facto parents without
requiring consent of the parents); Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Parents and Strangers: The Uniform
Adoption Act Revisits the Parental Rights Doctrine, 30 FAM. L.Q. 379, 384-85 (1996);Janet Leach
Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent,
16 NOVA L. REv. 733, 760 (1992); Woodhouse, supra note 14, at 1042.
177. See O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1303 (1995) (Baby Richard); DeBoer v. De-
Boer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993) (BabyJessica); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and
Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 11, 72-84 (1994); Gilbert A.
Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with
Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 376-77 (1994); Suellyn Scarnecchia, Who isJes-
sica's Mother? Defining Motherhood Through Reality, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL & L. 1, 1-2
(1994); Woodhouse, supra note 54, at 336-37 (each addressing one or both of these cases).
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tive parents failed to obtain parental consent or prove that a non-
consenting parent was unfit. Moved both by the plight of the chil-
dren and their psychological parents, the commentary promotes a
model which places such de facto parents or judges on the same or
better footing as biological parents in determining what the child's
interests are.
This model accords children or their psychological parents legal
standing to question parental determinations about what is best for
the child. The model would require the court to hear and consider
the child's perspective, particularly evidence of affectional ties,
when determining custody as between parents and third parties. 17
The model could also, in its most extreme version, create a liberty
interest for the child and his or her psychological parents to family179
protection. By giving children or their psychological parents
these rights, this model provides children with a right not to be
raised by their birth parents.80 This right could inhere in the child
and the psychological parents to protect established family rela-
tionships,181 or could be effected by granting power to a child's
psychological parents to seek custody or visitation on behalf of the
• 182
child. The model would protect a child's psychological relation-
178. E.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 177, at 102-05; Holmes, supra note 177, at 397 (con-
templating visitation, not full custodial relationships, between children and psychological
parents).
179. E.g., Holmes, supra note 177, at 362, 395; Scarnecchia, supra note 157, at 52-56;
Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141. Although Fitzgerald does not develop this
argument, she does advocate that de facto families be protected to the same degree as birth
families. Fitzgerald, supra note 177, at 68.
180. Fitzgerald, supra note 177, at 22-23, 106-108; Lowe, supra note 176, at 385-86;
Scarnecchia, supra note 177, at 11-12; see also Holmes, supra note 177, at 362 (arguing that
the law should afford children an independent liberty interest in their relationships with
both "legal parents and nonlegal parents"). Holmes, like Fitzgerald, is particularly sensitive
to the multiple-attachments children have to parents and parental figures so he would not
supplant one parent or set of parents with another. Holmes, supra note 177, at 407 ("Pro-
tecting the child's liberty interest mandates the continuation of the child-parent
relationships through visitation, unless visitation would harm the child."). Holmes would,
however, supplant parents' rights with children's rights. Id. at 395.
181. Scarnecchia, supra note 157, at 45-46.
182. Richards, supra note 176, at 758; Scarnecchia, supra note 177, at 11; see also
Holmes, supra note 177, at 395-97 (stating that parent-like individuals could assert claims
on behalf of the child). Professor Scarnecchia does not argue for the unbridled standing of
nonparents. Instead, she would limit the right to petition for custody to cases where the
child is not in an "intact biological home" and the petitioners have actual custody of the
child. Scarnecchia, supra note 177, at 11. Some states permit custodial care-givers to retain
custody based on the best interests of the child (and thus disregarding parental presump-
tion) over the parent's objection. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-13-2.5, 31-17-2-8.5
(Michie Supp. 2000) (permitting award of custody to de facto custodian based on the bests
interests of the child). Indiana does, however, take into account parental consent or acqui-
escence to third party custody. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5 (Michie Supp. 2000)
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ships, regardless of the legal parents' fitness or consent to that re-
lationship. 1 3 Thus, when foster parents, would-be adoptive parents,
or presumably any other primary caretakers face a loss of custody
of the child to the legal parents, the court should review the best
interests of the child to award custody.11
4
Implicit in this model are two significant presumptions about
parental authority. The first is that parents do not want what is best
for their children, particularly when the children have formed at-
tachments to others. The second presumption is that the child or
other adults can weigh and assess the child's interests more accu-
rately than the parents, even without proof of unfitness. Both
presumptions implicitly or explicitly challenge parental rights doc-
trine by disconnecting parental and child interests and permitting
intervention into families based on some standard lower than pa-
rental unfitness or consent. This model, thus, fundamentally
revises parental rights doctrine by taking decision-making author-
ity from biological parents and giving it to the child, the child's de
facto parents, the judge or the child's lawyer. Parental rights doc-
trine only permits this transfer if the parents consent or are failing
in their parental responsibilities. The non-consensual de facto par-
ent model essentially holds that the parental decisions no longer
deserve deference once the child has been out of their care for an
undefined length of time. Moreover, this model's diminution of
the biological connection assumes that psychological attachments
are more important than biological attachments. It also assumes
that the parental work of bearing and giving birth to a child is less
valuable than providing day-to-day care to a child after birth.
In contrast, the parental rights doctrine values this biological
mothering and requires a failing on the part of the mother and
the person who supports her or the child before others can earn
the privilege of deciding what is best for children. The protec-
(requiring clear and convincing proof that the child has been cared for by de facto custo-
dian and consideration of parental intent in placing child with de facto custodian); In re
Huber, 723 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (requiring proof of parental unfitness,
long acquiescence in the child living in the care of others or voluntary relinquishment of
the child before applying best interests of the child to custody disputes between parents and
third parties); see also In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995); In re A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (both construing COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-123(1) (2000) to permit
award of custody to physical custodians based on the best interests of the child).
183. Lowe, supra note 176, at 386-87; Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note 141, at
2510-18.
184. Lowe, supra note 176, at 386-87. Accord Woodhouse, Irrational Action, supra note
141, at 2505-18 (referring to decisionmaking based on the child's attachments and the
child's voice).
185. In the thwarted adoption cases, the birth mothers consented to adoption just after
birth. The biological fathers were not be married to the mother or did not have a chance to
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tion of psychological relationships, to the formation of which the
birth parents never consented, undermines this prohibition
against intervention into biological families.18  Advocating that
children should have a separate, even constitutionally protected,
liberty interest in maintaining these relationships directly chal-
lenges the parental rights doctrine because the proposed interest
rests on a presumption that fit parents do not protect their chil-
dren's interests. Moreover, granting children such a liberty interest
would effectively permit psychological parents to usurp the par-
ents' constitutional liberty interest in a relationship with their
children.1
87
2. Adoption Promotion Model-This model limits parental author-
ity by expanding decisionmakers for children and presuming that
once a child or a sibling is in substitute care, the child need not be
reunited with the biological family. The adoption promotion
model manifests itself in standards, doctrine and the legal com-
mentary that make adoption or prospective adoptive families equal
to birth families.Iss The Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 (UAA) and
a handful of state adoption statutes provide an example of this ap-
proach. They permit hearings following thwarted adoptions that
would allow nonparents to obtain custody instead of a non-
consenting, fit birth parent.8 9 Accordingly, when nonparents seek
support the child. In these cases, one could argue that the biological father is not or should
not be a legal father. Nevertheless, parental rights doctrine grants the biological father the
first chance to fully earn parenthood, unless (arguably) the mother is married to another
man.
186. See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 176, at 384-85 (describing the flaws of privileging biol-
ogy over psychology).
187. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Quality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977)
(holding that foster parent liberty interest would interfere with parents' liberty interest).
188. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.LA. 1 (1994); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN (1999). Every state has amended its abuse
and neglect and termination of parental rights statutes to reflect ASFA's mandates to pro-
mote termination of parental rights and adoption. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
STATES' EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 6
(GAO/HEHS-00-1, December 1999); see also National Conference of State Legislatures, at
http://www.ncls.org/programs/cyf/howelfare.htm (surveying all state ASFA related provi-
sions). ASFA requires states to modify their state law and practice in order to receive federal
matching funds for child welfare service. 42 U.S.C.S. § 622 (Lexis 1998); 42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 671 (a), 675(5) (Lexis 1999 & Supp. 2001).
189. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) §§ 2-408(e)-(f), 2-409(e)-(f), 9 U.L.A. 60-63 (1999);
see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (providing that after an
adoption petition has been denied or vacated, "the court shall promptly conduct a hearing
as to the temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the
proceedings .... "); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-408 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 2000). Nevada
has a set of puzzling adoption and termination of parental rights statutes that could be con-
strued to permit a custody hearing after a failed adoption. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.165,
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to adopt a child and the court fails to find that grounds for adop-
tion exist (for example, the birth parent is unfit or has consented
to the adoption), the parent is not necessarily entitled to resume
custody.'90 Instead, the court will determine with whom the childS 191
should live.
These provisions essentially permit courts to transfer custody
from birth parents to other private individuals who have filed an
adoption petition, even when the court has found that fit birth
parents do not consent or have never consented to placement of
the child with the adoption petitioners. These provisions amount
to a limitation of parental authority because they transfer the right
to determine custody and control of the child from the parents to
the court. They also amount to a limitation of parental authority
because the provisions permit this intervention regardless of
whether parents have failed in their parental responsibilities by
abusing or neglecting the child.19 These provisions allow the filing
of an adoption petition to transform non-parents into parents.
Like the non-consensual de facto parent model, the UAA subordi-
nates biological relationships. The UAA, however, goes further by
128.160 (Michie 1998) (each stating, after describing methods to set aside an adoption or
termination of parental rights, that "[a]fter a petition for adoption has been granted, there
is a presumption ... that remaining in the home of the adopting parent is in the child's best
interest"). Even without explicit statutory authority, some courts will conduct custody hear-
ings after thwarted or failed adoptions. Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 15
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995); cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 118
(1995); Matter of Adoption of a Child, 705 A.2d 1233 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 1998).
190. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) § 2-408, 9 U.LA. 62 (1999) (a finding that the
parent is not unfit or does not consent to the child's adoption "is not tantamount to a de-
termination that the child must be placed in that parent's custody" (emphasis omitted)).
191. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) §§ 2-406(f) (2), 408(e), 409(e), 9 U.LA. 58-62 (1999)
(providing for determination whether return to the mother would be detrimental to the
child when the mother revokes her adoption consent after a failed attempt to have the fa-
ther's rights terminated and an adoption decree entered). State law has long permitted
courts to conduct best interests of the child hearings when a mother seeks to revoke her
consent when there are no other barriers to the adoption. E.g., Haw. REV. STAT. § 578-2(f)
(Michie 1999) (stating that the best interests of the child determines whether the mother
may revoke her consent); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 115-b(3) & (4) (McKinney 1999) (same);
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) §§ 2-408(0, 2-409(f), 3-506, 3-704, 9 U.L.A. 61, 63, 90, 96-96
(1999) (providing for determination of whether it is in the best interests of the child to be
placed with the father who does not consent to the adoption or is not found to be unfit);
Graves v. Graves, 288 So.2d 142 (Ala. 1973); Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955);
Adoption of Duarte, 40 Cal. Rptr. 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Kathy 0. v. Counseling & Family
Services, 438 N.E.2d 695 (Il1. 1982); In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1966); In re Adoption of
Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1984). For a recent example of application of this doctrine
after the vacation of a fraudulent adoption, see In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 946 (Ill.
App. 2000).
192. See Cahn, supra note 87, at 22-23 (noting that in these situations, courts explicitly
or implicitly redefine parent to include thwarted adoptive parents in order to avoid the
parental preference doctrine and apply instead the best interests of the child standard).
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subordinating biological relationships to nascent psychological
relationships.
Federal child welfare policy applies a preference for the
adoption of children whose parents have been unwilling or unable
to provide adequate childcare. The Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 (ASFA) 193 marks a departure in articulated federal
child welfare policy from family preservation to adoption.1 4 ASFA
promotes adoption of foster children at the expense of parental
rights. It simultaneously limits funding for family preservation and
time for family reunification while it increases funding for
promotion and preservation of adoption. ASFA limits the
provision of services to preserve families, instead "putting children
on a fast track from foster care to safe and loving and permanent
193. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). ASFA amends and significantly departs from the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (the "AACWA"), Pub. L. No. 96-272 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 & 670
(1994)). The AACWA, based on parental rights doctrine, created financial incentives for the
states to develop and use programs to keep children at home with their families whenever
reasonably possible and for those children who are removed, to return them home or when
return home is not possible place them permanently elsewhere through adoption or pre-
pare them for independent living. See FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (Mark Hardin ed.,
1983); Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do about It: Is the Problem
That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or That Too Many Children Are
Entering Foster Care, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 141, 141-43 (1999) (both providing a description
and history of AACWA).
194. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Fed-
eral Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 112 (1999). The term "articulated" is used
because, although federal child protection policy has, since at least 1980, featured families
of origin as the preferred resource for children, the federal government failed to provide
leadership in the form of explanation or enforcement of rules designed to do so. See Naomi
R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1189, 1192-97 (1999) (tracing policy back to the early 1900s). See also Suter v. Artist M.,
503 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1992) (noting absence of federal rules or regulation giving content
to the reasonable efforts requirement); David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act-
Hope and Its Subversion, 34 FAM. L.Q. 329, 334-36, 342 (2000) (describing failures of AACWA
largely due to lack of local and federal enforcement). But see Cahn, supra, at 1196-97 (de-
scribing and citing testimony at Congressional Hearings regarding AACWA claiming the
states had provided too much emphasis on family preservation and reunification); Herring,
supra, at 334 (suggesting that front line decisionmakers resisted federal permanency plan-
ning mandates due to concerns about fairness to families). Nevertheless, due to failures in
implementation of AACWA, child advocates resorted to private enforcement of federal law
provisions. By 1996, nearly half of the states were or had been under court supervision for
failure to provide basic services to children in the child protection system. Robert Pear,
Many States Fail to Meet Mandates on Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at 1. See, e.g.,
Suter, 503 U.S. 347; Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 E2d 504 (2d Cir. 1983); Norman v.Johnson, 739 F.
Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990); B. H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Il. 1989); see also
Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation" The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 593, 618-37 (1992) (describing the
litigation).
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homes."'95 ASFA permits states not to provide family preservation
services to families in certain instances. 196 It, nevertheless, requires
that the state seek to maintain most neglected and abused children
in their homes and, if removed, to reunify them with their families.
The AFSA also requires states to initiate or join petitions to
terminate parental rights in these same circumstances or if a child
has been in foster care for fifteen out of the most recent twenty-
two months, with a few exceptions.' 9' ASFA does not increase
funding or provide additional safeguards to insure that parents
receive reunification services during that fifteen-month period.'9 8
Instead, it limits the time period for reunification of children with
their families, provides financial incentives for adoption, and
requires states to make reasonable efforts to have a child adopted
when that is the goal for the child.19
ASFA presumes that certain children, those who have been in
foster care for over one year and those with very violent parents,
should be adopted. 00 These presumptions, coupled with the shift
of funding to adoption promotion and planning, even before pa-
rental rights have been terminated, illustrate a move away from
deference to parental authority and deference to individualizedin Urles201
inquiries as to parental fitness. ASFA also establishes generic
195. 143 CONG. REc. H10787 (Nov. 13, 1997) (statements of Rep. Kennelly).
196. Such instances are when a court has determined that the parent has abandoned,
tortured, chronically abused or sexually abused the child, the parent has feloniously as-
saulted, killed or attempted to kill the child or another child of the parent, or the parent's
parental rights to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated. 42 U.S.C.S. § 671 (a)(15)
(Lexis 1998).
197. 42 U.S.C.S. § 675(5)(E) (Lexis 1998). A state is not required to file a petition to
terminate parental rights when the child is being cared for by a relative, the state agency has
determined that filing such proceedings would not be in the best interests of the child, or if
reasonable efforts were required but not provided by the state. Id.
198. Indeed, the fifteen years between passage of the AACWA and its ASFA amend-
ments were marked by failures in the provision of meaningful preservation and
reunification services for families. Cahn, supra note 194, at 1201-04; Herring, supra note
194, at 332-36.
199. 42 U.S.C.S. § 671 (a) (15) (Lexis 1998) (requiring state agencies to make reason-
able efforts to effect the permanent placement of the child); 42 U.S.C.S. § 675(1) (E) (Lexis
1998) (defining adoption mandates and incentives).
200. This does not mean to suggest that adoption is not an excellent option for many
children or that the state agencies did not need incentives to promote adoption. ASFA does
reflect, for whatever reasons, a preference for substitute care for certain children, particu-
larly those who come from poor and minority families. See Roberts, supra note 194, at 129
(noting that "it seems that this reverence of adoption over biology is reserved for poor and
minority families that are most often clients of the child welfare system").
201. Although the Constitution countenances termination of parental rights--or non-
assignment of parental rights-before a father has established more than a genetic connec-
tion to the child or the mother, see supra text accompanying notes 22-31, the Constitution
does appear to require an individualized inquiry into parental conduct in relation to the
child after parental rights are established, see supra text accompanying note 93. Although
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mandates as to how long a child should belong to his or her family.
Although it permits individualized consideration, ASFA presumes
that children, whether they are infants or teenagers, should not
return to their families of origin after being separated for fifteen
months. ASFA further presumes that they should be placed in new
adoptive homes, again without regard to the children's own cir-
cumstances, attachments, or age. Like the UAA, the ASFA
constitutes at least a partial abandonment of the presumption that
biological parents are the first choice for children.02 Indeed, as
one commentator has observed, ASFA seems to view adoption as
the goal of child welfare services and the legal relationship be-
tween children and their parents to be the barrier to that goal's
attainment. °s
Professor Elizabeth Bartholet appears to be one of the few legal
academicians to embrace both the UAA's and ASFA's adoption
preference and diminution of biological parent-child relation-
204
ships. She advocates that parenthood should be reconstructed to
minimize biology so that adoption will be an easier and more de-. . . 201
sirable method for having children. In a more radical departure
from family preservation than the ASFA, she recommends aban-
doning the state's federally-mandated role to assist the parents in
the federal ASFA does permit individualized inquiry as to whether to file a termination of
parental rights petition and as to parental fitness at the hearing, some states mandate such
filings in every case, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4.5(a) (2) (1998) (Michie 2000), and at
least two states have defined parental unfitness solely in terms of the time the child has been
in foster care, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(m-1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 128.109(1)(a) & (2) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999). The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, has ruled the Illinois statute unconstitutional. In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864
(Il1. 2001); see also, Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251 (1996) (collecting statutes and discussing grounds).
202. Of course, the parents who are subject to these state ASFA laws have usually been
proven to be abusive or neglectful and have justifiably had their parental rights limited. It is
not the intention to equate these parents with the fit birth parents in thwarted adoptions,
except to note that both types of laws illustrate valuation of substitute care over parental
care.
203. Roberts, supra note 194, generally and at 114, n. 14; see also Herring, supra note
194, at 340 ("the preference for adoption is evident throughout ASFA").
204. In a growing body of work addressing infertility, transracial and transnational
adoption, and most recently child welfare, Professor Bartholet has designed a theory that
would make adoption an easier and more acceptable method of creating family, even at the
expense of non-consenting biological parents. E.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 188; FAMILY
BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond
Biology: The Politics of Adoption and Reproduction, 2 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL. 5 (1995); see also
Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26
CONN. L. REv. 1209 (1994); Russ, supra note 82 (both arguing for less family preservation
and easier termination of parental rights for foster children).
205. BARTHOLET, supra note 188, at 181.
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remedying the problem. That is providing services to reunify the
parents with the children. Professor Bartholet instead advocates
placing the state into the role of child-broker, terminating parental
rights and placing children with better parents. 2 6 Indeed, Profes-
sor Bartholet even criticizes the child welfare system for providing
services to intact families when abuse or neglect has been indi-
cated rather than removing the children immediately.2 0 ' Her work
also suggests the abandonment of traditional standards for state
removal of children (harm or risk of harm based on parental
abuse or neglect), while replacing these standards with something
• 208
akin to a best interests of the child standard.
The adoption promotion model diminishes the biological as-
pect, and privacy of parenthood, by permitting third parties to
decide when to dissolve and create a new family without first estab-
lishing parental failure or unfitness. This opens the family to
outside intervention. This evaluation may be based on the needs
or assessments of others outside the family, and not necessarily re-
garding parental conduct or the interests of the child. On the
contrary, the adoption promotion model makes generalized pre-
sumptions about family reformation that are based entirely on
third party adult actions (adoption petitioners) or assumptions
(that children should be severed from their parents after fifteen
months of separation).
C. Adult Choice Perspectives: Changing Roles of Sex and
Gender in Defining Families
Changes in the role of sex (in its biological and reproductive
senses) and gender in parenting have prompted re-examination of
biology's role in the definition of parent. Lesbian and gay families
confound the traditional gendered (mother and father) aspect of
the parental rights doctrine because they frequently seek creation
206. Id. at 102.
207. Id. at 96-97.
208. Guggenheim, supra note 157, at 1734.
Although she never offers a substitute standard for removal, Bartholet clearly advo-
cates that children be removed to protect their 'well-being' far more frequently than
is current practice. Because only a relatively small number of children are hospital-
ized or killed in the United States each year as a result of abuse, Bartholet's call for a
vast increase in removals must contemplate a significantly broader basis for re-
moval-one focused on 'well-being' or 'best interests' rather than on serious harm.
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or legal affirmation of family relationships that by definition are
not heterosexual and not marital. That is, in a same-sex co-
parenting arrangement, only one parent, at most, can be the bio-
logical parent.2m9 Because the parental rights doctrine generally
presumes only two parents of different sexes or genders, lesbians
and gays must often defeat the rights of one or both biological
parents to obtain parental status for themselves.2 °
Reproductive technology also permits parenthood without bio-
logical relation to the child and without coitus. It increases the
number of potential biological and legal parents for any one child.
Although reproductive technology need not disrupt parental
rights doctrine when adoption law principles apply, some com-
mentators advocate divorcing parenthood from biology and care-
giving entirely, replacing them with the pre-conception intent of
the potential parents. Moreover, reproductive technology now
permits the separation of the maternal biological connection to
the child: gestation and genetic relationships can be split between
two women. In this situation the parental rights doctrine does not
clearly identify who is considered the mother.
1. Protecting Lesbian and Gay Families-Lesbian and gay chal-
lenges1 to parental rights doctrine typically arise in several
settings: the creation of families (through artificial insemination,
209. Exceptions to this seeming truism might occur when one of the co-parents under-
goes a sex change operation subsequent to the child's conception or birth, or when
reproductive technology permits the production of an embryo using the eggs of two
women. See Kyle C. Velte, Note, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Trigametic
In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 431 (1999); Gina Kolata, Babies Born
In Experiments Have Genes From 3 People, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2001, at A13.
210. Of course, lesbians and gays also value the parental rights doctrine as it may pro-
tect them from loss of all rights to their children in custody battles with heterosexual ex-
spouses or grandparents who claim that placing a child with a lesbian or gay man cannot be
in the child's best interest or will harm the child. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 462-63, nn.3-7 (1990) (listing cases);
Ruthann Robson, Mother: The Legal Domestication of Lesbian Existence, in MOTHERS IN LAW
103, 105-10 (Martha Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (discussing challenges to lesbian
parenting). Moreover, the parental rights doctrine's matrifocal definition of parent does not
require a biological connection to the child: supporting the legal parent ("mother") should
be sufficient, absent or in addition to other contenders for the "father" title.
211. "Lesbian" refers to a diverse group of individuals as does "gay". Moreover, the in-
terests of lesbians and gays do not always coincide within and across each category,
particularly in the family arena. See, e.g., Robson, supra note 210, at 110-12 (describing dis-
putes between lesbian co-parents and gay sperm donors); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered
Critique of Second-Parent Adoption, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1999) (describing the re-
strictive class, gender, and (presumably) race based aspects of the concept of motherhood
that exclude many lesbians from fitting the norms necessary to be considered a mother).
The Article present here common themes regarding formation and protection of lesbian
and gay families.
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surrogacy and adoption), the legal extension of family benefits to
existing custodial de facto parent-child relationships (adoption),
and the protection of de facto parent-child relationships after dis-
solution of the adult relationship (third party visitation or
custody.) Many of these issues are not unique, but are more en-
demic, to lesbian and gay families because of laws that limit the
creation and protection of parental relationships of two persons of
the same sex. These issues may also be increasingly concentrated
in lesbian and gay families as more lesbian and gay couples be-
come parents, rather than sharing parenting responsibilities of a
child born in a previous affectional heterosexual relationship.
2 12
Childless lesbians and gays may create parent-child relationships
through artificial insemination, surrogacy, or adoption. These ar-
rangements normally depend on parental consent or judicial
processes that terminate parental rights of one or both birth par-
ents. This permits lesbians and gay men to have families without
engaging in heterosexual sex or having any ongoing relationship
.... 213
with the other biological parent or parents of the child. In some
cases, however, non-custodial biological parents-usually fathers-
214
may have standing to request and obtain visitation or custody.
212. See Polikoff, supra note 210, at 465-68 (describing the "new lesbian-mother fami-
lies" who begin to parent in the context of a lesbian relationship, rather than lesbian
parent-child relationships that formed in the context of a heterosexual marital relation-
ship); see also Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh But Not My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36
J. FAM. L. 219, 219 (1997-98) (citing statistics that, as of the mid-1990s, around 10,000 lesbi-
ans and gays had or adopted children). William Rubenstein refers to these new families as
"'second generation queer parent cases,'" distinguishing them from "'first generation'"
custody contests arising after divorce of heterosexual and homosexual parent, and forecast-
ing "'third generation'" queer parent cases when another adult is intended to have a non-
parental but significant role in the child's life. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Propagate:
An Introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Child Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 144 (1999).
213. In the case of anonymous sperm donation, the father does not normally have pa-
rental rights or status. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001). A known
donor, on the contrary, generally has parental status or the potential of such status and can-
not relinquish his parental rights or responsibilities by contract. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers... And A Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 1, 33 (1996) (distinguishing between involved and uninvolved sperm donors);
Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduc-
tion, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 329, 333 (1995) (advocating different levels of parenthood for
adults involved in the reproduction and rearing of the child). Of course, the father can
relinquish parental rights in the context of adoption, but such proceedings provide judicial
oversight ostensibly to insure that another adult or two will become parents and that some-
one is attending to the child's interests. Cf Bernstein, supra, at 33 (recognizing the
limitations of prenatal agreements for anticipating or governing what will be best for a child
as s/he develops).
214. Lesbians may use a known donor even though they do not wish the donor to have
legal rights to or responsibilities for the child. Reasons for using known donors include the
fact that many sperm banks or insemination services refuse to provide sperm to non-
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The mother and her partner both seek to bar the father's access
because he is not really a parent and should have access only at the
mother's and her partner's discretion.2 '5 This argument under-
mines the biological connection between father and child, but may
comport with the matrifocal aspect of parental rights doctrine and
the Supreme Court's preference for two affectional parents in the
same household.2 6
Adoption is an important tool to create new, and validate exist-
ing, de facto, parent-child relationships.2 1 7 Lesbians and gay men in
a relationship with a same-sex partner who is the birth or adoptive
parent of a child may want to establish a legal parent-child rela-
tionship for multiple reasons. This relationship provides the child
with second parent benefits, such as health insurance, governmen-
tal benefits, or a surviving parent, should the legal parent die or
become incapacitated, while insuring that the second parent will
married women. See Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against
Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173,
174-75, 180 (1996) (noting that in the 1990s, unmarried women still faced barriers to in-
semination); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried 98 HARV.
L. REv. 669, 670 (1985) (stating that in 1979, roughly ninety percent of doctors would not
provide insemination to unmarried women); see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, The Too
Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1028-30 (1996) (noting that doctors and
clinics often limit in vitro fertilization services to wealthy, heterosexual, married couples).
Additionally, some lesbians may wish to provide their children with more information about
the father, and even an actual person to whom the child could have access. See ROSEMARIE
TONG, FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS AND PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 172-73 (1997); Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Informa-
tion, Communication and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 27-28 (1991). Of course, gay men too
may decide to have ongoing or open relationships with the biological parents of their chil-
dren. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (discussing the status of a
gay adoptive father entered into open adoption with birth mother).
215. E.g., In re Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Jhordan C. v. Mary K,
224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994); Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). These presumably are Rubenstein's "third generation queer
parent" cases. Rubenstein, supra note 212, at 144.
216. See supra notes 40, 41 and accompanying text.
217. However, because adoption law requires an adoption to be in the best interests of
the child, it may exclude persons who do not meet dominant judicial norms of parent. See
Shapiro, supra note 211, at 31-32 (arguing that some lesbians cannot meet parenting norms
required for judicial approval in adoption and other contexts). Some states explicitly ban
lesbian and gay adoption. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63.042(3) (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 2000);
In re Appeal in Pima CountyJuvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Az. Ct. App. 1986).
Statutory language may also implicitly limit co-parent and second parent adoption. See Mark
Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reason-
ing, and The Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REv. 1019, 1027-40 (1999) (analyzing state
court refusal to allow second-parent adoption). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-602
(Lexis 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (Michie 1996 & Lexis Supp. 2001) (banning adop-
tions by persons who live with and have sexual relations with another adult to whom they
are not married under Utah law).
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have the rights and responsibilities of parenthood should the adult
relationship end in another fashion.2 8 Lesbian and gay partners
may seek simultaneously as a couple to adopt a child.2 9 Because
most adoption statutes do not explicitly permit same sex adop-
tion,2 ° same sex adoption litigants therefore must often argue for
expansive interpretation or liberal construction of adoptions acts.
The parties frequently rely on the ubiquitous best interests of the
child provisions of the statutes2' or relaxation of statutory thresh-
olds for filing adoption petitions.22 These arguments do not
usually address, or advocate eroding, standards that protect birth
223parent rights. However, the arguments could foster approaches
to adoption that privilege the best interests of the child, or justify
outcomes, at the expense of process in ways that could erode pa-
224
rental rights protections. That is, adoption law is structured to
consider adoption only after a parent has consented or been
judged unfit to be a parent. Modifying this structure or these stan-
dards could undermine parental rights protections. Apart from
218. See In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993) (holding that
adoption by the child's second mother will entitle the child to inheritance, to support,
health insurance benefits, and social security benefits in the event of second mother's
death).
219. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 843 (D.C. 1995) (noting that adop-
tion statute permits co-parents to adopt a child simultaneously).
220. It appears that only Connecticut explicitly permits an unmarried domestic partner
to adopt his or her partner's child. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-724, 45a-727, 4 5a-731
(West 1993 & Supp. 2001).
221. E.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1048 (Conn. 1999); In re M.M.D. &
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 856 (D.C. 1995); In reK.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 895-96 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995); In reAdoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316-17 (Mass. 1993); In reAdoption of
Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Dana, 660
N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d 739, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); In reAdoption ofJane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998), reconsidera-
tion denied, 711 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio 1999).
222. E.g., In re Adoption of T.KJ., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adop-
tion of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1048 (Conn. 1999); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678,
681-62 (Wis. 1994); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Vt.
1993).
223. In fact, in many cases the non-custodial "parent" is an anonymous sperm donor
who has no legal parental status. E.g., In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 n.1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000); see also Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective
on Second-Parent Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 255, 267-68 (1998) (distinguish-
ing her argument promoting second parent adoption from any attempt to limit parental
rights).
224. In one second parent adoption case, a dissenting judge articulated a way around
this tension when he claimed that only statutory provisions "implicating the involuntary
termination of parental rights" need be strictly construed, while other provisions should be
liberally construed. R.B.E, 762 A.2d at 745 (Johnson,J. dissenting); see, Glennon, supra note
223, at 267-68 (urging a liberal construction of the Pennsylvania adoption act, but recogniz-
ing need to interpret statute to protect parental rights).
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood
this potential threat, lesbian and gay adoption does not undermine
parental rights doctrine.
The break-up of same-sex partners who co-parent a child legally
related to only one of the parents raises custodial issues and reme-
dies similar to the consensual de facto parent model . Indeed,
same-sex couple dissolution is a paradigmatic example of the con-
sensual de facto parent model and these cases constitute a
substantial body of de facto parent doctrine. 26 A model that rec-
ognizes de facto parental rights of a same-sex, non-legal, co-parent
defers to the legal parent's autonomy because de facto parental
rights would arise out of a parent-child relationship which the legal
parent consented to and encouraged.
In sum, lesbian and gay parenting does not pose a fundamental
challenge to parental rights doctrine, even though the parental
rights doctrine generally presumes two and only two parents of
different sexes. Lesbians and gays advocate enlarging the defini-
tion of parent to include the non-marital, non-related partner,
and, occasionally, narrowing the definition to exclude one or both
biological parents (in order to obtain parental status for them-
selves). 22 Each argument devalues the male biological aspect of
parental rights doctrine (genetic connection only) but is consis-
tent with the aspect that establishes parenthood based on
relationship to the "mother."
28
225. See supra text accompanying notes 164-74; see also Martha Minow, RedefiningFami-
lies: Who's In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269 (1991) (ruminating about what it
means to be a parent and a family); Polikoff, supra note 210 (discussing alternate legal theo-
ries of parental status); Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Protecting Families:
Standards for Child Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (1999) (pro-
ducing guidelines for custody battles that protect children as well as lesbian and gay
community interests).
226. E.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1005
(1999) (defining de facto parent as one whom, inter alia, the legal parent encouraged to
take parental role). The de facto parent model is not universal, so lesbian and gay would-be
de facto parents cannot always invoke legal protection. See Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied sub nom., Crandell v. Wagner, 528 U.S. 1056
(1999); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re Visitation of
C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Il. App. Ct. 1999); Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL
467327 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997; In re Thompson, 11 SW.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999); Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1998); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt.
1997). Commentators propose alternative theories for protecting these relationships. See
Bernstein, supra note 213, at 52; Polikoff, supra note 210, at 501-02; Robson, supra note 210,
at 110-15.
227. Legal doctrine is not the only motivation for excluding non-custodial biological
parents from parental roles. Acceptance of the nuclear family model, which is based on the
adult affectional relationship, may also lead lesbian and gay parents to reject parents who
are not part of the foundational affectional relationship.
228. See, e.g., King, supra note 213, at 381, 388-94 (arguing for divorcing procreation
from biology, noting the practical difficulties of recognizing multiple parents, and
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2. Accommodating Reproductive Technology-Reproductive tech-
nology229  itself can challenge biologically-based parenthood
because it creates families who do not fit the traditional patterns
produced by coital reproduction and facilitates extra-family private
ordering among biological and non-biological kin.2 w Reproductive
technology, thus, dramatically increases the options for, and com-
plexities of, creating children and invites multiple claims to
parenthood of a single child, embryo or fetus. Reproductive tech-
nology permits separation of female gestation and genetic
contribution, and increases the possibility of separation of male
genetic donation and commitment to the mother or the child. A
child, therefore, can have as many as three or more women and
three or more men with legal claims to parenthood.23' Neverthe-
less, doctrine and commentary are largely consistent with parental
rights doctrine, although some reproductive technology rhetoric
imagines, or advocates for, new definitions of parenthood that
privilege intent and exclude biology and, thus, undermine paren-
2312tal rights doctrine. However, competing claims of gestational
233
surrogates and egg donors who agree to produce a child may
pose the most difficult challenge for parental rights doctrine.
suggesting that parenthood be defined by virtue of the relationship between the adults). See
generally Bernstein, supra note 213 (describing attempts to abrogate connection between
semen donors and their offspring).
229. Reproductive technology means noncoital production of children, generally en-
compassing assisted insemination, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy.
230. For example, Professor Dolgin views reproductive technology as the continuing
transformation of family law from a relational doctrine governing the biologically defined
family as an entity to a rights based doctrine in which families and family relationships are
bundles of individual rights holders. Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive
Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225 (1998). Professor Marjorie Shultz believes in-
creased options for creating children invite reconsideration of legal and normative
definitions of a parent. Shultz, supra note 17, at 304-318. Professor Rao views reproductive
technology as undermining family paradigms by replacing biological ordering with social
choice and destroying the opposition between family and market. Radhika Rao, Assisted
Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 959
(1996).
231. For example, egg donor(s) and her husband, sperm donor, gestational surrogate,
husband of the surrogate, and man and woman who contracted for the donated gamete
and womb.
232. A number of other issues arise in the literature as well that are outside the scope
of this Article. For example, ethical and policy issues regarding participants in and products
of these processes and the regulation of these processes, such as clinic regulation, storage of
reproductive materials, resolution of disputes, and informed consent. By omitting them, the
Article does not intended to minimize the importance of these issues or to suggest that
assisted reproduction does not pose immediate and long-term problems, both politically
and socially, for individual children and families that echo larger issues in family law and
social justice.
233. "Gestational surrogate" refers to a woman who carries a genetically unrelated fe-
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Assisted reproduction doctrine generally does not challenge
constitutional parental rights doctrine because it is consent-based.
234In most instances, the law will not force a traditional surrogate to
• 235
relinquish her baby if she changes her mind, and persons who
donate gametes so that others can use them to create and rear a
child are not entitled to, or burdened with, parental rights and
236
responsibilities. Many commentators apparently wish to normal-
ize assisted reproduction by treating it like sexual reproduction. 2 37
In fact, one of the major disputes is whether contract or family law
should govern the delineation of parenthood in non-coital repro-
duction.3 s Yet, even these doctrines are based on consent of the
biological parent(s), while the choice of either legal paradigm re-
lates to whether preconception intent of the parties should govern
parental rights or whether family doctrines such as best interests of
the child and safeguards around relinquishment of maternal rights
should govern. Neither family nor contract law advocates would
wrest children from biological parents who did not at one time or
234. "Traditional surrogate" refers to a woman who carries a fetus genetically related to
the surrogate.
235. E.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also, Cahn, supra note 87, at 23-
27 (noting that when a preconception agreement breaks down, courts will treat it as a cus-
tody matter and conduct a best interest of the child inquiry); James Lindemann Nelson,
Genetic Narratives: Biology, Stories, and the Definition of the Family, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 71, 72
(1992) ("Surrogateship contracts ... are quite widely regarded as 'unenforceable as con-
trary to public policy' " and are, in fact, banned in many states.). Indeed, adoption laws in
all but a few states forbid or discourage pre-birth maternal relinquishment of the child and
establish timing or other conditions for post-birth maternal relinquishment. Durcan & Ap-
pell, supra note 80.
236. Eg., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407-10 (2001); Marie J. Hol-
landsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for
Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 183, 208, nn. 108-110 (1995) (col-
lecting donor insemination statutes); see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT (1988) § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 265 (Supp. 2001) ("a donor is not a parent of a
child conceived through assisted conception"); National Advisory Board on Ethics in Re-
production (NABER), Report and Recommendations on Oocyte Donation, in NEW WAYS OF
MAKING BABIES 231, 299 (Cynthia Cohen ed., 1996) (recommending same).
237. Eg., Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REv. 835 (2000) (proposing parentage rules
for assisted reproduction that would mirror parentage rules for sexual reproduction); John
A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 927-28
(1996) ("Rather than undermining or altering traditional conceptions of the family, the
demand for [assisted reproduction technologies] comports with the prevailing family para-
digm of couples having and rearing biologically related offspring.").
238. See Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on
Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforemen4 81 VA. L. REv. 2377 (1995);
Dolgin, supra note 230; Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement,
81 VA. L. REv. 2305 (1995); Garrison, supra note 237; Shultz, supra note 17; see asoJana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1443, 1536-38 (discussing strengths
and weaknesses of private approaches to surrogacy).
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another express a willingness to relinquish parental rights through
139
anonymous gamete donation or contractual agreements.
Parental rights doctrine does not clearly mandate the use of
contract or family law principles. On the contrary, parental rights
doctrine permits states to govern conditions or methods for volun-
tarily relinquishing or transferring parental rights.14  Thus,
surrogates and gamete donors may relinquish parental rights pur-
suant to state law. However, the question of whether a surrogate
mother can validly relinquish parental rights pre-birth may have
constitutional implications relating to whether a woman can de-
prive herself of future liberty interests.2 ' Donation of eggs or
sperm for someone else's use is less problematic because genetic
contribution is not a sufficient condition of parenthood.42 These
donors relinquish the opportunity to establish a liberty interest,
unlike the traditional surrogate who will have established a liberty
interest by bearing the child.
The more thorny challenge reproductive technology poses for
parental rights doctrine arises in the gestational surrogacy context
when the woman who donates the egg and the woman who carries
239. Again, this is not to suggest that contract or family law does not make a difference,
particularly in the traditional surrogacy context in which it matters a great deal whether a
woman can and should be forced to relinquish custody or parental rights to her genetic and
gestational child and whether the child's interests would be outcome determinative. See Lori B.
Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framewor* For Surmgate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REv.
2343, 2343-45 (1995) (noting deficiencies with both doctrines). The Article does not intend to
suggest that family law doctrines do not produce ugly processes and results. See, e.g Ikemoto,
supra note 214, at 1024-26 (describing racialized presumptions regarding fatherhood); Doro-
thy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 244-52 (describing the use of genetic
lineage to maintain white supremacy).
240. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act permits men to donate sperm anonymously
and thereby relinquish any rights of responsibilities of subsequent parenthood. UNIF. PAREINr-
AGE Acr (1973) § 5, 9B U.LA. 407 (2001). Adoption laws provide forms and conditions for
relinquishing parental rights. JoAN HOLLINGER, 1 ADOPTION LAw & PRACTICE § 2.11 (2000); see
also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (permitting the state to establish
forms/evidentiary standards for persons to forego life-sustaining medical treatment). Even
Professor Dolgin's proposal for laws permitting women who are not biologically related to a
contractually produced child to be designated as the legal mother upon the child's birth, with-
out requirement of the birth mother's post-birth consent and entry of an adoption decree,
Dolgin, supra note 230, at 253-58, is not necessarily in conflict with parental rights. But see infta
note 241 and Section HIA & C.
241. See Barbara Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
19 (1988) (arguing that surrogates cannot alienate maternal or privacy rights prior to concep-
tion, but instead retain these rights throughout each stage of surrogacy: i.e., the decision to
conceive, the decision to carry or abort, medical decisions, and eventually the decision to sur-
render the child to the prospective (contracting) parents); see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy,
Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. LJ. 1759, 1786-91 (1988) (asserting that a surrogate
cannot alienate parental rights until after birth).
242. This is not to suggest that such reproduction does not pose the same sort of chal-
lenges to children and families as adoption and other biological disconnections between
children and families. E.g., Nelson, supra note 235, at 81-82.
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Pamnthood
the pregnancy each seek parental rights. The prevailing view seems
to privilege the ovum provider when she produced her ovum for
the express purpose of reproducing a child for herself.24 This view
appears to rely on an intent-based definition of mother that looks
to intent to parent at the time of conception. If a woman intends
to "donate" her womb or ovum so another woman can be the
244
mother, then the donee, not the donor, is the mother. If intent to
parent is a tiebreaker between two competing biological mothers245
(gestational and genetic), as many commentators suggest, it is
consistent with, but not mandated by, parental rights doctrine.
That is, neither the genetic nor the nurturing relationship is suffi-
cient to establish motherhood, so neither woman is the mother.
Yet, each can forego her ability to be considered a legal parent
through relinquishment of that right246 before, at, or after, the time
of conception. However, such contracts, particularly for gesta-
tional surrogates, pose other problems. 24' Despite a conceptual
243. E.g.,Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54
(1994) (both granting the genetic mother (ovum donor) parental status); see also UNIF. STATUS
OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988) §§ 5-6, 9B U.LA 266-67 (Supp. 2001)
(providing a number of alternatives including the designation of the woman who gives birth as
the mother or the specific enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements). But see Charo,
supra note 17, at 249-50 (arguing that gestation should define motherhood and noting that
every country but Israel that has examined the issue of split genetic and gestational mother-
hood defines the birth mother as the mother).
244. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACT (1988) § 4(a), 9B U.LA_ 265 (Supp. 2001) (stating that "a donor is not a parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception"); Ikemoto, supra note 214, at 1023-27 (explaining that
surrogacy doctrine reinforces long standing family doctrine maintaining white male control
over women's sexuality and white conceptions of racial purity); NABER, supra note 236, at 299
(recommending adoption of laws that recognize the gamete recipient, and not the donor, as
the legal parent).
245. See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Parents Anonynwus, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra
note 236, at 88, 96; Dolgin, supra note 230, at 275-79; Shultz, supra note 17, at 366-67.
246. This relinquishment is analogous to an anonymous sperm donor, or a putative father
who fails to register, file a paternity action, or hold himself out as a parent. Yet, it does seem that
under the parental rights doctrine, gestation would trump genetics, despite pre-conception
intent, because parental rights doctrine values nurture over genetic connections. By the time of
birth, the gestational mother has provided more nurture than any other parent. The tradi-
tional surrogate, of course, would be the only mother at birth since she embodies both aspects
of parenthood-the genetic and nurturing connections.
247. Like many feminists, the author is troubled by the gender, racial, and class implica-
tions of characterizing gestation as a fungible commodity. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Black
Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17 (1991) (linking surrogacy to slave women's
relationship to their babies, and critiquing enforcement of such contracts due to likely eco-
nomic and racial inequality between surrogates and contracting parents); Marie Ashe, Mind's
Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurispruence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1129, 1170
(1987) (describing the uniqueness of pregnancy and childbirth); Minow & Shanley, supra note
52, at 11 (noting that selling pregnancy and childbirth like any other labor diminishes the
special relationship between a woman and her reproductive capacities); MargaretJane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1915-16, 1925-36 (1987) (discussing the harms to
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consistency with parental rights doctrine, commentators do char-
acterize gestational surrogacy and gamete donation as a new type
of parenthood defined by pre-conception and pre-birth intent,
manifested by a contract, to have a child.
2 4 8
A rather extreme manifestation of an intent-based
parent conception is the theory that there is a constitutional
right to procreate that requires that the state recognize as
parents those persons who desire and plan to have children
using reproductive technology.249 This constitutional right to
procreate 25 extends to persons who are unable or unwilling to
reproduce coitally, regardless of whether they have a genetic tie to
the creation.2 5 Although this liberty interest does not mandate that
the state provide the means to procreate, the state must enforce
preconception agreements, over the claims of donors and
surrogates.
This establishment of a liberty interest in non-coital procreation
that requires states to enforce pre-conception agreements would
elevate to constitutional status the pre-conception intentions of
persons who may have no biological or personal connection to the
child or the biological parent(s). The enforcement of pre-
women's and children's personhood that selling reproductive services causes, particularly in
the context of class division and gender oppression); Roberts, supra note 239, at 241-52 (not-
ing how surrogacy echoes slavery's ownership of human beings and the use of slave women to
bear children to be sold, tends to privilege paternal and devalue maternal genetic ties, and is
used by wealthier women at the expense of poorer women); see also Stark, supra note 241 (dis-
cussing constitutional limitations on contractual surrogacy).
248. Dolgin, supra note 230 at 236-60; Nelson, supra note 235 at 79; see also Andrews, supra
note 239, at 2367-68 (arguing for upholding surrogacy-contracts because child would not exist
but for the intending parents); Cohen, supra note 245, at 96 (same); Marjorie M. Shultz, Ques-
tioning Commodification, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1841, 1852-54 (1997) (reviewing MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS,
AND OTHER THINGS (1996)) (same). Professor Shultz even argues that intentional parents may
be "better" parents than the gestational parent because assisted reproduction involves the type
of long-term and multi-faceted commitment required for parenting. Shultz, supra note 17, at
332. Professor Shultz does not, however, elaborate on why a surrogate's gestation and child
birth would not involve long-term, multi-faceted commitment
249. SeSJOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE]; John Lawrence
Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
250. This "right" is derived from the right not to procreate, Robertson, Procreative Liberty,
supra note 249, at 416-21, or the right not to be sterilized, Hill, supra note 249, at 366-69 (cit-
ing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
251. See Hill, supra note 249, at 379-83. Robertson notes that infertile and fertile persons'
interest in procreation is not different and so both should have a right to procreation.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 249, at 428-29.
252. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 249, at 126-27; Hill, supra note 249,
at 382-87.
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood
conception child-rearing agreements may not violate parental
rights doctrine. However, according their enforcement constitu-
tional protection confers parental status based upon volition,
rather than any biological connection or demonstrated affectional• 253
conduct. This would mean that the pre-conception intentions of
persons who are unrelated to the potential child and who have no
more than a potential nurturing relationship to the child or, per-
haps, supportive relationship to the biological mother would, as a
constitutional matter, suffice to designate them as the parents. The
traditional surrogate mother, who by definition intended initially
to relinquish the child but who meets the current matrifocal defi-
nition of parent, would not be a parent because the constitutional
definition of parent would no longer depend on genetic and nur-
turing relationships. This construction of parental rights deletes
biological and affectional connection, leaving third parties to de-
termine who are parents by virtue of adult preconception
intentions.
Reproductive technology, thus, poses both actual and rhetorical
challenges to parental rights doctrine by creating legal constructs
that permit alienation of one's gametic materials and allow the
separation of the maternal roles of gamete donation and gestation.
Because technology increases the options for people to plan for
children's reproduction before conception and without regard to
biological connections, commentators are tempted to re-write pa-
rental rights doctrine to exclude such connections and the
requirement of earning parenthood. Indeed, under procreational
rights theory, all that is necessary is the intent to parent. There-
fore, contract and procreational rights theory omits the child
altogether. These theories are exclusively adult-oriented, unlike
traditional family and adoption laws that recognize as parents per-
sons who have a physical relationship to the child or mother and
allow modification or transfer of that status according to the par-
ents' wishes and the best interests of the child.
253. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 249, at 143 ("preconception
rearing intentions should count as much as or more than biologic connection"); Hill, supra
note 249, at 382-386 (arguing that procreative rights are more fundamental than privacy
rights and procreation is inherently relational, as is parenthood, so parental rights are sub-
sumed in procreational rights and not defined by biology).
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D. Feminist Perspectives: Regarding Motherhood and Privacy
Feminist perspectives challenge parental rights doctrine because
they question the very meaning of biology, sex and gender, and the
privacy of the family. Feminist theory and activism have been
largely devoted to challenging the differential experiences, treat-
ment, and conceptions of women and men. In doing so, feminists
have identified and challenged the perceived connection between254
biological differences and gender norms. These challenges have
placed biology, motherhood and families at issue because women's
unique role in gestating fetuses and nursing babies has supported
constrictive social norms that dictate what women can and cannot
254. E.g., ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 2 (1988) ("Just as bi-
ology is never devoid of its cultural definition and interpretation, so sex itself, as a biological
entity, is partly defined in and through culture.); Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Rela-
tions in Feminist Theory, 12 SIGNS 621, 627 (1987) ("The single most important advance in
feminist theory is that the existence of gender relations has been problematized. Gender
can no longer be treated as a simple, natural fact."); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mis-
take of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5
(1995) (stating that "most, if not all, differences between men and women are grounded
not in biology, but in gender normativity"); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social Constructions of
Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra
note 136, 1, 3 (feminist scholars have challenged notions of manhood or womanhood as
inherent qualities derived from or related to sex); Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex":
Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1536, 1570 (1995) ("Sexual
difference, however it may be measured, is irretrievably bound up with gender."); see also
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187 (1988)
(showing how homosexuality challenges gender dichotomies); Robin L. West, The Difference
in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 81, 140-44 (1987) (describing how woman's biological pregnability and social roles
form women's identities as care-givers and how societal constructs couple pain with child-
birth though such a connection is neither natural or biological). Cf Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 687, 700-01 (2000) (claim-
ing that subordination of women is universal in that it occurs across all cultures). The
subject of gender and its relation (or lack of relation) to the increasingly outmoded catego-
ries of male and female has become its own intellectual specialty. See Franke, supra, at 3-5
(arguing that there is no such thing as biological sexual differences, only the meaning soci-
ety assigns to them and so "there is no principled way to distinguish sex from gender");
Adria Schwartz, Taking the Nature Out of Mother, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, 240,
250 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994) (discussing postmodern feminist challenges to the
binary categorization of men and women). The claim that there is no such thing as biologi-
cal difference-just the meanings we ascribe to them-has great relevance to the major
tenet of this Article, that biology matters because the legal parental paradigm encompasses
the two types of biological contribution that mothers/women/females make: gametic and
gestational. This Article does not take issue with the point that biology is meaningful only to
the extent we assign social meaning to it. Indeed, it describes the legal construction of par-
enthood as privileging (ascribing special meaning to) the things that persons who have
ovaries and wombs can do. It also defends that meaning because for some persons, that
genetic and gestational connection is the only socially meaningful thing that affords them
the privilege of being a parent. See infra text accompanying notes 287 and 416.
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do both to their own bodies and in the social, political and eco-
nomic spheres. 5 s These critical perspectives implicate, albeit
indirectly, the parental rights doctrine because much of feminism's
work has involved the disassociation of women from child bearing
and rearing and examination of the role family privacy ideology
plays in the subordination of women. In these ways, feminist per-
spectives reject or minimize the biological content of parenthood
and reduce family privacy. Although these feminist perspectives are
not anti-child, they are primarily concerned with adult freedom
and values.
1. Biology, Gender and Motherhood-The association of women
with children-women as mothers-is a major focus of feminist
scholarly debate. Torn between the power of motherhood and its
limitations, feminists are both critical and celebratory of women's
biological and socially constructed role as life and caregivers. Early
in the second wave of feminism, 256 Adrienne Rich described these
two meanings of motherhood as: (1) the potential relationship of
women to their powers of reproduction and to children; and
(2) an institution which works to keep that potential and women
251
under control. More recently, Dorothy Roberts has explained the
crux of this dilemma: "it is difficult to explain motherhood, as an
institution and an experience, in a way that grasps both its affirm-
ing and oppressive aspects.
2 58
Feminists have suggested that the unique, nurturing relation-
ship of women to children25 9 implicates a particular feminine
260
morality. Yet, feminists have also criticized the notion of family as
255. The same is true for men, but their gender norms are more likely to lead to physi-
cal, financial, or economic power and freedom than the norms of women. Of course, race,
culture, class and religion create divisions among men regarding such norms.
256. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 198 n.36 (1989-90) (contrasting the "modern day women's movement,"
with the first wave of feminism starting in the 19th century).
257. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITU-
TION 13 (1976). For a history of second wave feminist approaches to motherhood, see
LAURI UMANSKY, MOTHERHOOD RECONCEIVED (1996).
258. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141,
143 (1995); see also Flax, supra note 254, at 638-39 (noting that feminist perspectives range
from viewing the family as woman's special realm to viewing it as the site of gender strug-
gles); Carol Sanger, M Is For the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15 (1992)
(rehearsing feminist approaches to motherhood); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 53 (1988) (discussing the potentiality of motherhood as both valuable and
dreadful).
259. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 142-58 (1992) (discussing the special bonds mothers have
with their children).
260. See infra Part II.D.1.b.
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normative and socially constructed consisting of a White, middle
261
class, heterosexual cohabitational unit, oppressive to both
262
women and children, and a mechanism for reinforcing gender263
roles and patriarchal hegemony. The Article explores two basic
responses to these gendered dichotomies, one that distances
women from motherhood and the other that uses motherhood as
the model for all women and men. Both of these responses turn
motherhood into an abstract notion, making motherhood a virtual
activity or concept, divorced from the acts of gestation and birth.
a. Separating Women from Motherhood-Feminists have chal-
lenged the gendered connection between women and
motherhood for several reasons. Dominant conceptions of woman
entail motherhood.26 Thus, courts and legislatures have histori-
cally restricted women's choices based on a unified conception of
women and mothers.265 This social construction of womanhood
views all women as potential mothers,2 both constricting more
261. See e.g., Patricia Hill Collins, Black Women and Motherhood, in RETHINKING THE FAM-
ILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS, supra note 136; Iglesias, supra note 136; Dorothy E. Roberts,
Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993).
262. SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 17 (1970, reprinted 1993);Jeffner
Allen, Motherhood: The Annihilation of Women, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY
315 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); Nancy Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the Per-
fect Mother, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY, supra note 136, at 191.
263. Chodorow & Contratto, supra note 262; Michelle Stanworth, Birth Pangs: Conceptive
Technologies and the Threat to Motherhood, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 288, 296-97 (Marianne
Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); West, supra note 258, at 30.
264. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, supra note 103,
at 51 (women as a legal and cultural category encompasses motherhood in its definition);
M.M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of "Mothe;" in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 210, 73,
74 ("Women are socially constructed as Mothers or childrearers because of a system of
power that keeps them from working to full capacity in the labor market.") Carol Sanger
calls this "maternal essentialism." Sanger, supra note 258, at 18; see also Glenn, supra note
254, at 13 ("Woman is conflated with mother, and together appears as an undifferentiated
and unchanging monolith. (In contrast, men appear in all of their historical specificity in a
variety of roles and contexts.)"). Professor West embraces this connection. West, supra note
258, at 14-18.
265. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a state law
criminalizing sexual intercourse for teenage girls and not boys because young girls can
become pregnant); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding state statute
prohibiting women from working in factories more than ten hours per day based in part on
women's needs arising out of "discharge of her maternal functions"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Justice Bradley's famous concurrence with the court's rul-
ing upholding denial of woman's admittance to the legal bar because of her "paramount
destiny" to be a wife and mother). But see Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers v. Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (striking down a policy prohibiting women from working in
jobs that could damage a fetus). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's contradictory
conceptualizations of gender and biology, see Higgins, supra note 254, at 1542-60.
266. EISENSTEIN, supra note 254, at 80 ("The woman's body ... is inevitably associated
with the mother's body ... ."); Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of
Motherhood, in MOTHERS IN LAw, supra note 210 ("All women are socially defined as mothers
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expansive or different views of women and suggesting that women
who do not become mothers are not women. 26' The equation of
womanhood with motherhood limits women's opportunities out-
side and inside the family and supports gender-based expectations
regarding thought, action, dress, and behavior.2 If a woman is
only either an actual or potential mother, her role is to be, or pre-
pare for being, a mother, not an astronaut, attorney, or athlete.
The equation of woman and mother relegates women to the
private confines of the family, while men are free to engage in the
outside, public world of paid work and politics. 269 Moreover, be-
cause women are mothers, they have no interests apart from
motherhood, so women's interests become indistinguishable from
children's, depriving both mothers and children of individuality by
denying that their interests can ever conflict.
70
Those feminists who seek to be free, like men, from these con-
stricting norms, divorce parenting from women, disregarding
motherhood and the family, except insofar as they impede equal
or potential mothers."); see also Roberts, supra note 261, at 10 (noting that even feminist
reproductive freedom discourse "does not question the assumption that all women will
eventually be mothers."); Sara Ruddick, Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth, in REPRESENTA-
TIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 254, 29 (suggesting the connections among being
female, giving birth, and mothering are ubiquitous and tenacious); Siegel, Reasoning, supra
note 67, at 320-21 (describing force of the equation of women and motherhood in the anti-
abortion and contraception movements of the nineteenth century).
267. See Cain, supra note 256, at 205 n.96 (rejecting "dominant" feminist discourse "that
privileges the experience of motherhood over other experiences of female connections.");
Higgins, supra note 254, at 1566 ("[N]ot all women can or wish to be mothers and therefore
some resist a definition of woman as mother as not reflecting their experience."). Other
social norms, like race, also dictate who is and is not a woman. See Eileen Boris, The Power of
Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine the "Political, "2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25,
46 (1989); Roberts, supra note 261, at 15-16 (both noting that dominant norms exclude
African American from the category of woman).
268. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 45 (1989); see also
Franke, supra note 254 (discussing role of ability to bear children in the definition of
woman in the context of whether persons were born with male or female genitals); West,
supra note 258, at 47 (noting that, because it is compulsory, motherhood can be "tremen-
dously constraining, damaging, and oppressive"). Treatment of pregnancy and pregnant
women illustrates motherhood's subversion of women. See MacKinnon, supra note 110, at
1315-28 (noting dominant ideology's inability to conceive of the uniqueness of pregnancy
or a fetus, or to separate a woman from the fetus she carries); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drug,
Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 505, 537-38 (1992) (describing how the law equates pregnant women's use of drugs
with child abuse or neglect).
269. EISENSTEIN, supra note 254, at 82-83; OKIN, supra note 268, at 170-72; Fineman,
Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, supra note 103, at 967; see also
Shultz, supra note 17, at 380 (noting different legal treatment of mothers and fathers who
try to waive parental rights).
270. Glenn, supra note 254, at 13.
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271treatment in the male world. In attempting to maximize women's
autonomy, these feminists have highlighted women's similarity
to-not difference from-men, thus discounting sex-based differ-272
ences. In the context of the family, these feminists have
disavowed any connection between women and child rearing.173
Viewing child-rearing, at least in part, as a burden that inhibits
women's autonomy, they advocate social or legal reform that would
274equalize child rearing responsibilities among men and women.
After all, if women and men are the same, they should share child-
rearing responsibilities. 71 Once care-giving is no longer the
276domain of mothers, anybody can do it, even men. This has been
an important ideological step in freeing women from limitations
based on their potential or actual role as mothers. But, by equating
men and women as parents, feminists rhetorically nullify the very
271. This model, sometimes referred to as "legal equality," "liberty feminism," or
.sameness feminism," minimizes differences between men and women and seeks to estab-
lish rules that will apply to all persons, regardless of sex/gender. See Katherine Bartlett,
Gender Law, 1 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (1994); West, supra note 258, at 14 (both de-
scribing such feminism).
272. E.g.,Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989) (describ-
ing how focusing on women's difference from men reinforces oppressive gender
stereotypes); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 151 (1982) (arguing for gender neutral treatment of
pregnancy, rape, and the draft). Even though equality feminists discount dissimilarities, they
do not necessarily ignore them. On the contrary, equality feminists are critical of socially
constructed differences that subordinate women and advocate remedial action to place
women on par with men in the family as well as the workplace. E.g., Wendy W. Williams,
supra, at 173 ("[I] t seems entirely possible that the concept of exclusive mother-infant bond-
ing-the latest variation on 'maternal instinct'-is a social construct designed to serve
ideological needs.").
273. E.g., Shultz, supra note 17, at 379-90; Slaughter, supra note 264, at 73-74. Accord
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 272, at 822-835 (advocating for gender neutral
parenting coupled with restructuring wage labor to take into account of child rearing de-
mands).
274. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor Parental Equality, 38 UCLA
L. REv. 1415 (1991); Slaughter, supra note 264.
275. Czapanskiy, supra note 274; see also Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. Mi-
Amt L. REv. 653, 660 (1992) ("As a result of the push to gender neutrality, Mother as an
explicitly positive symbol with unique connotations and significance in regard to her rela-
tionship with her child has been moved out of the text and into the margins of family law
discourse. Mother is neutered into Parent and is, at the same time, transformed into 'Wife' -
a role considered to be more appropriate as it connotes an equal or full partner in the fam-
ily and extra-family contexts.").
276. See Czapanskiy, supra note 274, at 1464 (defining parent in gender neutral terms);
Slaughter, supra note 264, at 73 (noting in the context of child rearing, "there is nothing in
nature that requires women to Mother, or prevents men from doing so"); see also Fineman,
Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REv.
387, 397 (noting change in law to reflect gender neutral parenting); Shanley, supra note 52,
at 78 (contending that in the context of adoption, gender neutrality presumes that legal
rules treat both parents the same by requiring each to consent before a child can be
adopted).
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distinct roles of women's and men's biological connection to chil-
27dren and the attendant maternal privileges. Equating maternal
and paternal roles in the creation of parenthood either reduces
the biological connection to genetics or neuters the roles by char-
acterizing them as care-giving and, thus, discounts the matrifocal
aspect of parenthood.
b. Separating Motherhood from Women-The converse approach
that challenges confining normative associations of women and
parenthood is to privilege mothering and its associated norms.
This approach too presents a sex-neutral, though gendered, par-
enting model. The approach does so in the context of different
definitions of family278 or civic values,2 79 each of which privileges
and supports relations of dependency and caregiving. For some
feminists, redefining families begins with the recognition that
child rearing is factually, structurally, and ideologically gendered.
In other words, family is currently configured as a self-contained
triad defined or created by the relationship between adults
wherein the children depend on the mother for care and the
mother depends on the father for support.28 This configuration
masks the dual-edged nature of dependency whereby the act of
caring for dependents creates dependency for the caregiver (who
is usually a woman). 21' This caregiver dependency makes women
particularly vulnerable because they must rely on private financial
2812
and child-care support from their partners (usually fathers). To
277. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-98. Of course the minimal role of males in reproduction
frees them from invasive intervention during gestation, unlike women who may be subject
to criminal and civil sanction for behavior while pregnant. See Ferguson v. City of Charles-
ton, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001) (describing a public hospital's practice and policy of testing and
arresting (poor, mostly African American) pregnant women for illicit drugs); Whimer v.
South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (holding that
a woman may be guilty of "child abuse" for using illegal drugs while pregnant with a viable
fetus); KATHA POLLIT, REASONABLE CREATURES 181-82 (1995) (contrasting the "duty of
care" women have to their fetuses with the lack of such a duty to the men who live with
pregnant women).
278. Professor Martha Fineman has developed these themes in a number of works. E.g.,
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES, supra note 110; Fineman, The Neutered Mother, supra note 275; Fineman, Our
Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and Society, supra note 276. Professor
Karen Czapanskiy has developed a similar model of interdependency in a number of her
works. E.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdepen-
dency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1315 (1994); Czapanskiy, supra note 135.
279. See infra text accompanying notes 294-304.
280. E.g., Fineman, supra note 275, at 663-68.
281. SeeFineman, The Neutered Mother, supra note 275, at 401-02.
282. Women are still, by and large, care-givers (of dependant adults as well as children),
so this new model does not sufficiently compensate or protect women from the sacrifices
they make in providing care for children (and elders) in a social context in which women
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recognize and remedy this dependency, feminists argue for a
redefinition of families based on the mother-child or care-giver-
cared-for dyad . This model advocates ideological and financial
support for vertical relationships of dependency rather than hori-
284
zontal relationships based on sex. Under this model, the public
would support the parent (mother)-child dyad, rather than tying
support to the private means and volition of the other parent (fa-
ther). Moreover, this dyad would no longer be tied to biology
and child bearing, although it would be defined by dependency
and care-giving. Instead, this dyad could be filled by men and chil-
286dren (or other dependents, such as elderly parents).
The argument that mothering is not tied to biology, that child-
bearers need not be child-rearers, also resonates with feminists
who address families that do not fit dominant (White, middle-class,
heterosexual) family norms. Just as feminists have challenged gen-
dered norms arising out of women's biological ability to bear
children, feminists have also questioned biological and social con-
structions that affect parenting definitions. The dominant ideology
of family is that it consists of mother, father, and child(ren), with
the mother providing child care and the father supporting and287 -
heading the family. Yet that is a particularly White, heterosexual,
cannot or do not rely on fathers for support. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 26, 67-69.
283. Professor Fineman sees the dyad as primarily mother-child because women are the
most common nurturers, but she would not confine this care-giver-dependant dyad to
women. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 230-33. Professor Czapanskiy identifies this child-
care-giver dyad as interdependency. Czapanskiy, supra note 135, at 963.
284. Czapanskiy, supra note 135, at 961-65; Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of
the Family in American Law and Society, supra note 276, at 402.
285. In Professor Fineman's view, this dyad extends beyond parent-child to adult child-
parent. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 234-35. Cf Czapanskiy, supra note 135, at 972-73
(defining the parent ("lead caregiver") as "the adult who is allocated the bulk of caregiving
responsibilities").
286. Czapanskiy, supra note 135, at 963 (interdependency theory identifies adults by
their behavior toward the child or the child's lead care-giver); Fineman, supra note 110, at
234-35 ("I believe that men can and should be Mothers. In fact, if men are interested in
acquiring legal rights of access to children (or other dependents), I argue they must be
Mothers in the stereotypical nurturing sense of that term-that is, engaged in caretaking.").
287. See Collier et al., supra note 136, at 32-33 (noting that the dominant understand-
ing of family is that it consists of an identifiable and discrete group consisting of mother,
father and children); Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rheto-
ric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181, 2182 (1995) (ideal of the family is a married husband and wife living
with their children with the father providing economic support and the mother raising the
children); Ann Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthood in Legal Practice and Cul-
ture, in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 210, 308, 324-25 (describing a case in which dominant
construction of family required legal notice of family proceedings to absent, violent father
and disregarded the widespread, multi-generational experience of African American fami-
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middle-class norm that does not apply to many families of color, to
poor, lesbian, and gay families, and even to families of divorce.
For example, families of color frequently live in extensive kin
and fictive kin networks that transcend or even substitute for the
nuclear family, through, for example, maternal-led families, in-
formal adoption, and multi-generational households. 89 Blood ties,
although important, are only one ingredient in a rich construction
290
of family love and obligation. Moreover, White working class
families are often extended, rather than nuclear.29' Lesbian and gay
parents are not both biologically related to their children, nor do
292
they fit the heterosexual portion of the dominant family norm.
This diversity and complexity of family relationships leads some
feminists to question the primacy of biology in creating and defin-
• • • 293
ing families.
Another way that feminists value motherhood is to disconnect it
from women, place it in the public realm, and universalize it.
These feminists find cross-cultural similarities among women and
differences from men that are based on women's capacity to be-
lies constructed around mother-child dyads). The hegemony of the nuclear family patholo-
gizes other family structures. Thus, the single Black mother is the primary cause of the
growth of the "underclass," thereby discounting the material conditions in which families
live, including unemployment, good education, adequate transportation, childcare, hous-
ing and health care, as well as the strengths of these families. Maxine Baca Zinn, Family,
Race, and Poverty in the Eighties, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS,
supra note 136, 71, 72-73; see also Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, in
MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 210, at 205 (describing discourse that pathologizes poor, never
married mothers). But see Iglesias, supra note 136, at 917 (noting that the strong, independ-
ent African American mother is not merely a function of material conditions of racism and
poverty limiting fathers from leading their families, but arises too out of cultural factors and
expectations that "a woman be a strong, resourceful mother with a structurally central posi-
tion").
288. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 190; Susan Chira, Struggling to Find Stability
When Divorce Is a Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1995, at 1, 42.
289. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10
HARv. BLA KLErER L.J. 39, 43 (1993); Iglesias, supra note 136, at 925-27; Twila L. Perry,
The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 52-53 (1993-94).
290. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 261, at 219-23 (describing African American extended
and fictive families); Stack & Burton supra note 136, at 35 (describing an African American
man caring for his grandchildren because they are his daughter's children).
291. Judith Stacey, Backward toward the Postmodern Family: Reflections on Gende, Kinship,
and Class in the Silicon Valley, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS, supra
note 136, 91, 105.
292. Though they may be legally related through formal adoption in several states. See
supra text accompanying notes 217-24.
293. See Roberts, supra note 239, at 272-73.
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come pregnant and their cultural role as child rearers. Because
of the commonality of the potential for motherhood, some femi-
nists suggest that women share an essential connection to other
people and are, therefore, primarily relational, rather than, like
295
men, autonomous. In contrast to the values relating to the
dominant (male) norm of autonomy, e.g., individualism and rights,
women's connectivity suggests different norms, such as nurturing,
empathy, and inclusion.29 6 These feminists reject male-defined val-
ues of autonomy and rights and suggest instead that female values
297form an alternate jurisprudence and ethics for all people.
For these nurturing values to be universal, they must not beS 298
connected to gender or biology. Accordingly, some feminists
have separated motherhood, whence these norms arise, from
women. 99 Mothering, thus, is divorced from nature and biology-
child bearing-and becomes a practice, job or relationship in
which one person "nurtures and cares for another."30 0 Mothering
then starts after birth30' and can be done by anyone and in various
294. E.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 47-54; West, supra note 258, at 14. Robin West
asserts that this conflation arises from biology, socialization, and psychological forces. West,
supra note 258, at 26.
295. West, supra note 258, at 1-5.
296. Id. at 16-17 (citing Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan); Eichner, supra note 112,
154-56. Indeed, early feminists used women's special connection to children as part of their
political agenda toward social reform. See, e.g., Boris, supra note 267 (describing women's
use of motherhood as a political platform during the early 20th century women's move-
ment).
297. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 229 (1989); Fineman, supra note 110, at 235;
West, supra note 258, at 65-66; see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1567-68 (1983) (arguing for bringing fam-
ily values into the market in order to promote more communal forms of social life).
298. Disconnecting gender from biology is, of course, necessary to promote these cur-
rently gendered norms as universal, that is applying to men as well. See Sara Ruddick,
Thinking about Fathers, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY, supra note 136, 176, 186 (equating gen-
der-inclusiveness and genderlessness).
299. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 254, at 13 (noting need to deconstruct oppositions be-
tween male and female and subordinate position of mothering); Ruddick, supra note 298, at
186 (arguing for mothering as a "genderless activity").
300. Glenn, supra note 254, at 3. See also FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEX-
UAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 110, at 235; Barbara
Katz Rothman, Beyond Mothers and Fathers: Ideology in a Patriarchal Society, in MOTHERING:
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 136, 139, 154-55; Ruddick, supra note 266,
at 35-36. Ruddick also claims that neither childbearing or mothering "is a necessary condi-
tion for or consequence of performing the other activity well." Id. at 38.
301. OKIN, supra note 268, at 171; Ruddick, supra note 298, at 187. Thus, childbearing
no longer counts. But see Becker, supra note 259, at 140, 142 (noting the uniqueness of
pregnancy, particularly in relation to caretaking post-birth); West, supra note 258, at 22-23
(discussing the special connections between mother and fetus). Other arguments for de-
valuing pregnancy include the repercussions of its meaning in the context of reproductive
choice. Focusing on the importance of the maternal bonding that occurs during pregnancy
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of ParenthoodSUMMER 2001]
manners. That way, childbearing no longer counts. This degen-
dered universalization of mother allows non-mothers-especially
men-to appropriate the values of nurture and connectedness.3 0 3 It
also frees women from automatic relegation to the maternal role
304
and holds others accountable for fulfilling that role.
Feminists, thus, separate biology and parenthood for several
reasons. They do so to free women from confining maternal
norms, to make society more responsive to relationships of
dependency, and to reflect complex and diverse family structures
in which the biological parent-child connection may not be
primary or exclusive and promote maternal norms in larger
society. Although the intent is not to minimize motherhood, this
further abstraction of motherhood from the physical maternal role
to the more universal notion of care-giving diminishes the role of
maternal biology in parent-child definitions and suggests that
mothering belongs to the public, diminishing the privacy of the
parent-child relationship.
2. Gendered Harms in Family Privacy Ideology and Doctrine-In ad-
dition to separating women and family, feminists have attempted to
remove women and family from the private realm, so that they can
can militate toward personifying the fetus. See Linda L. Lacey, "0 Wind, Remind Him That I
Have No Child". Infertility and Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 188 (1998)
("An emphasis on the strength of the bonds formed between unborn children and the ges-
tational mother could be used to make the point that pro-life advocates have been making
all along-that from the moment of conception, fetuses are equally capable of thought and
emotion as born babies."). Of course devaluing the uniqueness of pregnancy can also limit
a women's reproductive choices. See MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1313-16 (noting that
the failure to recognize that pregnancy is not like other actions or body parts has limited
legal doctrine regarding abortion choice); Minow & Shanley, supra note 52, at 11 (arguing
that treating pregnancy like any other service or commodity can limit economically disad-
vantaged women's reproductive freedom).
302. The historical and cultural variety of parenting in part drives Glenn to create such
a broad definition of mothering. See Glenn, supra note 254, at 25 ("[W]omen's relationship
to mothering seems both different from and (potentially) the same as men's, just as any
particular woman's relationship to mothering is both the same and different from that of
other women.").
303. See Joan Mahoney, Adoption as a Feminist Alternative, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS,
AND THE LAW, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 35, 48-51 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (arguing for
defining parenthood as a nurturing, rather than genetic, relationship); Rothman, supra
note 300, at 134, 156; Ruddick, supra note 266, at 36 (such involvement with children "can
inspire distinctly maternal conceptions of bodily life that are in no way limited to women.").
Pre-birth conduct as well, apparently, should confer parental status. Shanley, supra note 52,
at 85-90 (arguing that law should examine fathers' conception and prebirth conduct to
determine whether he should be accorded parental status).
304. See Glenn, supra note 254, at 13; Ruddick, supra note 266, at 36. Ruddick also cau-
tions against associating mothering with birth-giving because not all birth-givers want to be,
and should not be forced to be, mothers. Id. at 38-39.
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partake of the benefits of the public world of polity and market.05
Feminist approaches to family have criticized the rhetoric that in-
vokes the purportedly private nature of families-the political,
ideological, and gendered construction of public and private
realms that relegate women and mothering to the private family
and place men, the market, politics, and law in the public realm. °6
The legal and social equation of families with privacy works in
three interrelated ways: 1) it associates families with the private
sphere, not the market or polity; 2) it associates women (and chil-
dren) with families and, therefore, the private sphere; and
3) because the families are private, it prohibits state intervention
into family relations, instead leaving them to be ordered pri-
vately.307 This construction of family as a private and unitary entity
has harmed women because of power imbalances and compulsory
gender norms that contribute to subordination of women.08
305. See Margaret Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 47
(1997); Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1 (2000); Olsen, supra note 297; Siegel, supra note 16; Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of
Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1153
(1993). Although the accuracy and relevance of the public private debate has been ques-
tioned, the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that
the civil rights cause of action provisions under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
are unconstitutional, may reinforce arguments against privacy doctrine arising out of dis-
tinctions between public and private realms. The Article addresses feminist critiques of
family and privacy, although they are often intermingled with and closely related to the
equation of women and privacy. Accordingly, the Article does not address feminist critiques
of privacy doctrine as a vehicle for individual choice. See MacKinnon, supra note 110, at
1311 (critiquing privacy doctrine as a tool for framing and protecting women's reproductive
rights).
306. E.g., OKIN, supra note 268, at 110-111; Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural
Family: The Limits of Privacy, supra note 103, at 967-69; Glenn, supra note 254, at 13; Gold-
farb, supra note 305, at 4-5; Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, supra note 297, at 1499-1500. Feminists have also challenged the myth of the private
family. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 305; Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The
Limits of Privacy, supra note 103; Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, supra note
123; see also Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 25-28 (rehearsing feminist challenges to the verac-
ity of the market-family dichotomy).
307. Descriptions of the gendered aspect of the private/public distinction vary and do
not always follow the Article's description, but most see at least a crude distinction between
public and private realms, with women and the family belonging to the private and the
market and politics belonging to the public. See Baldwin, supra note 305, at 62-63 (describ-
ing gendered public-private dichotomy as excluding women's issues from public discourse,
limiting women's participation in the public sphere, and normalizing women's privatized
status); Dailey, supra note 61, at 998 (describing the conventional view of family privacy-
but not this description of it); Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 22 ("[T]he market-family dichot-
omy supported a legal system that consigned women to a domestic sphere in which the law
then refused to intervene.").
308. See Minow & Shanley, supra note 52, at 17-19 (citing examples of how notions of
privacy militate against women obtaining domestic violence orders of protection and assert-
ing other rights). Professor Reva Siegel has traced the historical and current role of privacy
doctrine in limiting the rights of women. E.g., Siegel, supra note 16. Some feminists have
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The ideological and legal relegation of women to the private
family historically kept, and continues to keep, many women from
public life. For example, women could not work for pay, sue or be
sued, sign contracts or vote. These restrictions prevented women
from having a public life. 309 Relegating families to the private realm
both devalues domestic work and enforces patriarchal hegemony
over domestic assets and expenditures. 31 Family privacy also justi-
fies public (state and market) abdication of meaningful
311responsibility for the support of children or their caregivers.
Thus, women are not adequately compensated for their domestic
labor and support for children is often inadequate because this
support depends upon the private resources of their parents,
sometimes supplemented by inadequate public assistance.312
The characterization of the family as private also justifies state
reluctance to intervene to protect family members from violence,
abuse, or neglect, so women (and children) have no protection
from private harms/injury within the family.3 1 3 Marriage legally
unifies the husband and wife, and in the past, subsumed the wife's
claimed privacy as a vehicle to promote women's freedom. See Singer, supra note 238, at
1517-22 (rehearsing feminist arguments that private ordering of family relationships pro-
motes women's freedom).
309. Glenn, supra note 254, at 13; Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 22; Siegel, Home, supra
note 67. But see Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 846-84 (describing public lives of women in the past
several hundred years). Enslaved women (and men and children), though privately
"owned," were very much in the market as mere commodities and as producers of com-
modities, frequently working alongside men. Id. at 861. The feminization of family also
accounts for why the federal courts eschew domestic relations cases. Naomi R. Cahn, Family
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. REv. 1073 (1994).
310. Siegel, Home, supra note 67 (describing how historical separation of spheres rein-
forced husband's control of family assets and undervalued household labor); Singer, supra
note 238; at 1560-61.
311. Eichner, supra, note 112, at 156-68; Singer, supra note 238, at 1563-64. But see Kin-
dred, supra note 87, at 537-38 (arguing that if the state is empowered to interfere in the
private family to ensure that children are clothed, fed, and sheltered, the state itself must
have a duty to provide benefits to insure parents can adequately clothe, feed, and shelter
their children).
312. See Eichner, supra note 112; Fineman, supra note 52, at 7; Singer, supra note 238, at
1561.
313. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1311 (arguing privacy belongs to those
with power and is a hell hole for those without); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist
Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322-23 (1993) (noting
that feminist rejection of public-private dichotomy has permitted the movement of rape out
of the private realm, as a sexual act, and into the public realm, as a crime of violence);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 974, 984-86 (1991)
(claiming that the legal notion of family privacy has encouraged and reinforced violence
against women and children by shielding it, immunizing it, and characterizing it as an indi-
vidual, not systemic, problem); Siegel, supra note 16 (historical, legal account of private
spheres that tolerated wife abuse).
SUMMER 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
legal identity into the husband's, so the state could not intervene
in interspousal contests because the wife had no legal standing.314
The historically protected marital unity and resulting privacy given
to that relationship has been said to sanction or promote, violence
against women. Liberal notions relegate families and, by associa-
tion, women, to the private world. Similarly, differentiating
between state (public) and non-state (private) action limits legal
intervention to protect against non-governmental restriction of316
women's autonomy. This laissez faire structure leaves women
more vulnerable to private physical, economic, and cultural vio-
lence and subordination.
The persistence and limitations of assigning women and families
to the private realm have led some feminists to reject liberal and
constitutional privacy doctrine as useless and even harmful, and as
314. Siegel, supra note 16, at 2122; Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23
GA. L. REv. 359, 362-64 (1989).
315. See Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 22-24 (describing how doctrines like interspousal
tort immunity, the marital rape exemption, and laws of coverture, which permit a husband
to discipline his wife, have historically shielded domestic violence and continue to shape
ideology inhibiting protection of women from intimate violence inside and outside the
marital relationship).
316. See id. at 36-41 (describing how even violence against women by state actors is pri-
vatized and restating feminist critiques of state-civil society dichotomy). The Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), holding that the pervasive
violence against women and the subordination of women, as well as the inadequate local
response, does not give rise to a civil rights remedy under the 14th amendment enforce-
ment clause, may be an example of the deeply embedded exclusion of women from full
citizenship. Although the Supreme Court did not base its ruling in Morrison directly on any
claim that violence against women is private, and therefore, off limits, the Court's refusal to
extend a federal civil rights remedy to women victimized by gender-based violence may
arise out of deeply held connections between family privacy ideology and doctrine. See, e.g.,
Cahn, supra note 309, at 1105; Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 33. Indeed, prior to the Violence
Against Women Act's enactment (the federal statute at issue in Morrison), Chief Justice
Rehnquist warned that its private cause of action provision "'could involve the federal
courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes.'" Judith Resnik, The Programmatic
Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REv.
269, 271 (2000) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, THiRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3). The Morrison majority held that there was
no basis for federal jurisdiction over gender-motivated violence, because violence against
women does not implicate state action or the market (interstate commerce). 529 U.S. at
612-13, 619-27. This ruling echoes the traditional equation of women with the family, and
not with the market or the polity, harkening back to the laws of coverture that kept domes-
tic relations out of federal courts because a husband and wife were not considered diverse.
See Goldfarb, supra note 305, at 28-33 (discussing connection between the federal domestic
relations exemption and family privacy doctrine and ideology); Resnik, "Naturally" Without
Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1698 (tying ideological
constructions of women as private, domestic actors to the federal court's resistance to as-
sume jurisdiction of "domestic" matters); see also Cahn, supra note 309, at 1102-04
(describing domestic relations exception, but noting that federal courts do hear certain
family law matters).
317. See generally Baldwin, supra note 305; West, supra note 258.
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318 319
counterproductive tools for equality or for autonomy.3 Instead,
some feminists have argued for more intervention into the family
320
by dissolving the public-private split 3 2 and restructuring the rela-
tionship between families and the state so that public, rather than
private, resources are used to support mothers and children. 22
Feminists also argue that women should claim the autonomy as-
pect of privacy (freedom of choice) 32 3 and reject the familial
324
notions of privacy (state-family distinction). These responses to
the harms of privacy hint at, and often explicitly call for, a revision
or abolition of privacy doctrine.
Feminist theory has not been directly concerned with the legal
definition of parent. It argues, however, that the equating of
women and motherhood is limiting both for women and society, it
constrains women and mothers, it brackets values of care from
dominant societal norms, and it purports to be natural and, there-
fore, separate from the market and polity. Separating biology from
parenthood spreads the burden and benefits of motherhood, mak-
ing fathers better parents and counteracting the negative aspects
of individualism. In this way, feminist critiques, like the other revi-
sionist critiques reviewed in sections II.A. and II.B., would limit the
privacy of the family and disassociate biology or gender from par-
enthood.
Most of the revisionist critiques expose the underside of privacy
and the significant limitations of parental rights doctrine. Some
critiques are not explicitly or directly about the parent-child rela-
tionship, but the repercussions or careless extension of such
critiques could undermine family autonomy. Each of these cri-
tiques challenges a definition of parent based on biology and seeks
to limit the autonomy that the doctrine affords to families. Revi-
sionists present these challenges because the fixed, patriarchal,
nuclear family does not reflect the actual lives and structures of
318. E.g., MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1311-13; Schneider, supra note 313.
319. See generally Fineman, supra note 103.
320. E.g., Linda Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control, in RETHINKING
THE FAMILY, supra note 136, 262, 281-82; Schneider, supra note 313, at 974-75.
321. See Olsen, supra note 297, at 1567-78 (arguing that unifying market and family will
both bring communal values to the marketplace and help transcend the male-female di-
chotomy, although Olsen signifies the market as private).
322. Fineman, supra note 287, at 2205.
323. Schneider, supra note 313, at 994-97.
324. Id.; Stein, supra note 305, at 1155.
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many families. The nuclear family model disregards the needs of
children for care and nurture and the needs of adults to parent.
The fiduciary model demotes parents from arbiters of their chil-
dren's interests to protectors of their state-defined interests. The
psychological parent theories would define parents along adult-
child affectional, not biological, lines. The adult choice theories
would define parents according to adult-adult affectional relation-
ships or intent to rear children, without regard to biological
connection to the child. Feminist theories challenge family privacy
and the connection of biology and parenthood, seeking to make
families and family values more public and more universal. The
unifying theme of these various views is a challenge to the notion
that current constructions of families and motherhood should be
private and exclusive. Instead, revisionists all, on some level, argue
that families should be constructed, maintained, and publicly sup-
ported along actual caregiving relationships, rather than, or in
addition to, biological status.
III. PROBLEMS WITH REVISIONIST PERSPECTIVES
AND MODELS OF PARENTHOOD
Many of the family critiques above are compelling. However,
their suggestion that the parental rights doctrine or family privacy
is anachronistic may not comport with the experiences of the
thousands of families who are deprived of the recognition and
protection the doctrine affords. Descriptions of families and chil-
dren trapped in patriarchal, oppressive, and abusive homes,
cordoned from public law and the marketplace, are at best incom-
plete and at their weakest, simply inapplicable to many families.
The oppressiveness of the connections between woman and
mother, and mother and child may not accurately describe the ex-
periences of women who face social, legal and financial obstacles
to the full embrace of these connections. Moreover, many parents
face state intervention in intimate choices about child bearing and
child rearing, which leave their families particularly vulnerable to
disruption, contrary to the impression that the parental rights doc-
trine unduly insulates the family. For these families, the biological
connection may be their best claim to family.
There are three major, related problems with these critiques.
First, they do not propose standards or the standards proffered are
less determinate, as well as more subjective and more intervention-
ist, than the matrifocal standards currently supplied under the
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood
parental rights doctrine. Critics who suggest the reconfiguration of
families along caregiving or psychological, rather than biological,
lines, ignore the earned aspect of biologically-based parenthood-
that caregiving is an essential feature of existing definitions of par-
ent and the scope of parental autonomy. These critics also fail to
account for how the biological parents lose their parental status,
including their right to make decisions about what is in their chil-
dren's interest. Second, these revised standards take privacy for
granted, overlooking the fact that many families are already very
public and struggle against state oversight and control that is often
uninvited and unhelpful. These families are more public because
they are poor or otherwise do not meet dominant norms-norms
that frequently privilege White, middle class, married, and hetero-
sexual persons. Third, these public families suffer when family
privacy is reduced because they may not meet the discretionary
standards proposed. The relatively determinate matrifocal stan-
dards privilege the status of women who have carried and fed the
fetus through their own bodies and the "men" who are biologically
related to, and have cared for, the child or who have cared for the
mother. Without deference to these standards, the state would
have license to decide who is a parent.based on majoritarian or
dominant norms regarding parents. Such norm-based decision-
making is contrary to the liberal values of moral autonomy,
equality, and tolerance that limit state action.
This Part of the Article explores the problems that the critiques
raise in the remainder of this section. Section III.A. examines revi-
sionist models and illustrates that they broaden intervention,
substituting other adults for the parents in determining what is
best for children, frequently without regard to the parents' fitness
or consent. Section III.B. explores how and why family privacy is
inaccessible to many women and children who constitute non-
dominant families or have limited financial means. In the context
of this diminished privacy, section III.C. argues that defining fami-
lies along care-giving lines will most broadly and deeply affect
those families whose autonomy is already compromised and who
do not meet majoritarian or governmental standards for caregiv-
ing.
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A. Revisionist Standards
The parental rights doctrine defines parents using relatively ob-
jective principles: biological relatedness and domestic partnership
• . 325
with the mother or child. The doctrine then permits parents to
decide with whom their children will live and with whom they will
visit, unless the parents are not fit to do so. Parents can lose or de-
crease their rights by consent or by neglecting or abusing their
children. The deference to parental fitness or consent is a hallmark
of parental rights doctrine. It permits parents, rather than judges or
legislatures, to make fundamental, individualized decisions-that
may reflect diverse notions of the good life-about their children's
upbringing. The deference also limits public scrutiny of family func-
tioning to situations in which parents have fallen below minimum
care taking standards.
As observed above, many of the revisionist perspectives minimize
the role of biological caregiving and maximize post-birth caregiving
or publicly-defined determinants of the good life as grounds to in-
terfere with the parent-child relationship. Most of the critiques do
not dispute the presumption that birth parents will rear children,
unless there are specific reasons that the birth parents cannot, or
should not, do So.326 Indeed, it is these reasons for interfering with
this initial presumption that the revisionists address: when courts,
legislatures, and other adults can substitute as decision makers about
who constitutes or functions as a family and what is best for individ-
ual children. The revisionist models propose broader reasons for
intervention than those permissible under the parental rights doc-
trine, because those models permit intervention based on non-
parents' disagreement about a child's interests. These broader rea-
sons undervalue the earned nature of parenthood by allowing
intervention without first showing that parents are no longer compe-
tent to determine their children's interests.
3 2 7
325. The Article does not intend to minimize intractable problems women and chil-
dren face when multiple persons compete for the paternal role or non-supportive fathers
interfere with mothers' autonomy. Others have advocated models to resolve or minimize
these problems. E.g., Baker, supra note 55; Czapanskiy, supra note 135; Fineman, supra note
110.
326. Some critics would define parents according to their prebirth intention to parent
regardless of their physical or genetic relationship to the child. See supra text accompanying
notes 230-53. Critics, such as some advocates for same sex parents, would base their defini-
tion of parents on adult affectional relationships. See supra text accompanying notes 211-28.
327. Most of the feminist critiques do not advocate new definitions of parents or inter-
vention standards. Instead, reduction of family privacy is a by-product of much of the
analysis that devalues or universalizes maternal biological connections and that criticize
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In exploring these issues, it is helpful to define and distinguish
the notion of intervention and its scope. Intervention means the
point at which someone who is not a parent (for example, a third
party, judge, guardian ad litem, or legislature) is authorized to de-
termine and rank a child's interests. Intervention occurs once a
decisionmaker other than the parent has legal authority to review
the parent's determination of what the interests are and their rela-
tive priority.328 This definition of intervention is used because it
captures the substitution of parental judgment, not just the moment
when others have entered into, or become involved with, the family.
For example, in a thwarted adoption case, the point of intervention
may not be when the birth mother transfers the child to the pro-
spective adoptive parents, but instead the point at which the
prospective parents refuse to return the child to the non-consenting
birth father. Scope means what the substitute decisionmaker reviews.
For example, in a custody dispute between parents, the scope is
whether the court may review custodial candidates in addition to the
parents. The analysis is confined to intervention and scope .
29
The revisionist models appear to contemplate intervention at sev-
eral different points and for diverse purposes, although the
revisionists are not always clear about grounds for, and the scope of,
intervention. The fiduciary parent model330 would intervene from
the outset. The state, not the parents, would define and weigh chil-
dren's interests to promote the values the state has identified as most
important (e.g., public education) or in the child's best interests
(what any rational child would want.) Although the state would not
micro-manage the child-rearing endeavor, it might provide more
monitoring for those families who are most likely to have conflicts
with their children's interests, such as families headed by parents
who are extremely religious and families who divorce. The fiduciary
parent model, thus, accords the state broader power than it has un-
der current doctrine to determine what children's interests are and
family privacy. The Article addresses these revisionist perspectives in the next two subsec-
tions.
328. Intervention also occurs when the state investigates abuse and neglect allegations
and takes further child-protective action. The revisionist standards I review in this subsec-
tion do not address abusive and neglectful parents, but instead intervention into fit parents'
decisionmaking.
329. Intervention rather than decisional standards after intervention are addressed be-
cause it is at this point of intervention that the family's privacy is invaded. A discussion of
the relationship between the various decisional and intervention standards, including def-
erence and burdens of proof, is so complex and variable that it would require separate
treatment.
330. This model holds that parents do not have rights but are trustees serving their chil-
dren's presumed wishes or state-defined interests. See supra text accompanying notes 141-55.
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to monitor child rearing and assess which interests are paramount,
particularly for non-marital families or families considered too far
outside the mainstream. The scope of intervention is broad and ill-
defined, apparently including an assessment of whether the parents
are truly serving their child's short and long term interests and ex-
tends to children's moral education. That assessment substitutes the
state as identifier, prognosticator, and balancer of the child's inter-
ests.
The de facto parent models would allow an adult who has devel-
oped a psychological parent relationship with the child to intervene
when the legal parent denies access to the child. The consensual de
facto parent model331 permits intervention only when the parent had
abdicated the parental role or previously invited the adult to join the
family as a parental figure. The de facto parent has the status to as-
sert his or her desire to have a role in the child's life because the
legal parent has effectively already consented to that person's paren-
tal or quasi-parental role and enlarged the family circle accordingly.
That is, the de facto parent, like the marital "father," has, with the
legal parent's assent, supported the parent directly or indirectly by
caring for the child. The de facto parent, thus, gains parental status,
and accordingly, a right to maintain a relationship with his or her de
facto child. The scope of intervention would be confined to the exis-
tence of and the amount of access the de facto parent could have to
the child.
The non-consensual de facto parent model32 is different because
it does not require parental unfitness or consent to the relation-
ship's formation and because it is premised on the child's needs and
interests, not the de facto parent's status. The non-consensual model
allows any psychological parent to assert that the child's interests in-
clude contact or custody with the psychological parents. This
difference is significant because it permits intervention, regardless of
the parent's consent to the formation of the relationship, and be-
cause it is premised on the child's interests in maintaining important
relationships. Because the model bases intervention on the child's
needs and not on parental consent, it effectively grants (certain)
care-giving adults the (parental) right to decide, and then to con-
331. This model grants parental status to persons whom the parent has allowed to live
with and care for the child as a parent. See supra text accompanying notes 164-74. The de
facto parent model includes lesbian and gay perspectives that promote co-parent adoption
and visitation with the child post dissolution of the adult relationship. See supra text accom-
panying notes 211-28.
332. The non-consensual de facto parent model grants parental status on the sole basis
of the psychological relationship between the child and de facto parent. It does not depend
on consent or parental unfitness. Seesupra text accompanying notes 176-87.
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vince a judge, what the children's interests are. Although the non-
consensual de facto parent model is purportedly based on the
child's interests, it does not advocate for a broad scope of interven-
tion. Instead, it is generally confined to custodial decisions between
the de facto and the legal parents.
The private adoption promotion, and the procreational rights,
models 3 4 permit intervention when a parent who contemplates re-
linquishing an existing or prospective child changes his or her mind.
These models, unlike the non-consensual de facto parent model, do
not intervene unless a parent has at least considered relinquishing
parental rights. Unlike the de facto parent model, however, these
adoption promotion and procreational rights models will allow in-
tervention (substitution of judgment about the child's interests)
based on the potential for caregiving, and in the case of adoption,
even against a legal parent who never consented to relinquish the
child. 35 In effect, these models allow displacement of legal parents
with potential parents who need not have established any sort of
psychological or biological parent relationship. The models, like the
de facto parent models, confine scope of intervention to custodial
disputes between parents and prospective parents, and in some in-
stances, complete termination of biological parental rights.
Both the fiduciary and the non-consensual de facto parent
models, unlike the others, explicitly purport to serve children's
interests. Yet even these two approaches retain a nuclear family-
based model for child rearing, albeit with additional public
involvement and financial supports, so that poor children do not
face such harsh material conditions as they do under the current
regime. Within this conventional framework, the children's interests
models presume to know best what is in children's interests. For
example, the non-consensual de facto parent model values
psychological parent, but not other, attachments. Accordingly, they
advocate sparing children the grief attendant to loss of a de facto
parent but not other meaningful relationships, such as friends,
333. The private adoption promotion model permits third parties to attain parental
status solely by filing an adoption petition. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92. A
discussion of the ASFA (public adoption) is not included in this analysis because, for the
most part, intervention results from child abuse and neglect. The adoption promotion
occurs after that initial intervention.
334. The procreational rights model defines parent by pre-birth (even pre-conception)
intent to parent. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53. This and the adoption promo-
tion model may encompass other reproductive technology perspectives for purposes of this
discussion.
335. For example, if one parent refuses to consent to the adoption or revokes a prior
consent, then the court could determine who among the parties before it should rear
the child.
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teachers, relatives, or nannies. This model, thus, does not advocate
intervention to prohibit parents from moving their children away
from neighborhoods where they have established relationships, or
that nannies be given parental rights and responsibilities, even
though a child may not know the difference between a paid
336
caretaker and a family member. Ironically, the children's interests
models accord little attention to the harms of termination of
parental rights and adoption, despite the deep, ongoing pain that
estrangement from family causes some children.
This selectivity about what is good for children suggests that these
models protect only the relationships that adults value. The psycho-
logical relationship most valued is that of psychological parent.
Although it may seem uncontroversial that the most important con-
sideration is for children to remain with their psychological parents
(thanks in large part to the hegemony of the psychological parent
338theory), venerable competing theories exist. The Article is not ar-
guing that one theory or the other is correct. On the contrary, the
Article recognizes that there is disagreement about what children
need. The parental rights doctrine assigns that determination to the
birth mother and to the birth father or the birth mother's chosen
affectional partner because they have earned the right to be arbiter
of their children's interests.339 That right includes choosing who
should care for the child.
Moreover, the fiduciary, non-consensual de facto parent, adoption
promotion, and procreational rights approaches abandon the ma-
ternal paradigm by discounting, and even ignoring, the unique
biological and relational work of child bearing and permit estab-
lishment of parenthood over the objections of, and without having
supported, the "mother." Under the non-consensual de facto parent
model, parents are those adults who act like parents. The standard,
however, does not identify when or how the psychological parents
become more like parents than the biological parents. The adoption
promotion and procreational rights models would displace biologi-
336. As Professor Kate Nace Day described her feelings as a child for her nanny: "I
could no more discern the difference between hands that held me as work, and hands that
held me as love." Kate Nace Day, Judicial Voice:Judge Julia Cooper Mack and Images of the Child,
40 How. L.J. 331,346 (1997).
337. See Appell, supra note 7, at 1014-16 (describing deep and persistent attachments
adoptees have to their birth families).
338. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 156, at 957-961 (describing family systems theory);
Davis, supra note 157, at 354-64 (describing family network model).
339. Professor Guggenheim makes a similar point in the context of curbing the discre-
tion of children's lawyers to make their own choices regarding what is good and bad for
children, thereby usurping substantive legal standards. See Guggenheim, supra note 138, at
1507-08.
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cal parents with adults who want to be parents but do not require
that these new parents have earned parenthood or that the parents
chose them. On the contrary, these two models merely contemplate
that the prospective parents want to be parents. All of these models
effectively grant parental status to persons who act like, or want to
be, parents. Yet the models skip the critical step of finding first that
the persons who have already earned that status-the parents-have
relinquished, or failed to maintain, that status by abusing or neglect-
ing their children.
This presumptive redefinition of parent invokes less determinate,
more subjective standards regarding current or future care-giving
and discounts the temporally and logically prior care-giving that es-
tablishes parenthood in the first instance under the matrifocal
parental rights doctrine. By doing so, the revisionists discount the
parenting work the initial parents have performed as a condition of
obtaining parental status in the first place. Instead, the models re-
quire parents to re-earn parenthood. In these ways, revisionist
standards simultaneously lower the bar to intervention and mini-
mize the biological aspect of parent-child relationships, while
reconstructing families along purely social lines. These standards
would also make children more public because, as a developmental
matter, children need caretakers and decisionmakers. If their par-
ents no longer have that authority, persons outside the family-
judges, lawyers, prospective parents-exercise that authority. Indeed,
the purpose of many of the critiques is to make children more acces-
sible outside their families of origin. Many parents, however, are
already subject to external scrutiny, and their children accessible to
others. These families are the subject of the discussion that follows.
B. Families Who Need More, Not Less, Privacy
Revisionist perspectives essentially view families as hidden, sepa-
rate, and physically and psychologically oppressive to women and
children, and largely immune from outside intervention or govern-
ance. From this vantage point, perhaps family walls should be more
transparent and permeable. Many families who are more visible, less
private and less autonomous, however, do not share this vision of
family life or the related assumption that public intervention is fair,
equalizing, and helpful. Just as family formations are not monolithic,
neither are the experiences of privacy. Family privacy and autonomy
range along a spectrum marked by lines of class, race, gender,
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religion, and sexuality. Most simply stated, along this public-private
spectrum, White, upper class and middle class, marriage-based fami-
lies are the most private and protected from state intervention, while
poor, non-marital families of color are most vulnerable to state sur-
veillance and interference. 340 In between, there are families headed
by single parents, lesbian and gay parents, parents of color, and poor
White parents who do not fit the dominant norm of marriage-based
intact family.34' Because these non-normative families fall outside of
the definition of family, they enjoy less privacy. They may not take
privacy for granted or view motherhood as mandatory or isolating.
Although some mothers might experience the maternal role as
oppressive and limiting, for others motherhood is not oppressive and
husbands or other domestic partners are not the primary
342
oppressors. Instead, motherhood is a seat of power and value
production "through which children are raised into a deep
appreciation and respect for maternal authority and commitment to
• . .343
familial interdependence" rather than independence. Moreover,
340. See EVA RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: IDEOLOGY & ISSUES
47-49 (1986); Appell, supra note 5, at 584-87; FINEMAN, supra note 110, at 177-78.Judith Brad-
ford and Crispin Sartwell capture the dimensions of nuclear family privacy: "The 'family space'
that accompanies the model of the nuclear family is both a social and physical space. Polite
neighbors avert their eyes from family matters, and house walls hide them.... Privilege pre-
serves the nuclear family from both visibility and questionability. No one asks: 'What the hell is
wrong with your mother?'" Bradford & Sartwell, Addiction and Knowledge: Epistemic Disease and
the Hegemonic Family, inFEMINISM AND FAMILIES 116, 123 (Hilde Lindemann Nelson ed., 1997).
341. See FINEMAN, supra note 110, at 177-78 (explaining that the state intervenes into sin-
gle mother families because these families have a void-they are lacking a father); Patricia Hill
Collins, Shifting the Center Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing About Motherhood, in REPRESENTA-
TIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 254, 56, 59 (noting that outside forces threaten the
integrity of non-dominant families); Fineman, supra note 103, at 958-59.
342. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 341, at 56-57 (arguing that critiques of motherhood
based on male domination are decontextualized vis-A-vis women in alternative family struc-
tures); Denise A. Segura, Working at Motherhood: Chicana and Mexican Immigrant Mothers and
Employment, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 136, 210, 213
(noting presumption that motherhood is oppressive and that women do not work outside the
home). Such views of families and motherhood may arise from privileged perspectives. Collins,
supra note 341, at 59-60. Indeed, a primary result of middle class women's foray out of the
home and into the workplace has not been a less gendered division of labor within the home,
but instead a shift in the responsibility for that labor to women of color. See Roberts, supra note
266, at 236 (noting that Black women have filled this role).
343. See Iglesias, supra note 136, at 903-05, 915-28, 989; see also BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST
THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 133 (1984) (claiming that although White women in the
early women's movement viewed motherhood as an obstacle to women's liberation, Black
women historically have viewed it as humanizing woman-affirming work); Collins, supra note
341, at 67 (women of color view mothering as work on behalf of the family as a whole, not on
behalf of a patriarch). Of course, any generalized discussion of experiences of motherhood
and the family (including the discussion in this Article) risks oversimplification and the sub-
mersion of individual and cultural differences among women. See Segura, supra note 342, at
212 (noting that research on Mexican and Chicana mothers revealed differences between
views of motherhood and employment, although "current research on Mexican-origin women
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especially for women of color, dominant culture presents a
substantial threat to reproductive freedom, to the ability to raise
children, and to preservation of children's culture. 44 For these
women, "the possibility of nurturing, motherhood, and family
maintenance" has been challenged, not imposed.145 Further, for
many working poor and working class women of any race, "work and
family have rarely functioned as dichotomous spheres.'341 Women
who must work out of economic necessity while their own children
are unattended or cared for by others might well appreciate being• . . 347
cabined at home with their children. These women may find
348freedom in mothering their own children.
... treats them as a single analytic category ... as well as research on contemporary views of
motherhood that fails to appreciate diversity among women").
344. See Collins, supra note 341, at 64-66; Glenn, supra note 254, at 17-19. Patricia Williams
captures the devaluation of African American mothers and their children when she contrasts the
common theme of welfare reform that "black women have no business having any more children"
with the encouragement of "poor white women who have children out of wedlock.., to give up
their children for adoption and redistribution in the great 'white baby shortage.'" PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE RoosTERs EGG 9 (1995); see also RicKuE SOLINGER, WAKE Up LiTrLr SUZIE: SINGLE
PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE Roe v. Wade 20-40 (1992) (describing the early 20th century poli-
cies and laws that prevented unwed African American mothers from relinquishing their children
for adoption while mandating White unwed mothers to do so). The history of birth control and
forced sterilization also reflects this denigration of Black women and children. See Roberts, supra
note 261, at 31-32 (explaining the racism of the early feminist birth control movement that aimed
at reducing the birth rate of African American children and detailing the disproportionate sterili-
zation of Black women). Indeed, framing reproductive choice in the context of safe, unrestricted
abortion, and not resources for healthy pregnancy and parenting illustrates too the privileging of
White, middle class women. Id. at 32-33.
345. Boris, supra note 267, at 30; see also Kathleen Neal Cleaver, Racism, Civil Rights, and Femi-
nism, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 35, 37-39 (Adriene Katherine Wing ed., 1997) (contrasting
White women's liberations movement fighting against their own oppression within dominant
culture while African American women fought for liberation from dominant culture).
346. Collins, supra note 341, at 58; see also Glenn, supra note 254, at 15-16 ("An ideology that
places mothering exclusively in the private, emotional realm creates conflicts for mothers who
have to work outside the home.").
347. Boris, supra note 267, at 29; Collins, supra note 341, at 56-64; Marlee Kline, Race,
Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 130-31 (1989); Roberts, supra
note 266, at 235. In June 1990, a majority of White mothers (54.9%) and nearly half of
Black (46.9%) and Latina (44.4%) mothers were working for wages. Segura, supra note 342,
at 228 n.3. Historically, African American women particularly have worked outside the
home. By the early twentieth century, up to seventy percent of African American women
were wage earners-nearly five times that of white women. Boris, supra, at 28. Most of these
women were working as domestics, often caring for the children of more privileged women.
Id. at 29; Collins, supra note 341, at 56-64; see also Kline, supra, at 130-31 (noting that West
Indian women emigrate to Canada specifically to work as domestics); Roberts, supra note
266, at 235 ("Women of color continue to do most of the domestic service in America.");
Mary Romero, Who Takes Care of the Maid's Children? Exploring the Costs of Domestic Service, in
FEMINISM AND FAMILIES, supra note 340, 151.
348. See Roberts, supra note 266, at 236 ("Black women historically experienced work
outside the home as an aspect of racial subordination and the family as a site of solace and
resistance against white oppression.").
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Many African-American women in particular share a history in
which the very reproduction of children was public and commodi-
fled. Female slaves gave birth to babies whom slave owners then sold
as labor power.4 9 Professor Dorothy Roberts has noted the continu-
ity of this challenge to African American maternity: "Black mothers'
bonds with their children have been marked by brutal disruption,
beginning with the slave auction where family members were sold to
different masters and continuing in the disproportionate state re-
moval of Black children to foster care." 350 This experience and image
of mothers who had no power to control the often-permanent sepa-
ration from their children after slave masters sold them35' starkly
contrasts with the image of women seeking freedom from the op-
pression of motherhood. The former image resonates today, as
African American women face tremendous threats to family integ-
rity, particularly through the child protection system in which
African American children are disproportionately represented.
In the divorce and custody context, families without fathers (or
mothers) too are public, even if they are White and middle class.
The best interests of the child standard, applicable in these pro-
ceedings, allows the state to assess family structure and functioning
without regard to parental fitness. Once parents divorce, the
parents may use courts to monitor parental behavior and direct
child rearing, including custody, visitation and education.354 For
example, courts have denied lesbian mothers and gay fathers cus-
tody of their children and even prohibited these parents from
having their lovers be present or affectionate during visitation.355
This oversight affects mothers more than fathers, because mothers
are usually primary caregivers and courts will generally enforce the
349. See Boris, supra note 267, at 34; Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical
and Contemporary Study of Black Single Mothers and their Families, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 239
(1987); Perry, supra note 289, at 52-53. Female slaves were not even relieved from their
other work while producing children. NANCY FOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS? 169 (1994)
("African-American women performed extraordinarily demanding physical labor, even
while pregnant or nursing."); see also Roberts, supra note 266, at 233-34 (noting that slave
women's strenuous labor challenged the dominant ideology associating mothers with frailty
and domesticity).
350. Roberts, supra note 258, at 146. Other women of color too are at greater risk than
white women of losing their children to the state or having diminished opportunities to
parent due to the economic necessity of working. Kline, supra note 347, at 132.
351. See Boris, supra note 267, at 34; Roberts, supra note 239, at 250-51.
352. Appell, supra note 5, at 578; Peggy C. Davis & Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Fam-
ily in Modern Slavery, 1987 HARV. BLAcKLETTER LJ. 9. For a recent account of, and
explanation for, the disproportionate number of African American children in the child
welfare system, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS (2002).
353. See Fineman, supra note 103, at 958; Shapiro, supra note 211, at 19, 31.
354. Baker, supra note 55, at 1526; Fineman, supra note 103, at 961.
355. Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 166, at 533-37.
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requests of fathers, regardless of their level of involvement or sup-
356port of the child s.
Poor families of all races are public because they use, or must
rely on, public resources and are more visible .3 5 The repercussions
of this publicness are a special vulnerability to surveillance and
external control, and, accordingly, a diminution of privacy and358
autonomy. The limitations on individual liberties of women
receiving needs-based social security benefits359  include the
inability to assert protection under the Fourth Amendment, a6 to
treat abortion as a medical procedure a6 1 and to plan their own
356. Baker, supra note 55, at 1569-74.
357. Appell, supra note 5, at 584; Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In
Search of the Least Detrimental Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1810 (1987); Roberts, supra note
258, at 148; see also Rayna Rapp, Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes Toward an
Understanding of Ideology, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY, supra note 136, 49, 58-59, 65 (noting
that sociologists have studied poor African American families more than poor white fami-
lies, and that upper class families are not even subjected to studies). This is not to say that
middle class families do not receive numerous and valuable government benefits through
tax, inheritance, and marriage laws that, among other things, exclude employer contribu-
tions to health and life insurance policies from taxable income. Fineman, supra note 287, at
2205; see also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE 68-92 (1992) (describing the
pervasive and nearly invisible benefits middle and upper class families receive). Neverthe-
less, public discourse views these families as "self sufficient" and "independent" while it
views non-dominant families as needy, inadequate and a threat to social mores and the pub-
lic fisc. Fineman, supra note 287, at 2213.
358. See RUBIN, supra note 340, at 147 ("The traditional privacy of the home, and the
freedom to govern family relationships in that protected environment free from govern-
ment intrusion, has not applied to welfare families."). Poor women of color are most likely
to be subjected to forced medical treatment regarding pregnancy. Nancy Ehrenreich, The
Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492 (1993); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry:
Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, in CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM supra note 345, 136, 139-40; see also Dorothy Roberts, Motherhood & Crime, 79
IOWA L. REV. 95, 124 (1993) (describing surveillance of pregnant women).
359. See Catherine R. Albitson & Laura Beth Nielson, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy
Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473, 478-80
(1995); Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle" The Interpretation of Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899 (1990); see also
Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817, 830-31
(1994) (noting the difference between widow and AFDC benefits); Leroy Pelton, Welfare
Discrimination and Child Welfare, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1479-80 (1999) (recognizing both
difference between Social Security's treatment of poor elderly and single mothers and its
payment to foster families and single mothers); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit
Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159,
1175-77 (1995) (noting frequently race-based exclusions of women from early AFDC pro-
gram).
360. See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (requiring women receiving
AFDC benefits to permit state social workers to conduct police-like searches of their homes
without a warrant).
361. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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families. 362 Families receiving welfare historically faced regulation
of who could live in the family home and with whom the mother•. 363
could create a domestic partnership. The Personal Responsibility
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWRA)364 continues to
govern personal decisions, including with whom a mother has sex
leading to birth of a child 36 and a mother's decision about whether
166
to work outside of the home. PRWRA also permits states to
condition benefits on certain parental conduct, such as attendance
361
of parenting classes. Moreover, receipt of PRWRA's Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) like its predecessor, AFDC,
requires parents to seek child support from non-custodial parents
who must then contribute child support in an amount dictated by
368
the state.
Poor families are also more likely than middle-class families to
experience the child protection system, a family law that is more
public than that normally associated with families-the laws of
domestic relations that govern inheritance, marriage, divorce, and
custody between parents. Although the domestic relations system
362. See Dorothy Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Wel-
fare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 941-42 (1995); see also Callahan & Roberts, supra note 14, at
1198 (noting that seventy-five percent of women placed on Norplant as a condition of pro-
bation for child abuse and neglect are minority women and one hundred percent are
poor).
363. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1225, 1225-29 (1999) (noting that welfare law restricted mothers from living with men and
from having children with men to whom they were not married); see also Roberts, The Only
Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, supra note 362, at 941-42 (discuss-
ing increased regulation of families receiving welfare).
364. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
365. Federle, supra note 363, at 1229.
366. See Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 229, 265-67
(1999) (noting distinction between support requirements for families on and off the wel-
fare rolls).
367. Id. at 246 (citing 42 U.S.C.S. § 608(b) (2) (A)(ii) (Lexis 1998)). Some states condi-
tion support on the children's grades, parental attendance at parent-teacher conferences
and participation in family counseling. See Brito, supra note 366, at 246-47.
368. See Fineman, supra note 103, at 964-65 (noting how the states force women on
public aid to submit to paternity and child support proceedings regardless of the mother's
desire to involve the father and discussing court intrusion into single mother's extra familial
relationships). This support enforcement requirement usually applies to mothers, but also
applies to custodial fathers and other custodial relatives. Parents who do not receive aid can
determine for themselves whether to seek support and how much. If they cannot agree,
about custody and support, however, then a court may decide.
369. Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children From The
Home For Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 447 (1997); Garrison, supra note 357. Ironically, the
public system, characterized by coercive state intervention into families, is shielded from
public view by confidentiality laws, while the more private system is open to public view.
Adoption proceedings, which may be consensual or coercive, are also confidential. Eliza-
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sanctions state intervention into parental decisionmaking and cus-
tody, it is a mechanism for private dispute settlement 7 ° which
typically presumes that the parents, not the state or third parties,
will maintain custody and control of the child.371 The child protec-
tion system, however, involves the state as a party, generally
prosecuting the action and obtaining custody of the child or su-
372pervision of the parent. Coercive judicial and administrative
intervention, the disruption of family relationships, and a mark-
edly reduced deference to parental custody and control distinguish
373the public system from the private family law system.
The child protection system is arguably a descendant of the
American (and English) poor laws and Post-Reconstruction-era
laws, both of which in different contexts required poor, and
Southern Black, children to be bound out for labor, apprentice-
ship, and "better" lives and training than they would have with
beth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth
Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 374-77 (2001).
370. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile Courts in Child
Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 205, 207 (1987). Indeed in family court, private
parties, usually one of the parents, initiate the action.
371. Garrison, supra note 158, at 395; Garrison, supra note 357, at 1769-70; see also Cza-
panskiy, supra note 135, at 968 (noting that noncustodial parents nearly always given
visitation).
372. See Edwards, supra note 370, at 206 (noting that the state takes an assertive role in
and is a party to the proceedings). Some characterize public benefits system (AFDC and
now TANF) as the public family law of the poor. RUBIN, supra note 340, at 147-48.
373. Although the private family law also may be intrusive and coercive, the distinctions
between these two systems of family law and litigation are stark and well-documented. See,
e.g., Edwards, supra note 370; Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423, 432-42; Gordon, supra note 320; Jean Koh Peters, Three Systems of Family Law: A
Preliminary Historical Investigation, inJEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS app. A (1997). Of course, these certainly are not the only family
law systems. Native American and enslaved African American families have, for example,
experienced extraordinarily detrimental race based de jure treatment. Laws sanctioned
widespread removal of Native American children from their families and reservations. See
Monsivais, supra note 127, at 2. See generally THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMI-
LIES (Stephen Unger ed., 1977). Currently, Native Americans may enjoy a distinct de jure
family law designed to remedy past Anglo-American violations and promote, and preserve,
Native American tribal norms. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Lexis
2001) (providing special procedure for custody and adoption proceedings involving Native
American children); Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the
Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577 (2000) (reporting distinctions between Anglo-American and
tribal family jurisprudence). Laws pertaining to slaves prohibited marriage and any rights to
rear or direct the rearing of their children, while literally allowing fathers to own their chil-
dren and brothers to own their siblings. E.g., DAVIS, supra, note 9; Adrienne D. Davis, The
Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999) (examining
antebellum and post bellum testamentary and interstate laws as applied to relationships
involving enslaved and formerly enslaved people); Peters, supra note 373; see also Peggy
Cooper Davis, Introducing Robert Smalls, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1702 (2001) (describing
Robert Smalls who when a slave had been the property of his brother).
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374their own parents. The newer system, like its predecessors,
largely targets poor and minority families375 and often confuses
poverty with neglect.3 76 It, thus, intervenes to protect children by
directing parental conduct and child rearing techniques, fre-
quently removing children from their families. 77 Indeed, of the
approximately 560,000 children in state-supervised substitute care,
forty-two percent (239,516) are identified as "Black Non-Hispanic,"
thirty-six percent (203,000) as "White Non-Hispanic," fifteen per-
cent (84,924) as "Hispanic," two percent (8,910) as non-Hispanic
Native American, and one percent (6,304) as Asian/Pacific Is-378 379
lander.378 Most of these children come from poor families.
The predominance of poor families, particularly poor African
American families, in this system is not surprising, given their visi-
374. See MASON, supra, note 16, at 189-91 (describing child saving movement and ex-
ploring the "two-tiered system in dealing with poor children and relatively rich children in
custody matters"); LEROY PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1989) (describing long history of
U.S. efforts to rescue poor children from their families); Jim Hacsi, From Indenture to Family
Foster Care: A Brief History of Child Placing, 74 CHILD WELFARE 162 (1995) (describing and
connecting the historic and contemporary treatment of poor or orphaned children from
private and public indenture, orphanages and family placement to modem pubic foster
care); Peters, supra note 373, at 242-43, 246-47 (briefly rehearsing both poor laws and post-
reconstruction laws).
375. Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 369, at 461-62; Cahn, supra note 52, at 1244; Gar-
rison, supra note 357, at 1810.
376. See Pelton, supra note 359, at 1486 (noting that a recent national study revealed
conflation of poverty and neglect); see also Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 369, at 461-62
(discussing the correlation of poverty and child maltreatment); Cahn, supra note 194, at
1199 (discussing the connections between poverty and neglect); Federle, supra, note 363, at
1235 ("The dependency and foster care systems have retained certain practices that make
poor children more likely to be the subject of a petition and less likely to escape foster
care."); Hacsi, supra, note 374, at 163 ("Parental poverty has always increased the risk of
children being removed from their families and placed elsewhere, whether in other homes
or institutions."); Kindred, supra note 87, at 534 ("[S]tate child services agencies and the
juvenile courts routinely rely on neglect statutes to remove children from the homes of
impoverished parents.").
377. For descriptons of the child welfare system, see Appell, supra note 5; Emily Buss,
Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431 (1996); Jill Chaifetz, Listening to
Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1999).
378. U.S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE AFCARS REPORT (Current Estimates as of
October 2000(4)), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb [hereinafter AFCARS
REPORT]. The race/ethnicity of the remaining four percent (25,346) of the children is un-
known. Id. U.S. Census Bureau counts membership in the general United States
population, using similar categories, as follows: Black Non-Hispanic 12.2 %, White Non-
Hispanic 71.3%, Hispanic, 11.9%, Native American 0.7%, Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.8%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATIONS ESTIMATES OF THE UNITED STATES BY SEX, RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: APRIL 1, 1990 TO JULY 1, 1999, WITH SHORT TERM PROJECTION TO
NOVEMBER 1, 2000, at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt
(last visitedJuly 27, 2001).
379. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 106TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 2000
GREEN BOOK 714-15 (Comm. Print 2000); Pelton, supra note 359, at 1487-89.
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bility and their dependence on public benefits, both of which
make families more likely to come to the attention of public au-
3180
thorities.. Social scientists debate whether the prevalence of poor
families in the child welfare system is primarily due to higher levels
of abuse and neglect in poor families or to state decisionmaking
bias . 3 181' Assessments of the existence of child abuse and neglect,
however, are largely subjective and the decision to intervene3 8 2 is
related to the decisionmaker's views about the viability of families
and the benefits of intervention. Although definitive proof of
384
race and class bias may have eluded empirical researchers, evi-
dence suggests that indicators of poverty may be confused withS 385
indicators of potential child abuse or neglect, and that risk-
assessors are unconsciously biased to see minori t and socio-
economically disadvantaged families as pathological.. Racial and
380. Appell, supra note 5, at 584; Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 369, at 461-462.
381. Brett Drake & Susan Zuravin, Bias In Child Maltreatment Reporting: Revisiting the
Myth Of Classlessness, 68 Am.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 295 (1998);Jill E. Korbin et al., Neighbor-
hood Views On The Definition and Etiology of Child Maltreatment, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1509 (2000).
382. Throughout this discussion, "intervene" is used to include decisions to contact the
child abuse and neglect hotline, to investigate allegations, to find those allegations to be
founded, to coercively provide services, and to remove children from their families.
383. Bilha Davidson Arad, Parental Features and Quality of Life in the Decision to Remove
Children at Risk from Home, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 47, 48 (2001); IraJ. Chasnoffet al.,
The Prevalence Of Illicit-Drug Or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies In Mandatory
Reporting In Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990); Anne P. Vulliamy &
Richard Sullivan, Reporting Child Abuse: Pediatricians' Experiences with the Child Protection
System, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1461 (2000). Studies also show that loyalty to or
familiarity with parents correlate to a reduced likelihood of reporting suspicions of child
abuse and neglect to authorities; Korbin et al., supra note 381; Gail Zellman, The Impact Of
Case Characteristics on Child Abuse Reporting Decisions, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 57 (1992).
This familiarity may also be a class marker if richer families are more likely to have social
relationships with their doctors, are more likely to spend more time with doctors at visits,
are more likely to have the same doctor each time they seek medical care, or are more likely
to be able to afford preventive rather than just emergency care.
384. See Drake & Zuravin, supra note 381 (rehearsing studies and arguing those show-
ing such biases are faulty).
385. SeeJudith Larsen et al., Medical Evidence in Cases Of Intrauterine Drug & Alcohol, 18
PEPP. L. REv. 279, 287-88 (1991) (noting the similarities between factors used in assessment
for prenatal drug use and factors associated with poverty, including lack of prenatal care).
Indeed, some legal definitions of abuse and neglect are skewed toward children in poverty.
See id. at 282-83 (discussing the broad use of child endangerment statutes).
386. See Zellman, supra note 383, at 69 (remarking that socioeconomic status and race
had an effect on reporting judgments). Particularly noteworthy in Zellman's study is that
when race and socioeconomic status were subtly stated, they had a greater effect on report-
ing, but when they were clearly stated, they had less effect. See id. at 69-70. These findings
suggest that unconscious biases affect intervention decisions. See Sandra T. Azar & Corina L.
Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and Termination of Parental Rights, 18 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1994) (describing the role of unconscious cultural values that influence
professional and judicial assessments of the adequacy of parenting); LoringJones, Decision
SU MER 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
economic bias in child welfare is particularly evident in the detec-
tion and diagnosis of drug use during pregnancy. Pregnant poor
and African American women are significantly more likely to be
identified as drug users, even though the rate of drug use is rela-
357
tively even across socioeconomic and racial groups.388
Regardless of the propriety of child protective intervention,
once the system has identified the families, they become even
more public than previously. State caseworkers supervise, survey,
and assess these families. They make recommendations to courts
for determining if, and when, the children should be removed
from, or returned, home, and if removed, whether a court should
terminate parental rights. 389 Unlike the domestic family law system
that presumes a basic unity of interests between parents and
child,90 the child welfare system separates parents from children,
providing greater financial benefits for children in substitute care
than in home care.3 9 1 In addition to being structurally anti-family,
Making in Child Welfare: A Critical Review Of The Literature, 10 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC.
WORKJ. 241, 258-59 (1993) (noting individual discretion in child protection decisions and
suggesting methods of recognizing and reducing bias); Edward J. Saunders et a]., Racial
Inequality and Child Neglect: Finding in a Metropolitan Area, 72 CHILD WELFARE 341, 351 (1993)
(describing biased assessments and methods for suggesting reducing child welfare confu-
sion of cultural difference with pathology); Sylvia Sims Gray & Lynn M. Nybell, Issues In
Affican-American Family Preservation, 69 CHILD WELFARE 513 (1990) (describing important
cultural differences between African American and white families and suggesting strategies
for the predominantly white child welfare establishment to better communicate with and
provide services to African American families).
387. See Chasnoff et al., supra note 383; Larsen et al., supra note 385, at 287-88; Ober-
man, supra note 268, at 510-11; Roberts, supra note 358; Dorothy Roberts, Unshackling Black
Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REv. 938 (1997). Inger Sagatun-Edwards & Coleen Saylor, Drug-
Exposed Infant Cases in Juvenile Court: Risk Factors and Court Outcomes, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NE-
GLECT 925, 927 (2000). These biases are further exacerbated because states are more likely
to remove drug exposed infants from their mothers than they are likely to remove children
for other abuse or neglect, and states are less likely to return drug exposed infants than
children harmed by other abuse and neglect. See Sagatun-Edwards & Saylor, supra, at 928,
932.
388. Even assuming the families in the child protective system are truly at risk, there is
much dispute as to whether that system is the appropriate method of intervention, particu-
larly if there is a causal relationship between child abuse and neglect and poverty. Pelton,
supra note 359; Elizabeth D. Hutchison, Mandatory Reporting Laws: Child Protective Case Find-
ing Gone Awry ?, 38 Soc. WORK 56 (1993).
389. Appell, supra note 5, at 582-83 (describing the child welfare system).
390. For example, children are not usually parties to divorce and custody proceedings
or provided with separate legal representation, although domestic relations statutes provide
for such appointments in certain situations. See Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need
for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 299, 307, n.35 (1998) (listing statutes providing for appointment and under what cir-
cumstances). Moreover, custody usually resides in whole or part with parents, even those
who have had little child giving role in the child's life. See Garrison, supra note 158, at 373-
374.
391. Payments to foster parents, group homes, and adoptive parents who adopt abused
and neglected children, are significantly higher than benefits under TANF or its predeces-
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the child welfare system is often administrated without respect for
family unity, strengths, or needs.392 The psychological parent theory
has "never been closely followed in contexts of deciding whether
to remove a child from her home for placement in foster or or-
phanage care. 39 3 This devaluation of families is reflected in
punitive, rather than helpful, practices and in a reluctance to re-
turn children to their families.394
Moreover, once the state coercively removes children from their
families, it all too frequently fails to provide meaningful and suffi-
cient services to support or reunify the families.396 On the contrary,
the unavailability of needed services and inappropriateness of
396
some provided services are well-established. For example, drug
use is cited as a risk factor in twenty to ninety percent of child pro-
sor AFDC. Garrison, supra note 357, at 1814; Leroy Pelton, Child Welfare Policy and Practice:
The Myth of Family Preservation, 67 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 548-49 (1997). In addition,
there are greater federal financial incentives for state agencies to provide foster care, rather
than family preservation services. ASFA limits the amount of time a state may provide family
preservation services, 42 U.S.C.S. § 629a(7) (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2001), provides technical
assistance for expediting adoptions, 42 U.S.C.S. § 673b(i) (Lexis 1998), and financial incen-
tives for adoption, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 673(a) & 673b (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2001). See also
Garrison, supra note 357, at 1813 ("[N]eglected children are popular, but welfare recipients
are not."). Indeed, estimated federal funding for foster care was approximately $3.6 billion
in 1997 and only $500 million for family preservation and support services that same year.
Pelton, supra note 359, at 1489 ("[C]hild removal is a way to serve 'innocent' children with-
out 'rewarding' their 'undeserving' parents").
392. Appell, supra note 5, at 600; Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Family
Support to Succeed, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 311, 312-313 (1996); Brooks, supra note
156, at 955-59; Garrison, supra note 158, at 374. Even family preservation services-those
services intended to keep children from coming in to foster care-are defined not to serve
the families who need the most assistance, "[c] hronically troubled families, families 'unmo-
tivated' to get help, families with addicted care-givers, and homeless families," and families
not amenable to short term treatments. Sandra M. Stehno, The Elusive Continuum of Child
Welfare Services: Implications For Minority Children and Youth, 69 CHILD WELFARE 551, 554
(1990). Instead, family preservation services are designed on a short-term crisis intervention
model that insures these services will help a small minority of the families in need. IRA M.
SCHWARTZ & GIDEON FISHMAN, KIDS RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT 43-46 (1999). Moreover,
this model was developed in White, non-urban areas so it is not surprising that it may not be
appropriate for the communities that populate child welfare in the largest numbers. See
Stehno, supra at 554.
393. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 348.
394. Appell, supra note 5, at 605-06; Beyer, supra note 392, 312-313; Brooks, supra note
156, at 958; Buss, supra note 377, at 438-43; Oberman, supra note 268, at 508-11.
395. Approximately one-third of children in foster care never return to their parents.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: HHS COULD BETTER FACILITATE THE
INTERJURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION PROCESS 9 (GAO HEHS-00-12, Nov. 1999).
396. SCHWARTZ & FISHMAN, supra note 392, at 49; Appell, supra note 5; Beyer, supra
note 392, at 313, 324; Saunders, et al., supra note 386, at 351; Clarice Dibble Walker et al.,
Parental Drug Abuse and African-American Children in Foster Care, in 1 CHILD WELFARE RE-
SEARCH REVIEW 109, 114-17 (Richard Barth et al. eds., 1994). Others argue that too many
services are provided to families in the child welfare system. E.g., BARTHOLET, supra note
188.
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tection cases, with the higher percentage in such highly populated
states as Illinois, New York, and California. 397 Yet those who need
substance abuse treatment may find it unavailable or encounter
long waiting lists.39 8 Moreover, substance abuse generally cannot be
"cured" or resolved quickly. 399 Although recovery is marked by re-
lapses, the state may require parents to be absolutely drug free at
all times before they can have any unsupervised contact with their
children.9 ° Similarly, inadequate food, shelter, and childcare are
frequently causes of child abuse or neglect. 1 Yet, child welfare ser-
vices are not set up or funded to correct these material
397. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TESTIMONY, PARENTAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN, THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, AND FOSTER CARE OUTCOMES 4
(statement of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues, HEHS) (T-HEHS-98-40 Oct.
1997) [hereinafter Ross TESTIMONY]; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER
CARE: AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES SECURING STABLE HOMES FOR CHILDREN OF SUBSTANCE
ABUSERS 2 (HEHS-98-182, September 1998) [hereinafter STABLE HOMES] (study finding
two-thirds of foster children in Illinois and California had at least one parent who abused
drugs or alcohol, and noting the total foster care population in Illinois and California con-
stitutes twenty-five percent of the nation's foster children). Drug use may be a barrier to
family reunification in sixty-five and seventy-four percent of dependency cases in California
and Illinois, respectively. Id. at 8-9.
398. Ross TESTIMONY, supra note 397, at 7; STABLE HOMES, supra note 397, at 20-21. In
addition, child welfare workers may not be familiar with substance abuse programs or
treatment. Lisa D'Aunno & Gay Chisum, Parental Substance Abuse and Permanency Decision
Making- Measuring Progress in Substance Abuse Recovery, 18 CHILD'S LEG. RTs. J. 52, 54 (1998);
STABLE HOMES, supra note 397, at 20. But see STABLE HOMES, supra note 397, at 28-32 (de-
scribing child welfare programs designed specifically to reunify substance abusing parents
and their children).
399. Ross TESTIMONY, supra note 397, at 7-8; D'Aunno & Chisum, supra note 398, at
53.
400. This is the author's experience in two different urban jurisdictions (Cook County,
Illinois and Clark County, Nevada). See also Appell, supra note 5, at 592 (describing a case in
which a mother was required to have six consecutive months of drug free urine, in order to
obtain even unsupervised visits with her daughters). Others have noted unrealistic judicial
expectations of recovery. See Richard C. Boldt, Evaluating Histories of Substance Abuse in Cases
Involving the Termination of Parental Rights, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 135, 142-44 (1999)
(describing judicial treatment of relapse as failure); Judith Larsen & Cindy S. Lederman,
Drug-Exposed Infants and the Miami Criteria For Judicial Decisions in Dependency Cases, 14 INT'L
J.L., POL'Y & FAM. 86, 97 (2000) (noting that parent child contact may be barred if the par-
ent is not completely abstinent and how punitive and unsound this approach is). Many
experts recognize that relapse is part of recovery and advocate looking at patterns and
length of drug use as well as involvement in treatment and recognition of triggers when
assessing whether the child can safely return home. D'Aunno & Chisum, supra note 398, at
53.
401. See Pelton, supra note 359, at 1485-86. In fact, a number of social scientists have
characterized the primary problems of the families in child welfare to be poverty related
and have suggested that the child welfare system, with its focus on individual family pathol-
ogy and substitute care, is an inappropriate response to what are at root economic
problems. Eric C. Albers et al., Children In Foster Care: Possible Factors Affecting Permanency
Planning, 10 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 329, 340 (1993); Leroy Pelton, Enabling
Public Child Welfare Agencies to Promote Family Preservation, 38 Soc. WORK 491 (1993); Stehno,
supra note 392, at 554.
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conditions. °2 Moreover, PRWRA limitations will make it more dif-
ficult for poor families to obtain federal and state funding for
poverty relief and childcare.40
Thus, once parents and children (and often siblings) are sepa-
rated through state intervention, their prognosis for timely
reunification, if any, is poor. Minority children in particular typi-
cally spend more time in state care than White children. 4 0 ASFA's
mandate that the state seek termination of parental rights after a
child has been in substitute care for fifteen months undermines
the integrity of these families, particularly in light of the well-
documented inability of the child welfare system to provide timely
services.0 6 Moreover, once the state terminates parental rights to
one child, protection of the parents' parental rights for their other
children diminishes because ASFA expressly permits states to
abandon family preservation or reunification attempts when the
parents have previously had their rights to a child terminated.
Once the state severs the children's ties to their parents, the chil-
dren lose their legal ties to the remainder of the family and have
no guarantee that they will become members of new families.4 8 On
the contrary, every year the state creates hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of legal orphans, children who have no legal or flesh and
blood parents. The number of these legal orphans will increase
with the application of ASFA's mandatory termination of parental
402. See Pelton, supra note 359, at 1485; Stehno, supra note 392, at 554; Walker et aL.,
supra note 396.
403. Pelton, supra note 359, at 1481-82.
404. William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Sib-
lings' Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745, 745 (1994) ("Approximately 35,000
brothers and sisters a year are separated into different foster or adoptive homes without a
formal or statutorily mandated due process hearing.").
405. Albers et al., supra note 401, at 330, 338-40.
406. In addition, recovery from substance abuse is a lifelong process and even achiev-
ing some consistent sobriety is unlikely within the ASFA time frames, particularly given the
under-supply of affordable substance abuse services. Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of Sub-
stance Abusefor Family Preservation Policy, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 72, 73, 76-80 (1999).
407. 42 U.S.C.S. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (iii) (Lexis 1998).
408. Termination of parental rights does not guarantee adoption, but simply makes a
child available for adoption. Recommended approaches advocate termination of parental
rights even when there is no prospective adoptive home in sight. DONALD N. DUQUErrE &
MARK HARDIN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND STATE LEGISLATION CONCERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN VI-30 (June 1999).
409. Martin Guggenheim, The Effects Of Recent Trends To Accelerate The Termination Of Pa-
rental Rights Of Children In Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis In Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121
(1995). As of September 1999, states reported that 46,000 children are legal orphans and
had been for an average of twenty-three months. AFCARS REPORT, supra note 378. On aver-
age, at any given time, 8,000 legal orphans have no current prospects for adoption. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: HHS COULD BETTER FACILITATE THE INTER-
JURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION PROCESS 2 (GAO HEHS-00-12, Nov. 1999).
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rights provisions.4 10 These public children will have no family pri-
vacy. Their parents will be the state.4 11
Even children who maintain legal ties to their families may
spend significant time in state care, while some never return home
during their childhoods. Like legal orphans, these other public
children, most of the half million children in foster care, rely on
the state to provide basic parenting functions: food, education,
clothing, medical care, shelter, and, hopefully, a sense of home
and family. Unfortunately, these public children do not always re-
ceive basic parenting from the state. Foster children may go
hungry, without health care, without permanent or even long term
homes, and they may also suffer physical and sexual abuse by their
state-supported care-givers.4 12 Moreover, the state must assume the
parental role of preparing children who will reach majority in fos-
ter care to live independently413 Yet these children who reach
majority in foster care are more likely than not to leave the foster
care system dependent and vulnerable, without the skills or sup-
414port systems to make homes for themselves. Thus, children
410. See Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 25, 33 (2001) (noting since
ASFA, termination of parental rights petitions have increased and plans to reunify children
with their families of origin have decreased).
411. Just as a privileged perspective may view husbands and fathers as oppressors of
wives, mothers, and children, the view that parents are the oppressors of children may arise
from a privileged perspective of those who have corporal parents. See, e.g., Woodhouse,
supra note 68, at 1827-29; see Annette R. Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Coopera-
tive Adoption: Can it Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 495-500 (1996)
(describing importance of birth parents to children in foster care). Similarly, equating chil-
dren with slaves seems to be at best hyperbolic and at worst demeaning to adults who
actually are or were slaves and therefore not permitted to engage in basic autonomous adult
actions such as marrying, choosing whether and how to bear and raise children, owning
property and voting. See Anar & Widawsky, supra, note 54; Woodhouse, supra note 54, at
326; see also Buss, supra note 377, at 439 (For children in state care, "the only thing worse
than being 'owned' by their parents is being owned by the public system.").
412. Chaifetz, supra note 377, at 2-8, 19-21 (reporting studies showing that foster chil-
dren are ten times more likely to be abused, and four times more likely to be sexually
abused, than children in the general population; twenty-two percent of children in state
care claimed they were not getting enough food; and twenty-six percent claimed they did
not have proper seasonal clothing). The GAO found that there were 77,000 children aged
sixteen to twenty in foster care in 1998, but only 42,680 received independent living ser-
vices. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT
LIVING SERVICES UNKNOWN 4, 16 (GAO/HEHS-00-13, November 1999) [hereinafter GAO
INDEPENDENT LIVING SERVICES].
413. 42 U.S.C.S. § 675(5)(C) (Lexis 1998). Every year, approximately 20,000 foster
children are discharged from care because they reach the age of majority, from 18 to 21
years old. GAO INDEPENDENT LIVING SERVICES, supra note 412, at 1.
414. Id. at 3-12 (rehearsing studies and the GAO's own findings that from twenty-five to
fifty-one percent of young "adults" leaving foster care had been homeless, incarcerated,
dependant on public assistance, without employment and without a highschool education);
Mary Lee Allen & Robin Nixon, The Foster Care Independence Act and John H. Chafee Foster Care
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removed from their neglectful and abusive homes do not necessar-
ily find a safe and nurturing harbor, let alone a new family.
In sum, family privacy is elusive for many mothers and children.
Some women must overcome significant financial and social barri-
ers to becoming and being mothers. Some do not meet dominant
norms of motherhood because they are poor, non-White, not mar-
ried, or otherwise fail to resemble mothers. Their experience of
public life is not particularly welcome or helpful. On the contrary,
it exposes families to further intervention and ultimate dissolution.
With these public families in mind, I assess the threat of revisionist
models and perspectives in the next subsection.
C. Harms of Diminishing Family Privacy
The preceding subsection helps complete the revisionists' por-
trayal of family privacy. This fuller picture holds two important
lessons for the revisionists. First, the state views women through its
own biases that frequently equate the failure to meet mothering
ideals with a reason to intervene. Second, the purpose of this in-
tervention is not to affect the parent's assessment of her and her
families needs and interests. Instead, intervention second guesses,
or directs, the mother's decisions about her own and her chil-
dren's lives. These are important lessons because revisionists seek
to make families more public by increasing opportunities and
grounds for state-sanctioned intervention that minimize the more
determinate maternal biological connections and maximize poten-
tially biased standards of maternal conduct.
The remainder of this section explores the disturbing conse-
quences that may flow from the substitution of less determinate
care-giving norms for more determinate biological norms. As the
preceding subsection reveals, decisionmakers are less likely to de-
fer to parents who do not satisfy decisionmakers' norms regarding
what it means to be a parent. Yet revisionist standards would give
decisionmakers even more discretion to intervene in and reform
families than under current doctrine, thus injecting the state into
Independence Program: New Catalysts for Reform for Young People Aging Out of Foster Care, J. Pov-
ERTY L. & POL'Y 197, 198-202 (2000) (citing studies showing dependency and
homelessness and reciting testimony of children discharged from foster care as "adults").
Within a month of release of GAO INDEPENDENT LIVING SERVICES, Congress enacted the
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, designed to provide additional supports to state
independent living programs and foster teens. Pub. L. No. 106-169 (Dec. 14, 1999) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.S. § 677 (Lexis Supp. 2001)).
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the arguably impermissible role of choosing between different
conceptions of the good life. This intervention will have greater
impact on parents, particularly mothers, who are already more
vulnerable to intervention because they do not look like parents.
This result is particularly problematic because the revisionists
would remove liberalism's protection of family privacy while leav-
ing intact other aspects of liberalism that reinforce bias and
material disparities, which in turn make parents more vulnerable
to state intervention.
Under revisionist standards, whoever acts like, or wants to be, a
parent is the parent. Divorced from biology, these standards make
the parent-child relationship even more contingent, subjective,
and indeterminate. Defining parent this way is particularly chal-
lenging when there are multiple candidates who have, or seek to
have, relationships with the child. The lack of cultural and scien-
tific consensus as to optimal caregiving, children's best interests,
and the relative importance of relationships, exacerbates the diffi-
culty in resolving these disputes.4 5 Standards that seem neutral,
natural, or scientific, may in fact simply be value judgments, fre-
quently arising out of, or constituting, dominant norms of family
and motherhood (for example, "married," "White," "heterosex-
ual," "middle class") 16 Commentators and decisionmakers who
415. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 49, at 78-82 (describing indeterminacy of best in-
terests of the child standard and competing views about what is most important to and for
children). See generally Azar & Benjet, supra note 386 (discussing cultural diversity regarding
assessing parenting ability and the strength of families); Davis, supra note 157, at 354-364
(rehearsing different social science theories about children's developmental needs and
different family forms).
416. Appell, supra note 5, at 585; Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers," Good Lawyers, "and "Legal
Ethics", 81 GEo. L.J. 2533, 2547-51 (1993); Ikemoto, supra, note 358, at 136; Adrien Kathe-
rine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mothering: The Need for
Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 257, 268 (1999). Identifying dominant
norms is difficult, due to social changes and a real diversity of views regarding family. Molly
Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umanski, Introduction, in BAD MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN
20TH CENTURY AMERICA 1 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umanski eds.,1998); Wing & Wesel-
mann, supra, at 258. But see Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Singe Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 19 (1995) (describing stigma of single parent families in popular, legal and social sci-
ence literature). There is little question, though, that judgments about mothers are
products of group stereotypes, idealized views of maternal conduct, and legal norms prefer-
ring and supporting heterosexual, marital families. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child
Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 75, 99 (1993); Azar & Benjet, supra
note 386. These norms judge women most harshly based on their membership in a disfa-
vored group and by viewing maternal conduct outside of its context and without regard to
actual care of the child. Ashe, supra, at 2549; Ladd-Taylor & Umanski, supra, at 3; Wing &
Weselmann, supra, at 258; see also Fineman, supra note 103, at 960 (noting the "problemati-
zation" of single motherhood); Roberts, supra note 261, at 13-15 (describing devaluation of
Black motherhood); Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 539, 541-46 (1983-84) (explaining that ignorance of cultural difference leads
to devaluation of maternal practices). These norms also include being free from violence,
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embody these norms may not appreciate this insight. Yet families
who do not embody these norms are less likely to survive scru-
tiny. 417 The parental rights doctrine's definition of parent, though
value-laden and socially constructed, is more objective (determin-
able) and more private (less government) than revisionist
definitions. It is easier to determine who gave birth to a child
than who is the truest or best caregiver.
Moreover, both biological mothers and fathers suffer under the
new standards because they dismiss the work that parents,
particularly mothers, have undertaken to become parents. The
new standards effectively require parents to "earn" parenthood
again. The parental rights doctrine protects this earned status by
requiring proof of unfitness or consent before persons outside the
family can gain parental status. The revisionists would permit such
usurpation on the grounds that third parties are entitled to be
parents, without regard to the fitness or the consent of the
biological parents.
This devaluation of gestation and birth harms mothers, particu-
larly because it neutralizes motherhood as a biological connection
and devalues mothers compared to non-parents and fathers.
Discounting the maternal contributions to childbearing frees par-
ent-child relationships from sex (in any sense of the term) because
the person (woman) who bears the child is no longer different from
any other "parent." This new virtual motherhood minimizes
women's role in the production of children and marginalizes the
maternal focus of parenting definitions. Instead, this definition
equates actual or prospective post-birth caregivers with mothers,
thereby decreasing the maternal power in relation to the father or
any other current or prospective caregivers. Mothering is no longer
different from fathering and a parent is someone who acts like, or
wishes to be, a parent.
These revisionist standards also bind women to constricting so-
419
cial scripts. Ideological visions of motherhood require that
mental illness, and addiction. See Appell, supra note 5 (describing experiences of such
mothers in the child welfare system).
417. See Azar & Benjet, supra note 386, at 250, 252 (noting that mental health profes-
sionals have a bias toward promoting "optimal" families and "observe families through
[their own] cultural filters that operate outside their awareness and often will persist in
their established views in spite of contradictory evidence.") (citations omitted).
418. "The relative" is used to underscore that the construction of biology and mothers
is social not natural, and to note the problem of splitting the baby when the role of "bio-
logical mother" is divided between gestational and genetic contributors.
419. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At The Intersection of the Ideology of
Motherhood, The Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1205, 1258-59 (1992) (ideology of motherhood is abstracted from gestation, birth,
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women appear to be completely devoted to their children and in-
hibit viewing the mother multi-dimensionally and as an individual
separate from her child. Although women who fall outside of these
420dominant norms are more likely to lose their maternal rights,
even mothers who meet the norms may lose their status if they de-
viate from the ideal of motherhood defined solely by selfless
nurturing.' When the measure is a mother's conduct and behav-
ior, rather than bearing and begetting, she loses the presumption
that her choices are best for her child, while the state gains the
power to evaluate whether her choices are good or selfless enough
for the child.4" To justify or re-earn their status, mothers will have
to live up to certain idealized standards, perhaps subverting their
own values and assessments of their children's interests.
Moreover, viewing these revisionist perspectives in the context of
public families reveals a largely structural anomaly. Proposed revi-
sions to parental rights doctrine challenge certain fundamental
liberal principles while leaving other aspects of liberalism in
423place. In other words, these largely unchallenged aspects pro-
mote or tolerate the very conditions that make families vulnerable
to intervention. The causes and persistence of class, race, and gen-
der inequalities are much more complex and fundamental than
the tenets of liberal theory. It is clear, however, that liberalism has
not been very effective in overcoming these problems. On the con-
trary, American liberal notions of individualism promote
individual responsibility, capitalism, and self interest while resisting
community responsibility, economic justice and altruism."'Judicial
and breast feeding as selfless child giving, in its most extreme form reducing mothers and
women to vessels); Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statu-
tory Rape Law, 85J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 64-67 (1994) (noting the tenaciousness of
compulsory maternal altruism that also tends to view women as wholly able to care for their
children or wholly unable); see also Chodorow & Contratto, supra note 263, at 63-67 (dis-
cussing constricting psychological constructs of motherhood).
420. Appell, supra note 5, at 584-87; Ashe, supra note 416, at 2547-48; Kline, supra note
347, at 120-21.
421. Cf TheodoreJ. Stein & Tina L. Rzepnicki, Decision Making in Child Welfare: Current
Issues and Future Directions, in CHILD WELFARE, CURRENT DILEMMAS-FUTURE DIRECTIONS
259, 275 (Brenda G. McGowan & William Meezan eds., 1983) ("[T]here is a strong prob-
ability that if ideal standards were applied to the community at large, a majority of families
would be found wanting....").
422. Chodorow & Contratto, supra note 262, at 203; Davis, supra note 157, at 365-66.
423. This is true of all of the models and most of the perspectives above. Some suggest
wealth distribution or value modification, but mostly in the context of private, nuclear fam-
ily, or parent-child dyadic relationships.
424. West, supra note 14, at 1912; see also Callahan & Roberts, supra note 14 (describing
how liberalism fails to recognize or support the moral equality of all people); Lani Guinier,
No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1477-80 (1991) (ar-
guing that majority rule as currently constructed promotes a winner take all mentality that
does not benefit from shared power and is not responsive to minority interests).
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remediation of poverty, sexism, and racism has stalled. Govern-
ment assistance programs for the poor have practically insured
that they will remain poor.426 Racial and other minorities are less
likely to have their values represented through elected officials.4
27
These inequities in jurisprudential, legislative, and political power
do not suggest that greater governmental intervention into fami-
lies will reflect the pluralism of the population or that the state will
understand, let alone respect, diverse conceptions of the good
life.42 8 Revisionists simply give the state more power to reinforce
and replicate dominant or majoritarian 429 values and biases (what-
ever their content may be) at the expense of families who resist or
apparently depart from these values.
425. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 186 (2000); Bowers v. Hardwick, 418 U.S.
186 (1986); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For an analysis of the movement to
forge a constitutional right to the material conditions for equal citizenship, see William E.
Forbarth, The Constitution and The Obligations of Government to Secure The Material Preconditions
For A Good Society: Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1821 (2001); see also Mary Becker, Towards A Progressive Politics and a Progressive
Constitution, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2007, 2050-51 (2001).
426. AFDC and other federal and state cash programs for the undeserving poor have
been effectively structured to maintain income disparities and dependency. See Handler,
supra note 359 (cataloging the close relationship between limiting welfare benefits and the
effect of labor markets); Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need
a Bed and a Car, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 1221, 1227 (noting that welfare benefits are at bare sub-
sistence levels); Roberts, supra note 362, at 946-47 (describing how the market benefits
from depressed wages and joblessness, and how the United States has failed to take steps to
ameliorate these and other structural impediments to wealth gain, including lack of child
care). Federal unemployment benefits and mandates have remained extremely low and
under localized control insuring that such benefits do not drive wages up or place workers
in better bargaining positions vis-di-vis employers. See Handler, supra note 359, at 915-22.
427. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy And Inequality: Towards A Substantive Feminism, 1999 U.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM 21, 75-76 (noting that the major political parties do not speak to inter-
ests of poor Americans who are in the minority). See generally Becker, supra note 425, at 2018
(showing lack of representation of women and minorities in Congress); Guinier, supra note
424 (examining the failure of one person per vote to achieve meaningful representation for
racial minorities, even when their members are elected).
428. On the contrary, the continued relative ideological and demographic homogene-
ity of the state (in the form of judges, legislators, and administrators) militates against
pluralistic decisionmaking. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualiz-
ing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralistic Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 160-205 (1999) (describing
unexamined dominant epistemologies and differences between majority and minority
world-views).
429. "Majority" is not used in its literal numeric sense to suggest that legislation or
other decisions made by elected officials necessarily embody the will of the majority of citi-
zens. See Robert W. Bennett, Conversational and The Sense of Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 845,
848 (2001) (noting that much of the United States government is not majoritarian); Lazos
Vargas, supra note 428, at 152 n.1 (defining majority in social, rather than numeric, terms).
Instead, "majority" is used to signify official decisionmaking based on popular or dominant
norms.
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Families with less property and less political or normative domi-
nance will lose their autonomy, and perhaps dissolve altogether,
under a scheme that dismantles family privacy while preserving or
promoting property and power disparities. Thus, the revisionists'
selective approach discounts the importance of private value pro-
duction in a way that will disproportionately affect the most
vulnerable and diverse members of the polity. One need not delve
very deeply to see how diminution of parental rights is detrimental
to, or will adversely affect, poor families and particularly poor
families of color. For example, Professor Raymond O'Brien de-
votes a law review article to the right of poor children (who are
disproportionately of color) to be saved from their families of ori-
gin. Professor Bartholet also connects poverty, race and
inadequate families while arguing for easier termination of paren-
tal rights and normalization of adoption by, apparently, wealthier,
411
more mainstream families.
This presumptive devaluation of economically disadvantaged
families and families of color contradicts liberal theories support-
ing family privacy. These theories view individuals as moral actors
who define and create value and circumscribe governmental au-
thority to restrict individual freedom and define values in ways that
limit this freedom, except, of course, to prevent harm, protect432
others, or promote public welfare. The responsibility for rearing
children rests with individuals, usually the parents, whose right and
role is to create and reproduce value in and through intimate as-
433
sociations and to rear children in diverse settings that prepare
them for life as democratic citizens. Parental rights doctrine's
presumption that parental decisions are in their child's best inter-
ests protects diverse values that drive or inform the parent-child
430. Raymond O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Par-
ents, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1209, 1211-13, 1234-35, 1251-52 (1994). Professor O'Brien's explicit
equation of termination of parental rights and "The Final Solution" is chillingly evocative of
the totalitarian implications of greater state involvement in dissolution of families. Id. at
1246.
431. BARTHOLET, supra, note 188, at 96-102; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It
All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional"
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 569, 584 (putting her support of de facto families "in context" at
the dependency, juvenile and family courts).
432. See supra Part I; see also Callahan & Roberts, supra note 14, at 1209 (reciting per-
missible reasons for state intervention with individual liberties); Galston, supra note 115, at
240-41, 246 (arguing that value pluralism is a central component of liberalism and limits
government's ability to establish a hierarchy of good, although permits protective interven-
tion); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideas After All, 104 HARV.
L. REv. 1350, 1352 (1991) (arguing that the liberal state promotes values of "autonomy,
equality, human dignity, and tolerance").
433. See supra text accompanying notes 116-22.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15.
[VOL. 34:4
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood
relationship. Coercive state intervention to redefine families ac-
cording to state norms subverts the parent's own ideas about the
good life for them and their children.
This subversion contradicts both liberal rationales for family
privacy-privacy as protective of individual autonomy and as in-
strumental to democratic citizenship. Imposition of state norms
interferes with individual self-definition and reproduction. In the
context of the continuum of family privacy, this imposition will
primarily affect value production in poor and other non-dominant
families because they are most vulnerable to surveillance and
intervention. However, as noted above, the state is not sufficiently
representative of economic, cultural, racial, and sexual minority
groups and does not respect those values of minority groups that
do not mirror dominant norms. Thus, increased intervention also
undermines the role of these families in creating independent citi-
zens because intervention would minimize or eliminate these
families as sites of production of values that diverge from that
status quo.
This elimination of non-dominant families is self-perpetuating,
as it undermines the socialization of children who, as adults, may
challenge state norms. These non-dominant families may try to
conform but face great challenges to joining the ranks of the
dominant because liberalism has failed to empower, or to provide
adequately for or improve the social and material conditions of,
436large numbers of men, women, and children. In any event, even
as norms change over time, they continue to reflect those who are
dominant and deflect those who are not. An example of the con-
tingency of specific norms and persistence of bias in the child
435. "State norms" refer to the fact that courts resolve disputes about custody or par-
enthood and that courts or legislators define grounds for family reformation. These
decision-makers are most likely to base their rules on cultural or self-referential values,
thereby interfering with private value production. See Azar & Benjet, supra note 386, at 250-
52, 263-65 (describing cultural, including race and class, bias in judicial, mental health, and
child welfare decisions). Even the psychological parent theory is both culturally biased and
has expanded to areas beyond its scientific validity. Davis, supra note 157, at 353-62.
436. Becker, supra note 425, at 2009; see also Callahan & Roberts, supra note 14, at 1200-
07 (noting contemporary liberal theory inadequately serves liberal values of individual
liberty and moral equality); West, supra note 14, at 1903-05 (rehearsing arguments that
liberalism is hostile to or even antithetical to universal rights to material well-being). But see,
e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Property And Its Relation To Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 741 (1986); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1999); Michelman, supra note 15; West, supra note 14 (each arguing that economic justice
or guarantees of material welfare are consistent with constitutional theory). Cf Dorothy
Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1564 (1996) (book
review) (noting racism against African Americans, not liberal philosophy, caused inade-
quacy of the needs-based welfare system).
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welfare context is the categorization of the Irish and Polish people
as separate and inferior "races" in late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century New York City.4 37 As other persons of other "races,"
particularly African Americans, have filled the places in this system
that European immigrants once occupied, the patterns of inter-
vention remain the same. Poor families and families who deviate
from the dominant ideology must fight to protect their own integ-
rity.
By supporting parental rights doctrine and by using liberal phi-
losophy to do so, the Article does not mean to imply that
liberalism or the structure of our government is the best, or even a
good, way to achieve equality, justice, or the good life. Instead, this
Article cautions abandonment of the limited protections liberalism
provides family integrity, until we have a system that is premised
less upon biased race, class and gender distinctions and expecta-
tions.3 8 Increasing the state's role in defining and assessing
families within this system will merely reinforce these inequities.
There is no reason to suppose that the state will value non-
dominant families any more under the proposed standards. On
the contrary, these non-dominant families already experience state
intervention pursuant to more (though not very) determinate
rules for intervention. More contingent standards would further
compromise the ability of such families to maintain their integrity
and to keep their children out of substitute care. State rearing of
children limits parents' ability to create and inculcate values.
Moreover, this limitation could have a homogenizing effect on cul-
tural and moral diversity, because it excludes families that do not
meet dominant cultural and moral norms.
Thus, in the absence of a more radical challenge to the prevail-
ing political, economic, and ideological structure in the United
States, we should be cautious about dismantling autonomy-based
protections for individual liberties, particularly family privacy, that
help promote moral and political equality and counteract the si-
437. LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 11-13 (1999). Wealthy,
protestant child savers of this era sent children of these and other immigrant "races" to
Midwestern and Western states as orphans to be placed with better families. See id. at 3-19.
Cf Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 166, at 523 (remarking how during the twentieth cen-
tury lesbian and gay families went from invisibility and incomprehensibility to prominence
and legal recognition).
438. SeeJ.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE LJ. 2313, 2324-26 (1997) (dis-
cussing the relationship between social and legal status); Finkelman, supra note 105
(illustrating how protection of slavery informed constitutional structure and provisions);
Guinier, supra note 424, at 1478-79 (illustrating persistent and systemic racism and exclu-
sion of minorities in U.S. electoral government); Charles R. Lawrence III, The 1D, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (describ-
ing and explaining unconscious racism against African Americans).
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lencing effects of economic and ideological inequality.43 9 Revision-
ist standards upset the structure of this liberal democracy because
they do not have "roots in the language or design of the Constitu-
tion."440 The language and design of the Constitution, arguably,
include the protection of private value production. Although bi-
ases and wealth inequities prevent full realization of this ideal for
all, revisionist standards exacerbate these inequalities and under-
mine this fundamental liberal value of moral equality. These
revisionist standards are, therefore, suspect because taking families
out of the realm of privacy reduces autonomy and gives the state
power to decide how to, and who will, rear children. In theory, that
power would permit the majority of the electorate to define fami-
• 441
lies, excluding non-majoritarian ideas of family, and would be4412
contrary to notions of individual autonomy. Such selective revi-
sions to liberal theory would be unbalanced and unjust.
CONCLUSION:
THE VIRTUE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The parental rights doctrine is a progressive tool that protects
individual moral liberty and simultaneously retains sufficient flexi-
bility to accommodate non-marital, non-nuclear family forms. It
provides relatively objective, deferential, and determinate stan-
dards that leave to individual self-determination family creation
and, to some extent, definition. Parental rights doctrine guards
439. See Dorothy Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks'Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1761, 1763-64 (arguing that African American support of the Constitution and
rights theory is instrumental).
440. Bowers v. Hardwick, 418 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
441. See Balkin, supra note 438, at 2367-70 (describing how it is that democracies may
preserve unjust distinctions among groups). Of course, since less than half of the electorate
votes in this country, Becker, supra note 427, at 74, a powerful minority would define fami-
lies.
442. Again, "individual autonomy" is referred to in the specific context of United States
constitutional law and theory without examining whether autonomy is "natural," possible or
intelligible. See Ashe, supra note 416, at 2540-41 (rehearsing postmodern critiques of
autonomy); West, supra note 258, at 5-12, 61-70 (critiquing masculine ideas of autonomy as
separation). There is a certain irony in questioning the coherence of the concept of auton-
omy from the perspective of those who experience severe governmental or financial
limitations to their own actual freedom. See Callahan & Roberts, supra note 14, at 1218 (lib-
eral theory protects choices of the economically privileged and offers no support to the
economically disadvantaged); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals fiom
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987) (explaining that from the per-
spective of persons who have had no rights and for whom rights have great meaning,
rejecting rights theory is cavalier).
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against governmental or majoritarian decisions about who are ac-
ceptable parents. It also tolerates, and even promotes, diversity
because parental rights afford parents considerable latitude in de-
ciding how to raise their children. This too protects self
determination and limits majoritarian usurpation and homogeni-
zation of value production. Parental rights protections may not be
as important or meaningful to those parents whose values domi-
nant culture shares. However, such protections are undoubtedly
most welcome to, and needed by, those families who depart from
these values or the dominant norms these values are likely to re-
flect.
Parental rights doctrine offers principled and fair solutions to
many conflicts about children. Detailed exploration of precisely
how parental rights doctrine accommodates changing family struc-
tures is beyond the scope of this Article. The Article will make
explicit, however, what has been implicit in its exposition of the
doctrine and illustrate the doctrine's enduring utility. Stripped to
its core components, the parental rights doctrine, with its mixture
of biological and social connections, is remarkably flexible and
responsive to diverse family formations that both honor and sup-
port the role and place of the family in our constitutional system.
The doctrine defines parenthood as a status that the mother must,
and does, earn when she bears and gives birth to the child. The
"father" correspondingly earns his or her parenthood through
connection to the mother or genetic and nurturing relationship to
the child. Thus, parental rights doctrine does not automatically
grant non-nurturing fathers parental status. At the same time, it
recognizes that a domestic, sufficiently nurturing or supportive
horizontal relationship with the "mother," so far (but not necessar-
ily) evidenced by marriage, may establish parenthood. The
parental rights doctrine-as a logical matter-also does not dictate
the number of "parents" a child may have.
Decisionmakers and commentators can, and should, resolve in-
tervention questions within the logical contours of the parental
rights doctrine, which permits diminution or dissolution of paren-
443tal rights based on parental consent or unfitness. Neglect and, to
a lesser extent, abuse, are problematic standards that are extraor-
dinarily contingent on cultural norms of decisionmakers. Many,
including the author, have criticized these standards as class-based
443. See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. Cmi. L. REv. 325, 329-30 (1994) (recog-
nizing both standards and noting that the consent or unfitness requirement reflects a social
choice about the primacy of birth parent versus adoptive parent rights).
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and racially discriminatory.444 In principle, however, the standards
permit the state to determine, and take ameliorative action, when
parents fail to provide minimal parental care that harms or seri-
ously endangers their children.4 45 Lower standards than these
essentially replace parental values with state-created or state-
sanctioned values. Reasonable people may disagree about where a
child should attend school or with whom she should live, but pa-
rental rights doctrine defers to the parent's assessment of whether
the child's loss in one area of her life is worth the gain in another,
unless the parent is abusing or neglecting the child.
Parental rights doctrine also tolerates reformation or expansion
of the family when parents consent. Adoption and consensual de
facto parent doctrine are excellent examples of consent-based in-
tervention. Both permit parents to change the family's contours
and hold parents to those decisions. In the consensual adoption
context, parents can place their children into new families or con-
sent to adoption by a co- or step-parent. The consensual de facto
parent doctrine recognizes that there may be multiple parental
figures. When parents invite another adult into the family to act
like a parent, the parent has enlarged the family-created another
parent. De facto parent doctrine permits persons whom the par-
ents have in fact allowed to parent the child to assert an interest in
having an ongoing relationship with the child, even when the legal
parents subsequently change their minds and seek to exclude the
de facto parents.
Our current parent-child relationship standards are important
and empowering, even though they may appear crude to their crit-
ics. These standards are grounded in fundamental values that
support constitutional theory and protect children and families
who do not meet dominant norms. This protection is important to
individual families and may help preserve a diverse, independent
and dynamic polity. Moreover, parental rights doctrine is at root
matrifocal, using the maternal acts of gestation and birth as the
444. See supra text accompanying notes 374-87; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
763 (1982) (noting the subjectivity of unfitness standards that make them "vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias"); Guggenheim, supra note 157, at 1735
("[E]xperts estimate that 40% to 70% of children currently in foster care have not been
abused and need not be separated from their families if society sufficiently assisted poor
families in raising their children at home.").
445. See Pelton, supra note 391, at 550 (suggesting limiting child abuse and neglect
definitions to "severe harm or endangerment resulting from clearly deliberate acts or gross
abdication ... of parental responsibility").
SUMMER 2001]
790 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:4
paradigm, or anchor, for parenthood. These standards, albeit im-
perfect, remain superior to the less deferential approaches that
critics would substitute.
